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Abstract 
I present a new methodological approach to measuring news bias, aiming to settle 
the disagreement on how to define and measure bias in media and communication studies 
in this thesis. Unlike earlier research on TV news or newspapers, I choose international 
news agencies’ coverage of the Ukraine crisis in this study as a case to highlight the 
strength of the new approach. Utilizing newly-developed geographical news 
classification and sentiment analysis techniques, I analyse news coverage of the Ukraine 
crisis by Russia’s official news agency, ITAR-TASS, along with the independent news 
agency, Interfax, over two years to estimate partisan news bias resulting from state-
ownership. In this longitudinal content analysis, I focus on the change in sentiment of 
ITAR-TASS’s news coverage of Ukraine relative to Interfax’s coverage during periods 
following six key events in the crisis. 
The analysis shows that the sentiment of ITAR-TASS’s news on Ukraine’s 
democracy and sovereignty changed significantly after key events, reflecting the 
desirability of these events to the Russian government. ITAR-TASS’s news coverage 
became the most negative when the new Ukraine government launched military 
operations against pro-Russian separatists in east Ukraine, claiming that the revolution 
was instigated by Ukrainian fascists, who threatened the safety of ethnic Russians. This 
result indicates that the Russian government utilized the news agency for international 
propaganda to justify its actions. Further, an additional content analysis including western 
news agencies revealed that Reuters’s news coverage of the Ukraine crisis during this 
period was strongly correlated with ITAR-TASS, being influenced by the Russian 
government’s false statements on Ukraine. Reuters news stories were circulated 
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internationally, and published in the most popular news sites in the United States without 
context.  
I argue that the publication of the Russian government’s false narratives by 
American online news sites through Reuters indicates the vulnerability of today’s 
international news gathering and distribution system, and the rapidly changing 
relationship between states and corporations in the global news industry. This suggests 
that western news agencies’ use of temporary correspondents in covering rapidly 
developing international crises increases the risk of spreading false information globally. 
In this case, western news agencies are, in effect, supporting international propaganda by 
non-western states. 
Keywords 
Foreign news; International news agency; Text analysis; Media globalisation 
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Introduction 
 
Objectivity in news reporting is one of the most extensively discussed topics in 
journalism, and many studies on bias in news have been conducted (Barkho, 2013; 
Donsbach & Klett, 1993; Maras, 2012), but news bias has been defined and measured in 
different ways depending on the structure of the media system studied (Hopmann, Aelst, 
& Legnante, 2012, p. 241). Aiming to settle this disagreement, I propose a new 
methodological approach to measuring news bias that is flexible enough to be applied 
even to the most polarized media systems. I choose Russia’s state-controlled news 
agency, ITAR-TASS, as a case, and estimate partisan bias in its news coverage of the 
Ukraine crisis in this study. 
The Ukraine crisis started in November 2013 as anti-government protests erupted 
in Kiev, triggered by the Ukraine government’s sudden announcement to strengthen 
economic ties with Russia instead of with the European Union. Pro-EU rallies in the 
capital grew rapidly and the protesters eventually ousted President Viktor Yanukovych in 
February after violent confrontations with the police. Russia responded to the collapse of 
the pro-Russian government by annexing Crimea in March despite strong condemnation 
from the new Ukraine government, as well as from the United States and the European 
Union. The crisis ended in mid-2014, but Crimea remains under Russia control and pro-
Russian militants in east Ukraine remain active. 
The Ukraine crisis was not only an important geo-political event but also an 
interesting case for political communication research, because many news stories on the 
crisis were produced and circulated internationally, not only by the American or West 
European news media but also by the Russian media. The competition in covering the 
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crisis between the two sides has been described as an “information war” by media 
observers (Galeotti, 2015; Hutchings & Szostek, 2015). While the western media mostly 
reported the crisis as a democratic revolution against the corrupt regime in Kiev while 
focusing on Russia’s intervention on Ukrainian territory, the Russian media reported the 
crisis as a Ukrainian nationalist takeover that threatened the safety of ethnic Russians. 
Earlier results of content analyses of news stories on Ukraine (Boyd-Barrett, 2015; 
Freedman, 2014; McIntosh, 2015), which showed the Russian state-controlled media’s 
coverage of the pro-European Ukraine regime was very negative, claiming it was 
connected to ‘fascists’ or ‘nationalists’, also support the view that the Ukraine crisis was 
a propaganda war. As a result of propaganda from the Russian state-controlled media, 
confused western audiences perceived the Ukraine crisis as a conflict between Ukrainian 
nationalists and ethnic Russian minorities, a story tailored by the Russian government in 
order to have an excuse to annex eastern Ukrainian regions. Pomerantsev (2014) has even 
stated that Russia was “in control of defining ‘reality’”, not only domestically, but also 
internationally. 
In media and communications literature, the propaganda model refers to the 
collusion of states and corporations in spreading information via mass media to promote 
their own interests (Herman & Chomsky, 1988/1995), this being a different meaning from 
“propaganda” as a political message concerning enemy countries in wars (Jowett & 
O’Donnell, 2011). However, when the model is applied to the global news industry, it 
bears a meaning that is very close to the traditional sense of propaganda, or mediated 
public diplomacy, which aims to nurture a favourable attitude towards a home nation 
among foreign publics using communication media (Nye, 2008). In recent years, the 
Russian government has implemented strategic international communication by investing 
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heavily in its state-owned international media outlets (Lankina & Niemczyk, 2015). The 
establishment of Russia Today (RT) in 2005 was one such example, and the restructuring 
of its public diplomacy arsenal in 2013, which resulted in the closure of RIA-Novosti, 
was a move designed to enhance the effectiveness of Russia’s foreign propaganda. When 
Russia dispatched its special forces to Crimea and East Ukraine, the Russian government 
needed to justify its actions to the foreign public, thus it mobilized all its state-controlled 
international media. Such a combination of hard power (military) and soft power 
(communication media) is called “hybrid warfare” (Galeotti, 2015). 
Use of the mass media to promote western states’ political and economic interests 
has been highlighted by critics since the NWICO debates (Masmoudi, 1979), this line of 
argument culminating in the theory of media imperialism (Herman & McChesney, 1997; 
H. I. Schiller, 1991). Paterson (2011) argues that western news agencies such as Reuters 
and AP prioritize the interests of major western media and states in their news services. 
In light of this influential theory, the competition between western and Russian media 
during the Ukraine crisis would appear to be just another example of political-economic 
divisions in the media, but the result of my longitudinal analysis of news coverage by the 
western and Russian news agencies suggests that it is not. The difference in news 
coverage between ITAR-TASS and Reuters was not as sharp as media imperialism theory 
predicts. When the crisis rapidly expanded beyond Kiev following Russia’s annexation 
of Crimea, Reuters produced news stories that were surprisingly similar to ITAR-TASS’s 
newswires, being dependent on the Russian government’s press releases and effectively 
supporting Russia’s international propaganda. This unexpected result suggests that 
western media companies and non-western governments can jointly perform global 
propaganda when corporate interests are no longer linked to national interests. 
  8 
This thesis is highly critical of the Russian government and its news agency, but 
it by no means suggests that the American or West European news agencies are more 
trustworthy than their Russian counterpart. I believe that western media are also biased 
but in a different way, and this is exactly why I did not compare ITAR-TASS with 
Reuters, AP, or AFP as a benchmark to measure bias in the Russian news agency. If I 
compare a Russian news agency with a western news agency, the estimated bias will 
contain all kinds of differences in news coverage caused by the cultural values and 
economic and political ideologies of their home nations. Therefore, I chose Interfax, a 
Russian commercial news agency, as a benchmark to exclude differences caused by the 
news organisations’ home nations. 
The goal of this thesis is to establish a new methodological approach to measuring 
news bias through an analysis of ITAR-TASS’s coverage of the crisis. ITAR-TASS is the 
successor of the Soviet TASS agency and the official news agency of the Russian 
Federation. Although news bias is broadly defined in literature as a lack of “objectivity” 
in news reporting (Maras, 2012), I focus on partisan bias that is defined as a lack of 
impartiality. This definition of bias overlaps with classic propaganda, defined as “the 
deliberate, systematic attempt to shape perceptions, manipulate cognitions, and direct 
behaviour to achieve a response that furthers the desired intent of the propagandist” 
(Jowett & O’Donnell, 2011, p. 7). 
Studies in political communication often feature TV news or newspapers, but 
international news agencies are very important in the news industry as suppliers of foreign 
news to those “retail” news media whose networks are becoming even more important 
now that national news organizations are retreating from foreign news gathering (Riffe & 
Budianto, 2001). Therefore, if the news stories supplied by news agencies are biased, the 
  9 
content of many news outlets could be affected, misleading a mass audience. Further, 
news audiences have access to news stories produced by news agencies through retail 
news outlets, but news audiences are more directly exposed to news stories produced by 
news agencies in recent years because news agencies serve not only traditional news 
media but also online news portals (Bielsa & Bassnett, 2008; Paterson, 2005). 
It is still not common to study autocratic regimes’ news agencies in international 
communication research, but ITAR-TASS’s coverage of the Ukraine crisis offered a 
unique opportunity: my new approach could be tested against the expectation that ITAR-
TASS’s news content would reflect the wishes of the Russian government, considering 
the Russia latest strategy of enhancing its “soft power” and strong economic and political 
interests in Ukraine (Lankina & Niemczyk, 2015; Simão, 2016). Furthermore, the 
partisan nature of Russia’s media, where the mass media is often affiliated with political 
groups and utilized to promote the political interests of the owners (Dobek-Ostrowska & 
Smaele, 2010; Vartanova, 2011), also supports the expectation.  
I compare ITAR-TASS’s English-language news on Ukraine with Interfax’s to 
measure bias caused by the influence of the Russian government, focusing on key events 
that were clearly desirable or undesirable to the regime. My use of the independent 
Russian news agency as a benchmark unit was to exclude any effect from the nature of 
events and the country’s national ties to Ukraine. In my analysis, all the news stories on 
Ukraine’s democracy or sovereignty published by these news agencies over two years 
were analysed in terms of positive-negative sentiment, and relative changes in ITAR-
TASS’s coverage of Ukraine are considered as news bias caused by state-ownership, 
when they correlate with the desirability of preceding events to the Russian government. 
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This longitudinal content analysis was accomplished with the new computational content 
analysis techniques that I developed for this study. 
The analysis shows that ITAR-TASS’s coverage of Ukraine’s democracy or 
sovereignty reflected the desirability of the key events to the Russian government, 
suggesting it is strongly influenced by the Russian government. ITAR-TASS’s news 
coverage of Ukraine became extremely negative when the Ukraine military launched anti-
separatist operations in east Ukraine, claiming the new government’s ties with fascists 
and ultra-nationalists. These narratives, however, affected Reuters news stories on 
Ukraine during that period, and could have reached western news audiences through the 
most popular online news sites in the United States. 
Structure of the thesis 
This thesis comprises four separate research papers. The first two papers answer 
substantive questions in political communication and international communication, while 
the last two address methodological problems in the computational analysis of news. 
Although the methodology sections and appendices in the first two papers explain how 
the content analysis was performed, details of the methodology on geographical news 
classification and sentiment analysis are fully explained only in the last two papers. The 
two substantive papers and one methodological paper have already appeared in media 
and communications journals, The European Journals of Communication, The Journal of 
International Communication, and Digital Journalism. The forth paper is under review 
at Communication Methods and Measures. 
In the first paper, entitled “Measuring news bias: Russia’s official news agency 
ITAR-TASS’s coverage of the Ukraine crisis” (Watanabe, 2017a), I discuss the 
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theoretical background of my approach to news bias, reviewing political communication 
literature, and apply the new methodology to measure bias in ITAR-TASS’s coverage of 
the Ukraine crisis. The analysis shows that ITAR-TASS’s news coverage of Ukraine 
systematically responded to occurrences of events undesirable to the Russian 
government. This indicates that the state-owned news agency’s coverage of Ukraine was 
biased by influence from the Russian government. The bias in ITAR-TASS’s news stories 
was caused by a very weak distinction between facts and opinions in its news content. 
The news agency’s stories not only quoted Russian officials’ statements, but also western 
sources, intending to add credibility and newsworthiness to its content for foreign 
audiences. 
In the second paper, “The spread of the Kremlin’s narratives by a western news 
agency during the Ukraine crisis” (Watanabe, 2017c), I also analyse news coverage of 
the Ukraine crisis by the western news agencies, Reuters, Associated Press, and Agence 
France-Presse. The result shows that the Reuters stories published during the period 
following Russia’s annexation of Crimea strongly correlated with the ITAR-TASS stories 
conveying the Russian government’s narratives regarding the safety of ethnic Russians 
as being threatened by Ukrainian nationalists. This indicates that Reuters was either 
heavily dependent on Russian government press releases or ITAR-TASS’s newswire 
during this period. These stories were circulated internationally and appeared in the most 
popular online news sites in the United States without any contextualization. Although 
this does not mean Reuters was complicit in Russia’s propaganda, it highlights the 
vulnerability of today’s international news gathering and distribution. 
The third paper, “Newsmap: A semi-supervised approach to geographical news 
classification” (Watanabe, 2017b), introduces the new semi-supervised geographical 
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news classification technique used in the first two papers to identify news stories mainly 
about Ukraine. I argue that, although simple keyword matching has been often used to 
identify geographical foci of news stories, it often fails to determine the most important 
country in news stories due to the limited sizes of the geographical lexicon. Newsmap 
solves this problem by automatically extracting names of people, organisations and places 
associated with countries from a corpus of news stories. In an evaluation of its 
classification accuracy with 5,000 manually classified news stories, I demonstrate that 
this new technique outperforms simple keyword matching classification and geographical 
information extraction systems. 
In the fourth paper, “Big Media Analysis: Application of Vector Space Models to 
Document Scaling”, I explain how the domain specific sentiment analysis was performed 
in the first two papers. While supervised document scaling models demand very large 
training sets to accurately analyse diverse news content, I propose the use of unsupervised 
vector space models on a large corpus of news stories to calculate semantic similarity 
between unseen words and predefined words for document scaling. In the sentiment 
analysis, manually chosen general positive-negative words were given to the model as 
semi-supervision, and words associated with sovereignly and democracy were scored 
based on their proximities to the ‘seed’ words. This technique, named latent semantic 
scaling (LSS), is also developed into a very efficient fully supervised model in this paper 
for more complex document scaling tasks. 
Contribution of this study 
The study presented here focuses on the international crisis, but the new approach 
to measuring news bias contributes broadly to the field of political communication. In 
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earlier studies, news coverage disproportionate to fixed benchmarks has often been seen 
as unbalanced, or biased. Typical of such benchmarks was the 50-50 coverage rule 
specified in the US Federal Communication Commission’s policy, which demanded 
national TV broadcasters treat the two main political parties equally (Sambrook, 2012). 
Although this policy was abolished in 1987, the use of fixed benchmarking survived and 
even prompted recent studies outside of the United States that measure bias based on 
election results (c.f. Brandenburg, 2005; Hopmann et al., 2012). However, the use of fixed 
benchmarks in measuring news bias is unsuitable when the news market is highly 
competitive and fragmented, because all the news media that produce content appealing 
to politically segmented audiences would appear biased. 
The new approach presented here is more suitable for today’s diverse news 
market, because it accepts differences between news organizations, excluding the effect 
of institutional variables in estimating news bias. Although the international news system, 
which is comprised of very different news organizations, is more complex than any 
national news system, I have demonstrated that measuring news bias is still possible in 
this context. The key to accurate estimation of news bias lies in the choice of benchmark 
medium, which determine the type of bias to be measured. Although good benchmark 
media may not exist in some cases, the new approach still works with a composite 
benchmark made up of several comparable media. For example, in a project on media 
coverage of street protests in Russia, Lankina, Watanabe, and Netesova (2016) compared 
state-controlled TV and newspapers with a benchmark comprised of two independent 
news agencies. As news markets become increasingly diverse, it becomes more difficult 
to find non-media benchmarks of news bias, but it also becomes easier to find media 
benchmarks. 
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Newsmap is useful not only in studies of international news but also of domestic 
news because it can accurately identify news stories about foreign events erroneously 
retrieved from news databases with simple keyword searches. In fact, Lankina et al. 
(2016) used this geographical technique to separate out stories on Russian street protests 
from stories on the Middle East. More broadly, Newsmap introduces semi-supervised 
machine learning techniques to media and communications studies. Applying such 
techniques to other types of classification tasks would greatly improve the accuracy and 
efficiency of computational text analysis of media content. One prospective application 
is the topical classification of social media posts, which is difficult for supervised machine 
learning techniques to achieve without a very large training set due to the high lexical 
diversity of such posts. 
Finally, while the LSS technique is only used for sentiment analysis of news 
stories in this study, it nevertheless offers a general technique to turn very efficient vector 
space models (e.g. LSA, NMF, LDA or Word2vec) into semi-supervised or fully-
supervised models for document scaling. Lankina et al. (2016) also used this technique 
in their project on Russia’s street protests to capture subtle changes in state-controlled 
media’s framing. In their project, the supervised LSS technique successfully constructed 
a model that replicated manual coding on the dimension of protests as freedom of 
expression vs. social disorder from only 15 manually coded documents. The efficiency 
of supervised LSS technique will make computational content analysis less expensive and 
more accessible to researchers in media and communications. 
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Earlier studies of international communication 
There are two fields in international communication research that are relevant to 
this study: the representation of foreign countries in news and international flows of news. 
In my first paper, I focus on the representation of Ukraine in news published by ITAR-
TASS, whereas the second paper concerns flow of news about the crisis from Russia to 
the United States through western news agencies. In earlier studies on representation of 
foreign countries, researchers revealed that news coverage was globally concentrated on 
North America and Western Europe (Galtung & Ruge, 1965; Lazano et al., 2000; Meyer, 
1989; Paik, 1999; Sreberny-Mohammadi, 1984), and that western news media 
extensively covered Africa and South America only in the events of violent conflicts or 
natural disasters (El Zein & Cooper, 1992; Golan, 2003; Larson, 1984; Paik, 1999; 
Weaver, Porter, & Evans, 1984; Wilke, Heimprecht, & Cohen, 2012). In studies on 
international flows of news, researchers criticized western news agencies, namely 
Reuters, AP, AFP, and UPI, because they gathered and distributed many of the foreign 
news stories on Africa and Latin America for both western and non-western news media 
(Galtung & Ruge, 1965; Lazano et al., 2000; Matta, 1979; Meyer, 1989; Paterson, 2001; 
Schramm, 1978; Stuart, 2001).  
Nonetheless, there are few mentions of earlier studies of international news in this 
thesis, not only because of lack of space, but also because of the theoretical and 
methodological confusion in the field originating from post-colonial countries’ claims in 
international organizations in the mid-1970s (Hur, 1984; Stevenson & Cole, 1984a). 
Many media and communications scholars treated little news coverage of Asia, Africa 
and Latin America in the western media as an indication of unidirectional news 
transaction between the developed and developing countries, being influence by the 
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discussion for a New World Information and Communication Order in the UNESCO. 
Furthermore, earlier researchers, who were also influenced by debates in journalism, 
considered the coverage concentrated on developed countries and the negative 
representation of developing countries in the western media biased, because coverage 
deviated from the 50-50 benchmark in both cases. 
The theory of media imperialism (Herman & McChesney, 1997; H. I. Schiller, 
1991), which criticizes western media companies’ global domination and the spread of 
western ideology, is also an important theoretical concept in this research, but it is only 
briefly mentioned in the conclusion of the second paper solely due to lack of space. 
Therefore, I discuss the theory in this introduction in relation to the NWICO debate, and 
return to it in the concluding chapter. 
The NWICO debate 
 In the 1960s, leaders of newly independent countries in Asia, Africa and Latin 
America formed a group of nations called the Non-Aligned Movement, aiming to 
promote their economic and political interests in international fora. They gained 
bargaining power as exporters of natural resources in the oil crisis, and led the General 
Assembly of the United Nations to declare the establishment of a New International 
Economic Order (NIEO) in 1974 to correct the global imbalance of economic power. 
These countries also pursued greater autonomy in communication by proposing a New 
World Information Order, which was approved in 1976 as the New World Information 
and Communication Order (NWICO) (Nordenstreng, 2012). Two years later, the 
MacBride Commission was created by UNESCO to investigate problems in international 
communication. The result of the investigation was published in the report Many Voices 
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One World in 1980 and widely discussed in the general conferences (Carlsson, 2003; 
Masmoudi, 2012). According to Masmoudi (1979), who was one of the members of the 
commission, there were seven main problems in international communication: (1) 
unidirectional flow of information from developed countries to developing countries, (2) 
inequality in information resources, (3) developed countries’ desire for global dominance, 
(4) underrepresentation and misrepresentation of developing countries, (5) survival of 
colonial relations, (6) undermining of the economic, social and cultural spheres of 
developing countries, and (7) dissemination of biased media content about developing 
countries. 
The NWICO debate concerned international communication, but it had inherited 
its frame of discussion from the preceding discussion on international trade (Frau-Meigs, 
Nicey, Palmer, Pohle, & Tupper, 2012; Masmoudi, 1979). There was a clear 
correspondence between the goals of the NIEO and the NWICO: the aims of the NIEO 
were to ensure the rights of every nation to control foreign investment and the operation 
of transnational companies, expand world trade to increase exports from developing 
countries, and enhance cooperation between developed and developing countries for 
global economic growth (White, 1975); while in the NWICO, the goals were to introduce 
international regulation on the flow of information, increase information flows from 
developing to developed countries, and promote developing countries’ participation in 
international exchanges of information. The MacBride report’s (UNESCO, 1980) 
philosophical language also amalgamated economic and cultural issues: the word 
‘imbalance’ was repeatedly used in referring to problems in the international transaction 
and content of international news. The report claimed that ‘imbalance’ existed in news 
flow (a) between developed and developing countries, (b) between the capitalist and the 
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communist blocs, (c) between developing countries, and (d) within the capitalist and 
communist blocs per the size of the countries, and (e) in coverage of political and non-
political (social, economic, and cultural) news, ‘good’ and ‘bad’ news, and current events 
and their backgrounds. 
The vague concept of ‘imbalance’ had a profound impact on the way research on 
international news would be conducted. After an exhaustive review of international news 
studies published between 1970 and 1982, Hur (1984) pointed out the confusion 
regarding the most crucial theoretical and methodological problems in the field. 
According to him, an international news flow analysis is a “flow or transaction analysis 
which deals primarily with the volume and direction of news flow between and among 
countries” and an international news coverage analysis is “content analysis which deals 
with not only the amount, but also the nature and type of international news disseminated 
across national boundaries” (Hur, 1984, p. 367). 
‘Biased’ international news  
Following the NWICO debate, coverage concentrated on developed countries and 
the negative representation of developing countries were considered ‘bias’ in foreign 
news reporting. Gerbner and Marvanyi (1977) showed in a multinational study that 
countries in North America and Western Europe tend to receive the highest news 
coverage. Mayer (1989) reproduced their finding in an analysis of daily newspapers in 
Africa and Latin America: the United States received the most attention with 7% and 20% 
of the coverage in the respective regions. Paik (1999) found that Africa occupied only 3% 
of news coverage in a content analysis of 33,159 international news articles in the Wall 
Street Journal. Lazano et al. (2000) conducted a content analysis of newspapers in Latin 
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America in 1997 and reported that Europe and North America were the most covered 
regions after Latin American countries.  
News coverage concentrated on developed countries has been found not only in 
newspapers but in TV news. Weaver et al. (1984) found that in network evening news in 
the US Africa and Latin America received the least coverage, while the Middle East and 
West Europe received the most. Larson (1984)also reported that the most frequently 
covered countries by US network news between 1972-1981 were the United States and 
the Soviet Union. Golan (2003) found that only 1% of news stories solely covered African 
countries in American TV news in 1999. In a study of British TV news programmes in 
1999, the same coverage concentrated on developed countries was found  (DFID, 2000). 
In a more recent study of TV news in 17 countries, Wilke et al. (2012) found that Europe 
(40%) received the highest coverage, followed by North America (23%), Asia (19%), the 
Middle East (18%), South America (9%) and Australia/Oceania (3%), and Africa (3%). 
Nonetheless, Wu (2000) explains that the concentration of news coverage on developed 
countries is due primarily to logistical and economic factors. He statistically analysed 
data from an earlier multi-national study, and found that geographical distances and trade 
relations were among the most important predictors of foreign news coverage.  
The negative representation of developing countries in news was identified even 
in the seminal work on international news. Galtung and Ruge (1965) found that negativity 
of events was one of the most important factors that determined news coverage in 
Norwegian newspapers, and expressed concerns regarding the negative representation of 
developing countries, because it facilitates “an image of these countries as dangerous, 
ruled by capricious elites, as unchanging in their basic characteristics, as existing for the 
benefit of the topdog nations, and in terms of their links to those nations” (Galtung & 
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Ruge, 1965, p. 84). An analysis of international news coverage in The New York Times 
in the 1970s and  1980s revealed that, respectively, more than 50% and 85% of coverage 
of African counties were related to crises (El Zein & Cooper, 1992). Larson (1984)found 
that the proportion of the crisis theme in US TV news was the highest in news on 
developing countries and stated “Africa tends to be ignored by the US television networks 
except in the case of a war or crisis of major proportions” (Larson, 1984, p. 70). A similar 
tendency has been found repeatedly in American and British TV news (DFID, 2000; 
Golan, 2008; Miller, 2007; Paterson, 1992). Riffe and Budianto (2001) reported an 
increasing volume of negative news on developing countries in US network news 
between 1970 and 2000. 
Media imperialism 
The western news media usually enjoy a high degree of independence from the 
state thanks to their commercial nature, but this does not mean that their news coverage 
is unbiased. According to Herman and Chomsky’s (1988/1995) propaganda model, even 
commercial news media can be manipulated by a government through public releases, 
called an ‘information subsidy’, which help to reduce the news media’s operational costs 
of news gathering. Researchers of news routines also support their argument, pointing out 
that the news media’s choice of news sources is determined by their productivity and 
authoritativeness, which eventually concentrates reporters around official sources (Fico, 
1984; Gans, 1979; Tuchman, 1978). Herman and Chomsky’s propaganda model was 
further developed into a theory of media imperialism in the context of economic and 
cultural globalization (Herman & McChesney, 1997; H. I. Schiller, 1991). The theory 
states that western media companies not only promote corporate interests in domestic 
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markets, but also participate in propaganda against foreign countries through their 
exported media products by justifying the global dominance of western states and 
corporations, supporting the main argument for the NWICO by leaders of developing 
countries.  
While the theory of media imperialism draws a divisive picture of the world, 
emphasizing the reflection of geo-political interests in media content, theories of media 
globalization describe the world differently. Appadurai (1990, p. 296) states that “the new 
global cultural economy has to be understood as a complex, overlapping, disjunctive 
order, which cannot any longer be understood in terms of existing centre-periphery 
models”. He underscores his claim with the concept of “mediascape”, stressing the 
production and consumption of media content which disregards national borders. Such a 
globalist view of media systems is also supported by journalism scholars who describe 
the international expansion of western journalism practices (Golding, 1979; Matta, 1979). 
Despite the western origin of objective journalism (D. Schiller, 1979; Schudson, 2001; 
Shaw, 1967), and the cross-national differences in professional ideology found by 
international surveys (Patterson & Donsbach, 1996), a number of scholars argue that it is 
possible that western journalism has spread to the non-western world as a result of the 
commercialization of the news industry (Hallin & Mancini, 2004; McManus, 1994). In 
fact, after his fieldwork in Interfax, Boyd-Barrett (2014) reported a high degree of 
independence from the government and western-standard professionalism of its 
journalists. 
International flows of news 
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‘Biased’ coverage of developing countries has often been attributed to 
unidirectional flows of news from developed to developing countries. Nordenstreng and 
Varis (1974) also claimed that the ‘free flow of information’ is a one-way flow from 
developed countries to developing countries after studying international TV programme 
trade. Masmoudi (1979)  identified a lack of effective legislation regarding international 
information flows and criticized the overemphasis on senders’ rights and neglect of 
recipients’ rights in the concept of freedom of information. According to Stevenson and 
Cole (1984a), there were five problems involved in the unidirectional flow of news: (1) 
western perspectives distort or exclude authentic non-western values from the news, (2) 
news stories from countries in which western countries do not have immediate interests 
are excluded, (3) only a little news from developing countries goes into the global news 
network, (4) distorted or negative news of developing countries is sent back to them, (5) 
news from the western news agencies do not contribute to the modernization of 
underdeveloped societies or the establishment of nation states. 
  In discussion on international flows of news, the dominant roles of western news 
agencies have attracted special attention. Galtung & Ruge (1965) reported that 95% of 
news items in Norwegian newspapers about crises in Congo, Cuba and Cyprus in the 
1960s were delivered by AP, UPI, Reuters, and AFP. In a study by Matta (1979) in 1965, 
nearly 60% of news published in Latin American newspapers was attributed to western 
news agencies. Schramm (1978) analysed 14 Asian newspapers’ coverage of non-Asian 
developing countries in 1977 and found that three-quarters of news stories were supplied 
by western news agencies. Meyer (1989) found in African and Latin American 
newspapers that around 60% of news stories were from western news agencies in the mid-
1980s. Lazano et al. (2000) reported that European and American news agencies were the 
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most important news sources for Latin American newspapers in 1997, despite the 
diversification of their sources in the 1960s and 1970s. Stuart (2001) studied Bahamian 
newspapers in 1997 and 1998, and found 42% and 30% of news stories were provided by 
the American (AP) or French (AFP) news agency. 
However, a large-scale study revealed more complicated patterns in international 
news flows. Kim and Barnett (1996), in a network analysis of international newspaper 
and periodical trade, revealed that the United Kingdom, West Germany, France, and the 
United States were the most central exporters, while all other African, Asia and Latin 
American countries, except for Japan, Hong Kong, Singapore, India, South Korea and 
Mexico, were peripheral in the network. They also found eight geographical-linguistic 
clusters in the network, where European and North American countries were the most 
central and highly interdependent.  
Influence of international news 
 It is widely agreed that our understanding of the world is heavily reliant on 
indirect experience through the news media  (Page & Shapiro, 1992; Van Ginneken, 
1998). Early studies suggested a greater impact of biased news coverage on audiences in 
foreign affairs than in domestic affairs. The influence of foreign news is not limited to 
citizens, but also to policymakers and journalists. Policymakers monitor the mass media 
to assess the importance of foreign events to domestic politics and to react accordingly 
(Van Belle, 2008; Van Belle, Rioux, & Potter, 2004). Journalists also depend on foreign 
news stories delivered by international news agencies, as well as elite newspapers and 
satellite news broadcasters, in writing news stories for domestic audiences (Bielsa & 
Bassnett, 2008; Laville & Palmer, 2012). 
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Citizens 
Page and Shapiro (1992) found public opinion in the United States to be much 
less stable on foreign rather than domestic issues in their historical analysis, claiming that 
instability in public opinion on foreign issues is due to the influence of the mass media. 
They noted that “many events, however—especially distant happenings in foreign 
affairs—do not directly and immediately affect ordinary citizens and, therefore, do not 
speak for themselves. These cannot have much impact on public unless they are reported 
in the mass media” (Page & Shapiro, 1992, p. 321). The influence of international news 
coverage has been found in changes in audiences’ perceptions of the importance of 
foreign policy issues (Du, 2012; Iyengar & Simon, 1993) and attitudes toward foreign 
countries (Kiousis & Wu, 2008; Wanta, Golan, & Lee, 2004; Wanta et al., 2004; Zhang 
& William Meadows III, 2012). Iyengar and Simon (1993) found a strong correlation 
between the amount of televised news coverage of the Gulf War and the number of 
respondents who answered in a poll that the war was the most important problem facing 
the United States. They argued that the extensive coverage of the war raised the salience 
of war-related issues, while it overshadowed other issues, such as the budget deficit, drugs 
or crime, all of which had been salient before the war had started. In a multinational study 
using BBC World Service Poll data, Du (2012) found correlations between the salience 
of key news events for the public and the amount of news coverage by leading national 
newspapers in 10 out of 11 countries in Europe, America and Asia. 
Several studies on international news and public opinion have also showed that 
extensive coverage of foreign countries increases the perceived importance of such 
countries among audiences. Wanta, Golan and Lee (2004) analysed the relationship 
between news coverage and the perceived importance of countries, extending the agenda-
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setting theory, and revealed a strong correlation between the amount of news coverage 
by ABC, CBS, NBC, and CNN and the perceived importance of foreign countries with 
three to six month time-lags. Zhang and William Meadows III (2012), who found a 
similar relationship between international news coverage and audiences’ attitudes 
towards foreign countries, concluded that the “salience of the countries in the media leads 
to an increased perceived importance of foreign countries among the US public” (Zhang 
& William Meadows III, 2012, p. 88).  
Other studies have shown that negative coverage of a foreign country has a 
particularly strong impact on audiences. Wanta, Golan, and Lee (2004) reported that 
negative news coverage of foreign countries on TV news correlated with negative 
perceptions of those countries by the American public, while there was no such 
correlation in positive news coverage. Kiousis and Wu (2008) similarly reported that 
foreign countries’ public relations efforts in the United States increased positive news 
coverage, but only negative news coverage affected the attitudes of the public. Moreover, 
using a similar research design, Zhang and William Meadows III (2012) also found a 
stronger impact of negative news coverage on attitudes of audiences.  
Policymakers 
The influence of foreign news coverage on policymaking has been discussed from 
the 1990s in relation to the ‘CNN effect’ (Belknap, 2001; Gilboa, 2005; Groshek, 2008; 
Hawkins, 2011; Livingston, 1997; Robinson, 1999, 2002; Seib, 2002; Strobel, 1997), 
which suggests that satellite or cable TV channels’ rolling news coverage of crises 
overseas has a very strong influence on the foreign policy making process. The existence 
of such an effect has often been denied (Gilboa, 2005; Gowing, 1997; Livingston, 1997), 
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but recent large-scale analyses of the media coverage of disasters have revealed that news 
coverage, at least, has an influence on the foreign aid policies of democratic states 
(Eisensee & Strömberg, 2007; Van Belle, 2008; Van Belle et al., 2004).  
Van Belle, Jean-Sébastien and Potter (2004) studied the influence of news 
coverage on foreign aid programmes in the United States, the United Kingdom, Canada, 
France and Japan between 1985 and 1995, and found that foreign news coverage was a 
strong predictor of the financial aid provided by those countries. They explain that foreign 
aid is organised predominantly through a bureaucratic process, and non-elected officials 
tend to rely on news coverage to judge the political importance of foreign disasters. 
Eisensee and Strömberg (2007) also found strong correspondence between news coverage 
and US foreign aid in an analysis of more than five thousands disasters that had occurred 
in 143 countries between 1968 and 2002, concluding that “relief decisions are driven by 
news coverage of disasters and … this news coverage is crowded out by other 
newsworthy material” (2007, p. 722). 
However, causal relations between news coverage and foreign policies are still 
under discussion. Eisensee and Strömberg (2007) argues that they are interrelated, 
because (1) news coverage of disasters triggers citizens to lobby policymakers, (2) 
decisions to supply foreign aid bring good publicity for policymakers, (3) extensive news 
coverage of disasters indicates public interest, and (4) news coverage itself increases 
public interest in  disasters. Van Belle et al. (2008; 2004) elaborated on the last point and 
emphasized the influence of media coverage on bureaucrats rather than on the public, 
arguing that news coverage is an indicator of the political importance of foreign disasters 
for bureaucrats, who use information from the media to avoid being publicly accused of 
negligence. 
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Journalists 
It is widely recognized that international news agencies have a strong agenda-
setting influence on TV and newspapers (Boyd-Barrett, 1980). The media agenda-setting 
influence of international news agencies has been found as a correspondence of news 
coverage between national news media and news agencies. Stevenson and Cole (1984b) 
found that the amount of news coverage between newswires from western news agencies 
(AP, UPI, AFP and Reuters) and local newspapers in Latin America in the 1980s were 
strongly correlated, and argued that these news agencies were influencing newspapers’ 
editorial decisions. Link (1984) compared the number of news stories attributed to news 
agencies (UPI, AP, and AFP) and newspapers’ own correspondents in Mexican and 
Brazilian newspapers, and found strong rank correlations between them. Although this is 
not direct evidence of media agenda-setting, the result suggests an influence of news 
agencies on newspapers’ own news gathering activities. Du (2012) argued, after his multi-
national study of media agendas, “the significant correspondences suggest that an 
international intermedia agenda-setting function may exist among the news media in 
different countries about the globally significant events of 2005” (Du, 2012, p. 11). 
Nevertheless, it is not only international news agencies that have an agenda-
setting influence on foreign news coverage. Wu (2000) has shown that CNN is also a 
predictor of news coverage, and Roberts and Bantimaroudis’ (1997) interviewed Greek 
journalists and found, as well as news agencies, that satellite news broadcasters (CNN 
and French TV-5), leading newspapers (The New York Times, The Times, and Le Monde), 
and news magazines (Time, Newsweek and US News and World Report) influenced their 
news choices. More recent studies have also showed that journalists monitor satellite 
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news channels (CNN and BBC) and the websites of leading newspapers to find important 
foreign news (Bielsa & Bassnett, 2008; Laville & Palmer, 2012). 
Conclusion 
In the NWICO debate, coverage concentrated on developed countries and the 
negative representation of under-developed countries were considered as ‘bias’ in 
international news (Masmoudi, 1979). This debate strongly influenced international news 
research in the 1970s and 1980s, and scholars found that North American and West 
European countries were the most frequently covered regions, while African or South 
America countries were featured only in the events of natural disasters or violent 
conflicts. Such ‘biased’ news coverage is often attributed to western news organizations’ 
domination in the international news system.  
Further, earlier discussions on bias in international news were based on a variant 
of the Anglo-American concept of impartiality, which took the position that news media 
must cover developed and developing countries equally. The 50-50 benchmark was valid 
for national news coverage by the US media, but it was not valid for US international 
news coverage that targeted American audiences. However, the demand to allocate the 
same news coverage to all countries seems based entirely on the “arbitrary assumption 
that each region has an equal chance of newsworthiness” (Gerbner & Marvanyi, 1977, p. 
57). Furthermore, accusations against the western of covering developing countries in too 
negative a light also seem unfounded because such negativity may only reflect the 
objective reality that social disruption is more frequent in those countries (Stevenson, 
1984).  
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An alternative approach to assessing bias in international news would be to 
abandon fixed benchmarks and adopt instead benchmarks created from media coverage 
to control for the difference between countries and organizations. For example, Ishii 
(1996) predicted the number of news stories on countries in Japanese newspapers by the 
GDP and population of those countries, and defined deviation from these predicted values 
as bias in foreign news coverage. Watanabe (2013) measured western cultural bias in US-
based news portals by comparing the international news coverage of their US and Indian 
editions using national newspapers as benchmarks. I will further develop this alternative 
approach to news bias in the following chapters of this thesis. 
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Measuring news bias: Russia’s official news agency 
ITAR-TASS’s coverage of the Ukraine crisis 
Abstract 
Objectivity in news reporting is one of the most widely discussed topics in 
journalism, and numbers of studies on bias in news have been conducted, but there is little 
agreement on how to define or measure news bias. Aiming to settle the theoretical and 
methodological disagreement, the author redefined news bias and applied a new 
methodology to detect the Russian government’s influence on ITAR-TASS during the 
Ukraine crisis. A longitudinal content analysis of over 35,000 English-language 
newswires on the Ukraine crisis published by ITAR-TASS and Interfax clearly showed 
that ITAR-TASS’s framing of Ukraine was reflecting desirability of pivotal events in the 
crisis to the Russian government. This result reveals Russia’s strategic use of the state-
owned news agency for international propaganda in its ‘hybrid war’, demonstrating the 
effectiveness of the new approach to news bias. 
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There is almost unanimous agreement on the importance of independent 
journalism among scholars of mass communication, and objectivity in news reporting is 
one of the most widely discussed topics in journalism (Barkho, 2013b; Donsbach & Klett, 
1993; Maras, 2012). The independence of journalists is a precondition for objective news 
reporting (Barkho, 2013a). Importantly, journalistic independence provides objective, or 
unbiased, political information allowing for effective democracy, constrains the power of 
the mass media, and maintains the trust of the public in mass media (Maras, 2012). 
Further, biased news reporting leads to the marginalization of certain social groups, 
misperceptions of political agendas, and public disenchantment and cynicism 
(Brandenburg, 2005). Researchers have embarked on empirical studies of bias in news 
on elections (Brandenburg, 2005; Hopmann, de Vreese, & Albæk, 2011; Kahn & Kenney, 
2002; Robinson & Sheehan, 1983), wars (Aday, 2010; Aday, Livingston, & Hebert, 2005; 
Dickson, 1994; Entman & Page, 1994; Pfau et al., 2004), and foreign countries 
(Chaudhary, 2001; Jones, 2008; Meyer, 1989; Miller, 2007), but  there is little agreement 
on how to define or  measure news bias.  
In the empirical studies, one school of thought defines the lack of objectivity in 
news as unbalanced coverage of different subjects (Brandenburg, 2005; Cushion, Lewis, 
& Groves, 2009; D’Alessio & Allen, 2000; Dominick, 1977; Hopmann, Aelst, & 
Legnante, 2012). Within this conception of news bias, researchers focus on the sheer 
number of articles and the length of airtime allocated to certain issues, events or actors. 
Other groups of researchers pay attention to tones of news reports, using metrics such as 
‘positive-negative’ (Aday, 2010; Brandenburg, 2005; Hopmann et al., 2012; Pfau et al., 
2004; e.g. Robinson & Sheehan, 1983), ‘favourable-unfavourable’ (e.g. Hofstetter, 1976) 
or ‘supportive-critical’ (Aday et al., 2005; Entman & Page, 1994; Kleinnijenhuis, Van 
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Hoof, Oegema, & De Ridder, 2007). In this approach, news reporting with predominantly 
positive or negative tones is considered to be biased. 
The definition of news bias must be operationalizable in empirical inquiries, but 
it should also be based on the theories of media effect. Agenda-setting theory suggests 
that the amount of news coverage allocated to certain issues, events or actors influences 
their perceived importance among audiences (“what to think about”) (Besova & Cooley, 
2009; Hester & Gibson, 2003; McCombs, Llamas, Lopez-Escobar, & Rey, 1997; Salwen 
& Matera, 1992; Wanta, Golan, & Lee, 2004), but, if our primary interest is investigating 
the mass media’s role in shaping news audiences’ attitudes towards subjects (“how to 
think”), we must scrutinise the ways those subjects are represented in news reporting. 
According to the theory of second-level agenda-setting, or priming, news reporting 
focusing on negative or positive aspects of events, issues and actors has a significant 
impact on an audience’s attitude toward them (Entman, 1993; Hester & Gibson, 2003; 
Iyengar & Simon, 1993; McCombs et al., 1997). The concept of media framing, which is 
defined as “selecting and highlighting some faces of events or issues, and making 
connections among them so as to promote a particular interpretation, evaluation and/or 
solution” (Entman, 2004, p. 5), also establishes a link between news reporting and 
people’s understanding of public affairs.  
Selective media frames manifest as unbalanced tones of news stories, which 
become either positive or negative when they concern events, favourable or unfavourable 
when they concern opinions, or supportive or critical when they concern policy options. 
However, not all news stories with a predominantly positive or negative tone can be 
considered biased, because tone can be a simple reflection of  objective reality, i.e., tones 
of news reports will be profoundly negative when stories describe inherently negative 
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events, such as natural disasters, armed conflicts or social disruptions, as Stevenson 
(1984) correctly point out in negative representation of the under-developed countries in 
foreign news. Also, tones become overwhelmingly supportive of the status-quo when 
disagreement among political elites is absent (e.g., the aftermath of the 9/11 attacks), as 
Bennett’s (1990) index theory suggests. The reflection of objective reality in the tones of 
news reporting poses methodological challenges in measuring news bias. Entman (2007), 
who is agnostic regarding objective reality, has even proposed an approach to news bias 
focusing only on the balanced coverage of different aspects of events, issues or groups. 1 
This methodological challenge has constrained how news bias has been defined 
and measured in earlier empirical studies. The adoption of concepts such as ‘balance’ and 
‘fairness’ as proxies to objectivity has been a common practice among researchers, as 
well as regulators, because of the difficulty in measuring objectivity itself  (Maras, 2012). 
The Fairness Doctrine of the Federal Communication Commission, which required 
American broadcasters to produced ‘balanced’ news reporting on public agendas between 
1949 and 1987, has strongly affected the concept of news bias in scholarly debates, but 
‘balance’ in news reporting is not so obvious in countries where the political landscape is 
more complex and the simple 50-50 benchmark derived from the US two-party system 
does not hold (Hopmann et al., 2012). Some researchers of European media have resorted 
to benchmarks constructed based on the number of seats political parties hold in 
legislatures (Brandenburg, 2005), but it seems unrealistic to expect equal coverage of 
                                                 
1 Entman is still dependent on his own knowledge of objective reality in identifying which aspects are not 
covered by the news when applying this approach. 
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political groups in polarized media systems where partisan journalism is the norm. As a 
result of this, empirical studies on news bias have concentrated in the United States. 
Aiming to facilitate empirical studies on news bias in complex media systems, I 
present a new approach to measuring news bias, taking Russia’s official news agency 
ITAR-TASS’s English-language news coverage of the Ukraine crisis as an example. My 
case selection was motivated not only by the significance of the crisis in Europe to 
international politics, but also by the severity of the above mentioned methodological 
challenges; in this case, the challenges were made particularly severe by a rapidly 
changing situation on the ground and a lack of non-media benchmarks with which to 
assess balance in the news coverage. In my approach to news bias, I will conceptualize 
objectivity in news reporting as coverage of all possible newsworthy stories, and analyse 
ITAR-TASS’s news coverage in relation to Interfax’s broader news coverage. In this 
setting, Interfax serves as a benchmark unit, which helps us to measure bias in ITAR-
TASS’s news reporting caused by the Russian government’s influence excluding the 
effects of the inherently positive or negative nature of the events on the ground. I 
estimated the amount of bias in ITAR-TASS’s news reporting using longitudinal data, 
which I produced by content analysing all the news stories on Ukraine published by the 
two news agencies over an 16-month period starting from January, 2013. 
My statistical analysis of the longitudinal data will clearly show that ITAR-
TASS’s framing of democracy and sovereignty in Ukraine systematically biased during 
the crisis corresponding to the desirability of the situation in Ukraine for the Russian 
regime. The main causes of bias were (1) highly critical comments made by Russian 
officials on Ukraine, which the news agency quotes very frequently, and (2) profoundly 
negative descriptions of events related to Ukraine by the news agency. However, ITAR-
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TASS’s news articles tend to present the Russian government’s views on Ukraine in an 
‘objective’ style of writing, blurring the distinction between opinions and facts. The 
systematic bias in ITAR-TASS’s news coverage of the Ukraine suggests the importance 
of ITAR-TASS in Russia’s ‘hybird wars’, which utilizes non-military means to achieve 
military goals.  
Hypotheses 
ITAR-TASS is a prominent example of a state-owned news agency. Its roots can 
be traced back to the imperial era, when the first Russian news agency, the Russian 
Telegraph Agency (RTA), was created by the tsar in 1866. The operation of the first news 
agency was limited to domestic clients, but a more international agency, the St. Petersburg 
Telegraph Agency, was established by the government in 1904 to overcome Russia’s 
dependence on the German news agency, Wolf, for the international distribution of news. 
After the 1917 October Bolshevik revolution, newspapers and magazines were obliged to 
publish information received from a new central news agency, ROSTA, which integrated 
all national and regional information agencies, and later became the Telegraph Agency 
of the Soviet Union, known as TASS. This news agency was directly controlled by the 
state and often used for propaganda during the Soviet era. According to Vartanova and 
Frolova (2010, p. 264) “TASS was different from other international agencies in that it 
acted as a voice of the Soviet government which tended to speak to the peoples of the 
world through its official spokesmen”. TASS survived the collapse of the Soviet Union, 
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and was subsequently renamed ITAR-TASS. 2 Today, it is the official news agency of the 
Russian Federation and owned and administered by the government, enjoying exclusive 
access to official information. 
The influence of the Russian government as the owner of the news agency alone 
might have caused bias in its news reporting of the Ukraine crisis, in which Russia has 
vested interests, but it is also important to note that the general level of press freedom and 
the journalistic culture in Russia is very different from in Western countries. The media 
system of Russia is chracterized as Polarized model, in which journalists practice partisan 
reporting, commercial news media experience frequent state interventions, and media 
figures are integrated into the elite political network (Dobek-Ostrowska & Smaele, 2010; 
Vartanova, 2011). This limited press freedom and partisan journalism in Russia is 
expected to increase the degree to which ITAR-TASS reflects the wishes of Russia’s 
political elites, and therefore I expect to find consistent patterns in the framing of 
mediated communication that promote the influence of Russia on Ukraine, which indicate 
an existence of bias in ITAR-TASS’s news caused by the Russian government’s 
influence 3 In fact, Horvit (2006), in his research on news agencies’ framing of the debates 
around the US-led intervention into Iraq in 2003, found that 54% of the ITAR-TASS 
stories sourced Russian government officials, and 53% of the paragraphs in its stories 
                                                 
2 ITAR-TASS was renamed TASS in September 2014 again to emphasize its connection to the predecessor 
(TASS, n.d.). 
3 This statement was originally “consistent patterns in the framing of mediated communication that promote 
the influence of one side in conflicts over the use of government power” (Entman, 2010, p. 166).4 See 
Appendix 1 for more detailed timeline of the crisis. 
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were negative toward US policy. His finding predicts that the ITAR-TASS framing of the 
Ukraine crisis will reflect the desirability of pivotal events to the Russian government, 
and therefore I formulate my first two hypotheses as following: 
H1: ITAR-TASS’s framing of the Ukraine crisis will become more 
positive when the situation in Ukraine is desirable to the Russian 
government. 
H2: ITAR-TASS’s framing of the Ukraine crisis will become more 
negative when the situation in Ukraine is undesirable to the Russian 
government. 
Although the literature details theory largely based on studies of the news 
coverage of elections, wars or foreign countries by retail news media (such as newspapers 
or TV), I adopt this theoretical framework as a starting point, aiming to identify necessary 
changes for wholesale news media (news agencies). D’Alessio and Allen (2000) 
identified three types of bias in news reporting in their meta-analysis of election studies: 
‘coverage bias’, ‘gatekeeping bias’ and ‘statement bias’. According to their definitions, 
coverage bias stems from unbalanced amounts of news coverage allocated to particular 
subjects; gatekeeping bias is a result of selection or deselection of particular kinds of 
stories; and statement bias is caused by inclusion of journalists’ opinions. Coverage bias 
is expected to increase the salience of a particular country for the international audience 
as concentrated media coverage has an agenda-setting effect; both gatekeeping and 
statement bias are likely to cause attitude changes among audiences, because the arbitrary 
selection of stories and insertion of opinions have a second-level agenda-setting effect. 
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Considering ITAR-TASS’s status as an official news agency, I expect to find 
gatekeeping bias caused by the prioritisation of Russian official sources in its coverage 
of the Ukraine crisis. Therefore, my third hypothesis is: 
H3:  Bias in ITAR-TASS’s reporting of Ukraine is caused by high 
representation of Russian government officials in its stories. 
However, it is unlikely to find personal opinions in ITAR-TASS’s news coverage, 
because it adopts the ‘objective’ style of writing in newswires. Alternatively, I expect to 
find ‘corporate bias’, in other words, one driven by the ideological, social and political 
orientations of media organizations (Barkho, 2013a).  This is as opposed to ‘personal 
bias’, which would derive from the educational, religious, economic or racial background 
of individual journalists. Therefore, my fourth hypothesis is the following: 
H4:  Bias in ITAR-TASS’s reporting of Ukraine is caused by its 
corporate views on Ukraine, but not by the personal views of the 
journalists. 
Methodology 
In the studies on news coverage of national politics in the United States, 
unbalanced volumes or tones of news stories were seen as indications of news bias, but 
such an approach is not appropriate in measuring bias in ITAR-TASS’s news reporting 
of the Ukraine crisis, because (1) there is no ground to expect ITAR-TASS to cover 
different sides of the conflict equally (i.e., Russian news agencies more likely to report 
the Russian government’s views sympathetically, even without the influence of the 
Russian government, because of their greater access to Russian sources and Russians’ 
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psychological attachment to the country), and (2) the rapidly changing situation on the 
ground affects the tones of news reporting (i.e., a more negative tone in a story might be 
caused merely by occurrences of more inherently negative events, such as violence 
confrontations or social disruptions, not by it being negatively framed intentionally). 
In order to overcome these problems, Interfax, a Russian news agency that is 
independent from the Russian state (Boyd-Barrett, 2014), is included in the analysis as a 
benchmark unit. Interfax was founded in a radio station in Moscow independently of the 
government in the last days of the Soviet Union. Operating as a commercial enterprise, it 
generates a significant portion of its revenues from its economic news service. According 
to earlier studies, 85% of Interfax clients consisted of banks and financial enterprises, 
10% insurance and audit companies and 5% privatized enterprise; it has developed a wide 
range of products that include providing electronic financial information and analytical 
reports, and has become a leading supplier of information on Russia and CIS countries. 
Thanks to its successful commercial operation, Interfax maintains a high level of 
independence from the Russian government (Boyd-Barrett, 2012; Rantanen & Boyd-
Barrett, 2004; Vartanova & Frolova, 2010).  
I can identify bias caused by the Russian government’s influence (‘state-
ownership effect’), while excluding the effect of ITAR-TASS being based in Russia 
(‘home-country effect’) by using Interfax as a benchmark unit. This benchmarking also 
allows us to control for inherently negative or positive events that affect news content of 
ITAR-TASS (‘real-event effect’). In this approach, I focus on changes in ITAR-TASS’s 
news coverage relative to Interfax’s corresponding coverage, and relative changes after 
pivotal events are treated as bias caused by the influence of the Russian government. This 
is an application of the difference-in-differences technique, which is widely used in 
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econometrics to estimate the impact of policy interventions (c.f. Card & Krueger, 1994), 
although it is much more limited for the a number of reasons. First, I cannot assume a 
high stability in benchmark units (media outlets) in studies of media since the spread of 
information is much less restricted than it is in policy interventions. Second, I often cannot 
find multiple benchmark units on which to base my statistical estimation of the 
uncertainty of observed news bias: this is because there are few media outlets comparable 
to those in which I am interested. Third, the occurrence of media bias can proceed pivotal 
events when they are predictable (staged events). However, unlike other social scientists, 
who only have access to numeric data, I can scrutinize original texts produced by the 
news media, and supplement the quantitative data with rich textual information to 
overcome the limitations. 
Pivotal Events 
In the early days of the crisis, there were events with which I can relatively easily 
associate Russia’s political interests, but, as soon as the fight between Kiev’s military 
forces and separatists began, the Russian regime’s wishes became increasingly obscure. 
Therefore, I restricted my analysis to the period from January 1, 2013 to April 21, 2014, 
the day before the Kiev government relaunched its anti-separatist operations. Table 1 
presents pivotal events in the Ukraine crisis with their desirability to the Russian regime. 4 
Table 1: Pivotal events in the early stage of the Ukraine crisis 
Date Label Event Desirabilit
y 
September 03, 2013 E1 Yanukovich demands legal reforms to MPs for EU association 
plan  
Negative 
November 21, 2013 E2 The trade agreement with the EU is abandoned by Yanukovych Positive 
January 16, 2014 E3 Protest against the pro-Russian regime in Kiev intensifies Negative 
February 22, 2014 E4 Yanukovych is removed from presidency by the parliament Negative 
                                                 
4 See Appendix 1 for more detailed timeline of the crisis. 
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March 16, 2014 E5 Crimea referendum is held and 95% support accession Positive 
April 15, 2014 E6 Military operations against separatists are launched  Negative 
 
Data Collection 
For my content analysis, I downloaded the English-language news stories 
covering Russia and CIS countries published by ITAR-TASS and Interfax respectively 
from the Nexis and Integrum databases between 2013 and 2014. 5 I collected 103,236 
stories for Interfax and 87,725 for ITAR-TASS, after removing duplications. I also 
downloaded 21,718 Reuters reports from the Factiva on Ukraine, but they were used 
solely for manual reading and dictionary construction, as explained in Appendix 2. 
Content Analysis 
 To perform a statistical analysis of news reporting by the news agencies, I content 
analysed the downloaded news stories in terms of their geographical focus and positive-
negative framing of the state of democracy and sovereignty in Ukraine. Both geographical 
classification and framing analysis were accomplished by employing computerized 
content analysis, which relies on dictionaries constructed by lexicon expansion 
techniques (c.f. Pang & Lee, 2008; Turney & Littman, 2003). The geographical dictionary 
comprises not only names of places but also of institutions and persons related to the crisis 
for a higher classification accuracy. The framing dictionaries contain words related to 
democracy and sovereignty and scored in terms of their positive-negative sentiments. 
                                                 
5 The sources were the World service wire of ITAR-TASS; CIS and Russia General Newswires and 
Kazakhstan, Belarus, Ukraine and Asia Newswires of Interfax.   
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Construction of these dictionaries was based on statistical analysis of the corpus of news 
stories that I downloaded to avoid arbitrary choices of words. 
The adoption of computerized techniques is not only for efficiency in analysing 
the large volume of news stories published over 16 months, but also for consistency, 
which is usually difficult for human coders to achieve. The geographical classifier 
removed almost all the news articles not about Ukraine, accomplishing 0.94 in precision 
and 0.83 in recall. The framing analysis could replicate human judgements, achieving 
strong correlation between machine and human coding both in democracy (r=0.77) and 
sovereignty (r=0.70) (see Appendix 2 for details explanation and validation of the 
computerized method). 
Statistical Model 
To estimate news bias in ITAR-TASS’s news reporting, the continuous sentiment 
scores were regressed on indicators for time period following the pivotal events (𝑒𝑒1 … 𝑒𝑒6), 
a dummy variable for ITAR-TASS (𝑔𝑔), and their interactions (𝑒𝑒1𝑔𝑔… 𝑒𝑒6𝑔𝑔) with a random 
intercept (𝑢𝑢) clustered by day:  
𝑌𝑌 = 𝛽𝛽0 + 𝛽𝛽1𝑒𝑒1 …𝛽𝛽6𝑒𝑒6 + 𝛿𝛿𝑔𝑔 + 𝛾𝛾1𝑒𝑒1𝑔𝑔… 𝛾𝛾6𝑒𝑒6𝑔𝑔 + 𝑢𝑢 + 𝜀𝜀 
The inclusion of random intercept is to accurately estimate differences between 
ITAR-TASS and Interfax by controlling for variance caused by time-dependent 
heterogeneity. In this model, 𝛿𝛿  captures time-independent institutional heterogeneity, 
𝑒𝑒1 … 𝑒𝑒6  are real-event effects, and the coefficients 𝛾𝛾1 … 𝛾𝛾6  are Russian government-
ownership effects, in which I am most interested. 
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Analysis 
The data produced by my content analysis is visualized in Figures 1 and 2, where 
red circles represent sentiment scores of individual ITAR-TASS news articles, and black 
and red curves respectively show average sentiment scores of news articles published by 
Interfax and ITAR-TASS. The average sentiment scores are interpreted as representing 
the positive-negative framing of democracy and sovereignty in Ukraine by the Russian 
agencies at particular points of time during the crisis. 
In Figure 1, the red curve runs higher than and parallel to the black line before E1 
showing that the framing of Ukraine’s democracy was normally more positive by ITAR-
TASS than by Interfax. However, ITAR-TASS’s coverage shifts toward negative after 
E1, when the president called for legal reforms to join the EU, but it returns to the normal 
level of positivity relative to Interfax over E2-E3, following the abandonment of the trade 
agreement with the EU. A sharp negative shift occurs after E3, and its framing becomes 
almost as negative as Interfax’s over E4-E5. Finally, its framing moves sharply negative 
after E5, reaching peak negativity around E6, coinciding with the launch of the anti-
separatist operation by the Kiev government. 
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Figure 1: Framing of democracy 
 
In Figure 2, the difference in the framing of sovereignty between ITAR-TASS and 
Interfax over E1-E2 remains approximately the same as the pre-E1 period. A negative 
shift of framing starts only after E2, and the relatively positive framing by ITAR-TASS 
disappears in E3-E4, when the anti-government protests intensify in Kiev. Nevertheless, 
its framing rapidly improves from E4 toward E5 when the Crimean referendum was held, 
but it, again, becomes as negative as Interfax after E6. 
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Figure 2: Framing of sovereignty 
 
 
Amount of bias 
The amount of bias in the framing of the Ukraine crisis by ITAR-TASS was 
estimated using the statistical model, the results being presented in Table 2. In the table, 
the most important coefficients are found next to the interactions between the time 
indicators (E1-6) and the dummy variable for ITAR-TASS (TASS), which measures 
effects of Russian government’s ownership. The estimated state-ownership bias is also 
summarized in Figure 3 with 95% confidence intervals. 
 
Table2: Framing of the Ukraine crisis by ITAR-TASS 
 
 Dependent variable:   
 Democracy Sovereignty 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)  
TASS 31.033*** 22.735*** 22.416*** 34.783*** 27.411*** 27.231*** 
 (6.953) (6.946) (6.943) (9.695) (9.954) (9.910) 
E1 14.575** 17.458*** 17.663*** 16.757* 20.562** 20.538** 
 (6.655) (6.525) (6.517) (8.916) (8.949) (8.874) 
E2 -42.680*** -40.624*** -40.111*** -19.738** -19.243** -18.363** 
 (6.007) (5.920) (5.913) (7.990) (8.012) (7.928) 
E3 -45.593*** -45.494*** -44.906*** -27.975*** -30.279*** -29.495*** 
 (5.883) (5.828) (5.821) (8.108) (8.149) (8.053) 
Paper 1 55 
 
E4 -24.071*** -16.678** -15.750** -4.876 -2.373 -0.714 
 (6.628) (6.560) (6.554) (8.844) (8.895) (8.780) 
E5 -17.029*** -7.679 -7.175 -16.221* -10.020 -10.128 
 (6.492) (6.467) (6.458) (8.511) (8.624) (8.518) 
E6 -27.771** -15.346 -14.695 -19.681 -12.285 -11.271 
 (11.119) (11.047) (11.027) (14.534) (14.658) (14.460) 
Russia  -23.663*** -23.481***  -18.714*** -18.516*** 
  (3.052) (3.050)  (3.757) (3.741) 
Quote (Krippendorff, 2004) -70.038*** -34.341***  -2.375 89.584*** 
  (4.066) (12.456)  (5.204) (16.076) 
Quote^2   -41.860***   -105.207*** 
   (13.807)   (17.413) 
TASS:E1 -31.737** -31.808*** -31.787*** -27.482 -30.023 -31.778* 
 (12.422) (12.110) (12.102) (18.747) (18.768) (18.688) 
TASS:E2 -1.067 -0.390 0.172 -16.277 -15.150 -14.970 
 (9.320) (9.085) (9.081) (12.990) (12.987) (12.930) 
TASS:E3 -16.794* -17.785** -17.681** -32.245*** -30.403** -30.872** 
 (8.741) (8.522) (8.517) (12.456) (12.434) (12.381) 
TASS:E4 -29.571*** -34.481*** -34.003*** -24.722** -25.576** -25.141** 
 (8.744) (8.594) (8.590) (11.887) (11.987) (11.937) 
TASS:E5 -38.267*** -41.076*** -39.884*** -14.107 -17.361 -15.024 
 (9.185) (9.205) (9.208) (12.094) (12.454) (12.408) 
TASS:E6 -52.389*** -54.172*** -53.512*** -48.739*** -53.991*** -52.927*** 
 (13.013) (12.887) (12.881) (16.583) (16.825) (16.757) 
TASS:Russia  10.958** 10.944**  13.335* 14.804** 
  (5.118) (5.115)  (7.048) (7.024) 
Constant 8.998*** 48.364*** 43.364*** 12.560*** 22.348*** 9.795* 
 (3.264) (3.840) (4.176) (4.426) (5.205) (5.572)  
Observations 6,723 6,723 6,723 4,180 4,180 4,180 
Log Likelihood -40,066.280 -39,871.670 -39,863.540 -24,936.590 -24,916.190 -24,894.250 
Akaike Inf. Crit. 80,164.550 79,781.340 79,767.070 49,905.170 49,870.380 49,828.500 
Bayesian Inf. Crit. 80,273.530 79,910.750 79,903.280 50,006.530 49,990.730 49,955.180  
Note: *p<0.1**p<0.05***p<0.01 
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Figure 3: Estimated state-ownership effect 
 
 
As summarized in Figure 3, ITAR-TASS’s coverage of democracy in Ukraine 
becomes statistically significantly more negative (-31.7, p<0.05) than during pre-crisis 
after Yanukovych’s speech (E1), indicating the Russian government’s influence on 
ITAR-TASS. Its framing of Ukraine then becomes as positive as the pre-crisis period 
after the abandonment of negotiation (E2). The change following the intensified anti-
regime protest (E3) is only marginal (-16.7, p=0.054), but the collapse of the regime (E4) 
(-29.5, p<0.01) and Crimea referendum (E5) (-38.2, p<0.01) are strongly significant. The 
framing of democracy in Ukraine becomes increasingly negative, reaching -52.3 points 
(p<0.01) after the start of anti-separatist military operations (E6). This result clearly 
shows that all the events, other than E5, are followed by changes in framing toward the 
same direction as predicted by their desirability for the Russia regime.  
ITAR-TASS’s framing of sovereignty becomes significantly negative (-32.2, 
p<0.01) only after anti-regime protests intensify (E3), because earlier events did not have 
serious implications for Ukraine’s sovereignly. Framing starts shifting toward the positive 
(-24.7, p<0.05) from the collapse of the regime (E4), and then negativity completely 
disappears (p=0.21) after the Crimea referendum (E5), but Kiev’s military operations 
against pro-Russian separatists (E6) brings it to the most negative level (-48,7, p<0.01). 
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These changes also match the patterns, that the author expected based on the desirability 
of events for the Russian government. 6 
Source of Bias 
The statements of Russian officials frequently quoted in ITAR-TASS’s news 
articles are one of the main sources of bias. In my statistical analysis, a dummy variable 
for mentions of Russian entities (Russia in Table 2) created from the secondary-country 
category by the geographical classifier shows that articles mentioning Russian entities are 
23.6 points (p<0.01) more negative about the democracy in Ukraine, and higher 
proportions of quotes in articles (Quote in Table 2) lead to more negative framing of the 
country (β=-70.0, p<0.01). The effect of mentions of Russian entities also appeared to be 
statistically significantly negative (β=-18.7, p<0.01) on framing of sovereignty (model 5), 
but proportions of quotations have no significant effects in this subject (p=0.64). Yet, 
further exploration of the data revealed that quadratic terms of the proportions (Quote^2) 
have very strongly significant effects in both democracy (β=-41.8, p<0.01 in model 3) 
and sovereignty (β=-105.2, p<0.01 in model 6). 
                                                 
6 Confirmation of the statistical findings by manual reading of the news stories is presented in Appendix 4. 
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Figure 4: Non-linear relationship between sentiment and quotes 
 
 
Figure 4 presents sentiment scores predicted by the model 3 and 6 for news articles 
which mentioned Russian entities and were published by ITAR-TASS after E6. These 
articles clearly show a non-linear association between framing scores and proportions of 
quotations, which suggests that there are, at least, three types of biased news stories. The 
first type simply describes situations regarding democracy and sovereignty in Ukraine 
negatively with little or no quotation of sources (less than 30% of wordage), while the 
second largely relies on negative comments on Ukraine made by Russian officials or pro-
Russian Ukraine leaders (more than 70%). In the third type, relatively positive comments 
on Ukraine made by foreign actors, who are important in stories on sovereignty, are 
quoted (30-70%), but these are followed by very negative descriptions of the situation in 
the country, which are barely relevant to the quotes, to make the overall framing in the 
news articles more negative (examples of these three types are presented in Appendix 5). 
Discussion 
In my analysis of the framing of democracy and sovereignty in Ukraine by ITAR-
TASS’s English-language service, I found that the news agency’s framing reflected the 
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desirability of the preceding events for the Russian government, i.e., only the 
abandonment of the trade agreement with the EU and the Crimean referendum were 
framed in as positive a manner as news on Ukraine had been in the pre-crisis period. Apart 
from the periods following these two events, framing of the Ukraine crisis was profoundly 
negative, the most negative framing appearing after the launch of military operations 
against pro-Russian separatists. In this period, ITAR-TASS’s framing of democracy and 
sovereignty shifted 1.88 and 2.47 times greater than Interfax’s framing toward the 
negative, whereby I estimated the amount of bias in ITAR-TASS’s coverage to be as large 
as -52.3 points regarding democracy and -48.7 points regarding sovereignty. These 
findings support my first and second hypotheses (H1 and H2), and thus I argue that ITAR-
TASS’s news coverage of Ukraine was biased, reflecting the interests of the Russian 
governmentin the country. 
The strategic coverage of the Ukraine crisis by ITAR-TASS is indicative of the 
importance of the news agency in Russia’s ‘hybrid wars’, which utilizes non-military 
means to attain military goals. In recent years, researchers have paid special attention to 
Russia’s satellite news channel, Russia Today (RT), as a medium for public diplomacy 
(Galeotti, 2015; Nelson, Orttung, & Livshen, 2015), but very few studies on ITAR-TASS 
have been conducted from this perspective. The findings of this research suggest that the 
soft power strategy of Russia, which has been advanced by Vladimir Putin since 2012 
(Light, 2015), is more comprehensive than previously thought, namely, in addition to the 
dissemination of news stories directly to foreign audiences via RT, the Russian 
government utilizes ITAR-TASS to reach foreign news media, bypassing the Western 
media’s foreign correspondents in Moscow, who tend to be negative about the regime 
(Evans, 2005). To achieve this goal, ITAR-TASS even mixes its own very negative 
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descriptions on Ukraine with positive comments of Western leaders, who are generally 
more newsworthy than Russian officials for Western audiences, in its news coverage, 
creating the non-linear relationship between the sentiment scores and the numbers of 
quotation. This is a sophisticated propaganda technique to increase the chance of its news 
stories to be accepted and redistributed by foreign news media. 
By scrutinizing the three types of biased news stories, I have discovered that the 
main sources of bias in ITAR-TASS’s coverage of Ukraine were (1) statements of 
Russian officials, to which the Russian news agency grants higher prominence, and (2) 
negative descriptions of the situation in Ukraine, supporting my third and fourth 
hypotheses (H3 and H4). These causes are to a large extent consistent with the typology 
developed by D’Alessio and Allen (2000), but not entirely so, because ITAR-TASS’s 
news articles are written in an ‘objective’ style without making clear distinction between 
opinions and facts as required in Western journalism. In other words, the typology of 
news bias developed in research on the Western media does not fully apply to the non-
Western media, in which opinions are disguised as facts. 
Based on the findings, I propose three changes in its definitions of news bias to 
extend the scope of the typology. First, D’Alessio and Allen have defined statement bias 
as a result of inclusion of journalists’ opinions, but it should not be restricted to direct 
expression of opinions (e.g., expressly support or criticize actors or ideas), because 
opinions can be blended into news stories in various forms, some of which are very 
difficult to distinguish from ‘objective’ description of events or issues. In fact, much of 
the bias in ITAR-TASS’s news stories on Ukraine was caused by descriptions with 
excessive emphasis on their negative aspects of events. Second, as Barkho (2013a) 
pointed out that sources of bias are not only backgrounds of individual journalists 
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(personal bias) but also ideological, social and political orientations of media 
organizations (corporate bias), statement bias should encompass insertion of opinions of 
media organizations as well as of individual journalists, because personal  opinions of 
journalists were not found in ITAR-TASS’s news stories at all. Third, gatekeeping bias 
was very broadly defined as it is caused by selection or deselection of particular kinds of 
stories, but it should be redefined as bias caused by prioritization of particular sources, 
since quotation of news sources is the most significant source of bias, which can be easily 
distinguished from statement bias. These proposed definitions of news bias are 
summarized in Table 3. 
Table 3: Types and definitions of news bias 
Type Cause Structure Example Measurement 
Statement bias Insertion of opinions of 
journalists or media 
organizations 
No quote Stories emphasising 
social disruption 
caused by pro-EU 
protesters  
Positive-negative 
framing of events, 
issues or actors in 
relation to 
benchmark units 
Description of events or 
issues with focus on particular 
aspects 
Gatekeeping bias Quotation of particular type 
of sources 
Direct or 
indirect 
quotes with 
attribution 
Stories quoting 
Russian officials 
who criticise military 
operations against 
pro-Russian 
separatists 
 
Finally, the revelation of the systematic bias in ITAR-TASS’s news coverage of 
Ukraine demonstrates that the new methodology is an effective approach to measuring 
news bias. Although I have focused on ITAR-TASS in this research, the new approach is 
not limited to studies of news agencies or international news media: It is particularly 
useful in research on media bias in countries with a multi-party or authoritative political 
system, where estimation of news bias has been very difficult due to the lack of non-
media benchmarks. In research on the news bias in multi-party political systems, one can 
choose a news organization with a particular characteristic (e.g., ownership, political 
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affiliation, etc.) that is expected to cause bias in its news content. Then, the news content 
should be compared with news content produced by other news organizations lacking that 
characteristic. Even if partisan journalism is widely practiced, inclusion of multiple 
benchmark units selected from the entire political spectrum should allow estimation of 
news bias. Authoritative media systems usually have very few independent or anti-regime 
media outlets, but comparison between the state-controlled media should show relative 
sizes of news bias correspondingly to media outlets’ susceptivity to the media control as 
I have shown elsewhere (Lankina & Watanabe, Forthcoming). I invite readers to research 
on objectivity of news in some of the most problematic media systems, where biased 
news reporting is the pressing issue to democracy. 
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Appendix 
Section 1: Timeline of the Ukraine Crisis 
During this period, important events occurred nearly every week, but I pay special 
attention to six events presented in Table 1. The first pivotal event was President 
Yanukovich’s speech in the Rada of Ukraine on September 3, 2013 (E1), demanding legal 
reforms to the members of the parliament for an association agreement with the EU, 
which Russia had been trying to prevent. On November 21, he suddenly announced 
termination of negotiation with the EU (E2), which caused a large pro-European protest 
in Kiev on December 1. When the anti-protest laws were passed by the parliament, violent 
confrontation between protesters and the police started on January 16, 2014 (E3). After a 
month of intense anti-regime protests, the pro-Russian regime collapsed on February 22 
(E4), as the president was officially removed by the parliament. Following the collapse 
of the Yanukovich government, Russian soldiers appeared in Crimea, and the local 
government announced a secession referendum from Ukraine, which was then changed 
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to accession to Russia on March 6. The referendum was held on March 16 (E5) and 
reportedly over 95% of Crimeans voted to join Russia. On the next day, the United States 
and European Union launched sanctions against Russia. On April 7, pro-Russian 
protesters in Donetsk, Luhansk and Kharkiv occupied government buildings, demanding 
a referendum on independence, but the Kiev government responded by launching military 
operations (E6).  
Section 2: Computerized Content Analysis 
Geographical Classification 
Since I was only interested in stories related to the Ukraine crisis, I performed 
geographical classification to exclude news stories not mainly covering the country. The 
most common approach in computerized geographical classification seems to be simple 
keyword matching based on a list of place names, but this approach fails to identify the 
geographical associations of news stories that do not explicitly mention names of places 
(Watanabe, 2017). To overcome this problem, a list of place names was extended using 
the ITAR-TASS’s foreign news stories. 7  By extending the list, my geographical 
dictionary is not limited to names of countries or cities, but includes names of people and 
organizations (such as Putin, White House or NATO), which are also important indicators 
of locations. 8 
                                                 
7 Since Russia has treated Crimea as a part of Russia after the annexation, the region was classified 
separately and merged into Ukraine. 
8 The numbers of stories that were mainly about Ukraine were 7,101 for Interfax and 4,899 for ITAR-TASS 
in democracy, and 5,469 for Interfax and 2,549 for ITAR-TASS in sovereignty. 
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The geographical classifier achieves higher accuracy in identifying countries the most 
strongly associated with news articles; however, it is also able to identify the countries 
second most strongly associated with articles. For example, news stories, which were 
identified as having the strongest association with Ukraine, were also associated with 
other countries, such as with Russia or the United States. Since the second degree 
association countries were usually the home countries of actors mentioned in the stories, 
my geographical classifier helped us to understand the differences between news content 
according to the location of news sources. 
Framing Analysis 
For this analysis, I constructed new sentiment dictionaries on democracy and sovereignty 
using a technique called Latent Semantic Scaling (LSS), which automatically identifies 
entry words relevant to democracy and sovereignty, and assigns continuous sentiment 
scores to the words. Its algorithm was originally developed by Deerwester et al. (1990) 
as Latent Semantic Analysis, and introduced to social scientific text analysis by the 
current author. In repeated experiments, it has been demonstrated that the dictionaries 
created with this technique can content analyse political documents and news stories as 
accurate as human coders (author forthcoming). 
In the automated dictionary construction by LSS, the corpus of news stories was 
statistically analysed in terms of patterns of word occurrences: entry words to the 
dictionaries were selected by their frequency of  co-occurrence (collocation) with 
democracy (‘democra*’) or sovereignty (‘sovereign*’) within 10-word windows in the 
corpus, and sentiment scores of entry words were calculated by their contextual 
similarities to a set of general English positive and negative words commonly used in 
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computer scientific literature. 9 The sizes of the democracy and sovereignty sentiment 
dictionaries produced for this research are respectively 875 and 681 words. 10 
Sentiment scores assigned to each of the news stories were calculated by taking the sum 
of scores in the dictionaries weighted by frequency of words in the document. This 
scoring method, first used by Benoit and Laver (2003), makes the machine coding more 
robust against occurrences of words irrelevant to democracy or sovereignty in news 
stories. The scores assigned to news stories were normalized by shifting the overall means 
to zero and by rescaling a standard deviation equal to 100 points for easier interpretation 
of the results. I tested the accuracy of the coding by the dictionary by manually coding a 
random sample of 30 news stories. In the manual coding, each sentence of the news 
articles was coded on a five-point scale, and then scores for news stories were calculated 
by taking the average scores of sentences (see next section of this Appendix for 
definitions of negative and positive news). The agreement between machine and manual 
coding measured by Pearson’s correlation confidents were r=0.70 in sovereignty, r=0.77 
in democracy (Figure 1). I found some random errors in machine coding, but it has little 
effect on my statistical analysis as they set off each other in my large dataset. 
                                                 
9 The general English positive-negative seeds were identified by Turney and Littman (2003). Positive words 
are “good, nice, excellent, positive, fortunate, correct, superior”, and negative words are “bad, nasty, poor, 
negative, unfortunate, wrong, inferior”. 
10  The dictionaries are publicly available at http://koheiw.net/wp-
content/uploads/2017/01/dictionary_ukraine.zip. 
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Figure 1: Agreement between machine and human coding 
 
 
Entry-word Density Filtering 
In order to selected news stories related to certain topics, simple keyword 
matching often utilized, but this method is sensitive to length of texts, favouring longer 
articles. Alternatively, I measured normalized frequency, or density, of words strongly 
related to democracy or sovereignty in each of the stories, and imposed a fixed threshold 
to select highly relevant stories. To set a reasonable threshold, I first generated a subset 
of news stories, in which democracy (‘democra*’) or sovereignty (‘sovereign*’) occurs 
at least twice, and then obtained the first quantile of the density of the related words in 
the subset. The topic-related words are also entry words of the framing dictionaries, but, 
importantly, selection of relevant news stories is independent of the sentiment scores 
(correlations between the sentiment scores and the log-likelihood collocation statistics 
were r=0.02 in sovereignty and r=0.10 in democracy). As shown in Figure 2, the 
thresholds (vertical lines) obtained from the subsets (red circles on the right) separate 
short stories from large clusters of long less relevant stories (grey and black circles on the 
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left). Stories on the right-hand side of the vertical likes are likely to be related to either 
democracy or sovereignty, even if they do not contain these words. After the exclusion, 
the numbers of items were 15,862 for Interfax and 19,192 for ITAR-TASS in democracy 
and 16,523 for Interfax and 13,178 for ITAR-TASS in sovereignty. 
Figure 2: Entry-word density filtering 
 
 
Section 3: Manual Coding Rules 
This appendix presents the definitions of positive or negative sentences in news 
stories in my manual content analysis. In the content analysis, each sentence in a news 
article was classified as 1 (very negative), 2 (negative), 3 (neutral), 4 (positive) or 5 (very 
positive). Degrees of positivity or negativity were judged based clearly of reporting, i.e., 
explicit or concrete sentences were labelled as 1 or 5. Sentences not related to democracy 
or sovereignty were classified as such and excluded from the calculation of document 
scores. 
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Democracy 
Positive. 
Reaching agreement based on dialogue (e.g. signing a truce; ratifying a treaty); 
discussion between different parties (e.g. in the parliament or formal meetings); actions 
based on people’s support; actions respecting laws and the constitution (e.g. fair elections). 
Negative. 
Use of violence against political opponents; coercion of opponents by political 
power or physical force; Infringement or limitation of civil rights (e.g. Arrest or 
prosecution of citizens); abuse of political power or excessive power concentration; 
existence of obstructions to dialogue; people’s expression of discontent against the 
government (e.g. mass anti-government rallies); lack of transparency in political 
institutions; restriction on journalists and mass media. 
Sovereignty 
Positive. 
Foreign nations or transnational bodies’ (e.g. EU or NATO) recognition of 
Ukraine’s regime; Ukraine government officials to cooperate with foreign leaders; 
Ukraine government maintain social order in the country with law enforcement agencies 
or the military; political process complying with Ukraine’s laws and treaties; foreign 
nations to provide financial or military support to Ukraine. 
Negative. 
Denial of the legitimacy of Ukraine government (e.g.  link to ‘neo-Nazi’ or 
‘nationalists’); possibility of foreign invasion in Ukraine; spread of social disorder that 
threatens the stability of the Ukrainian regime (e.g. ‘coup’ attempts); foreign nations 
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sanction against Ukraine government officials or former officials (e.g. Victor 
Yanukovich). 
Section 4: Confirmation of Statistical Findings 
This appendix presents results of manually reading news stories by the author, 
which confirm findings in the statistical analysis. 
Democracy 
The positive change in framing after E2 corresponds to the abandonment of the 
trade agreement with the EU as ITAR-TASS publishes positive stories emphasizing the 
importance of the economic ties between Ukraine and Russia. For example, one story, 
scoring 273.2 points, reports a meeting between members of the parliament from both 
Russia and Ukraine on policies enhancing economic cooperation between the two 
countries (November 28; 273.2). During this period, ITAR-TASS also releases President 
Yanukovych’s comment addressing the importance of the “triangle relationship” between 
Ukraine, the EU and Russia (November 29; 265.2). The news agency also quotes the 
Ukrainian prime minister, who supports the Custom Union with Russia, Belarus and 
Kazakhstan, and Eurasian economic integration (December 27; 203.4). 
The reason for the negative framing after E5 is that many news stories published 
by ITAR-TASS after the referendum in Crimea are critical of the state of democracy in 
the other part of Ukraine. For example, one story reports that, according to a Ukrainian 
air force commander, over 90% of air force personnel in Crimea swear allegiance to 
Russia, because the annexation was caused by “the unconsidered actions of the Kiev 
leaders who give unclear orders and directions” (March 20; -346.1). The Russian foreign 
minister notes that the accession of Crimea to Russia is an opportunity to stop “current 
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outrages committed by ultra-nationalistic and extremist forces which business people and 
journalists, dissenters, Russian speakers and our compatriots fall victims to” (March 20; 
-191.9) and to recover from the misfortune caused by “people relying in many respects 
on extremists, neo-Nazis and radicals, who do not take into account interests of a great 
part of the Ukrainian nation” (March 21; -302.0).  
In response to the launch of the anti-separatist military operation by Kiev, ITAR-
TASS produced more stories accusing the Ukraine government for the use of force against 
citizens. In another story, Belarus’s Prime Minister is quoted as saying “we in Belarus 
want all the problems to be solved by peaceful means” (April 15; -196.2). ITAR-TASS 
quotes Dmitry Medvedev’s post on Facebook, in which he argues that the creation of a 
modern Ukraine is possible only based on “equality of peoples and their languages” (April 
15; -171.7). In another story, Crimean leader, Sergey Aksyonov, expresses support for 
people in East Ukraine, and is quoted accusing the new Ukrainian government saying 
“instead of dialogue with their people, [the] illegal authorities in Kiev have dispatched 
troops and gunmen they control to suppress a peaceful protest of residents in southeast 
Ukraine” (April 16; -177.9). 
Sovereignty 
The changes in framing of sovereignty do not respond to the earlier pivotal events 
(E1 and E2), because these events did not produce stories strongly related to Ukraine’s 
sovereignty. Sovereignty becomes a more prominent theme when the survival of the pro-
Russian regime comes into question following the intense protests (“coup d’etat” or 
“extremists”) and when Western nations start supporting protesters (“flirting”) and 
introducing sanctions (“blackmail”). Russia’s annexation of Crimea marks the climax of 
the “sovereignty” of the region during the crisis in ITAR-TASS’s news reporting. The 
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negativity after the beginning of anti-separatist operations (E6) is caused by reports on 
discrimination and violence against Russian-speaking minorities in East Ukraine, and 
Russia’s willingness to intervene in Ukraine to protect “compatriots”.  
After the Crimean referendum, ITAR-TASS publishes a large number of very 
positive stories. For example, one stories published on the day of referendum reports that 
93% of the voters supported accession to Russia (March 16; 160.7) and that the voting 
turnout among Crimean Tatars was as high as 40% (March 16; 181.5). The agency reports 
on the next day that empowered representatives of the Crimean Supreme Council are to 
sign a treaty for the accession of Crimea to Russia (March 17; 199.3). Russia’s labour 
minister states that Crimea’s accession is an important event that will lead to the creation 
of “positive conditions for development, employment and business activity of citizens” 
(March 19; 285.2). The following week, the news agency publishes a story quoting the 
Belarusian president, who claims that Crimea is a part of Russia as a matter of fact (March 
23; 174.9). 
Stories published by ITAR-TASS after the launch of military operations against 
pro-Russian separatists particularly focus on human rights and the equality of Russian 
speakers in Ukraine. One story quotes a UN Assistant Secretary General for Human 
Rights who warns of the risk of the “propagation of ideas of ethnic, racial and religious 
hatred” by pro-European activists, particularly before the presidential election scheduled 
on May 25 (April 15; -172.7). In other stories, sources express their strong support for 
Russian speakers in Ukraine. In one article, Sergey Aksyonov states “illegal authorities 
in Kiev have dispatched troops and gunmen they control to suppress a peaceful protest of 
residents in southeast Ukraine” and continues “we give full moral support to residents of 
Slavyansk, Kramatorsk, Donetsk and other cities” (April 16; -111.9). Finally, the 
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strongest message was Vladimir Putin’s statement that “the Federation Council has 
empowered the president to use armed forces in Ukraine. I do hope that I will not have to 
use this right and that political and diplomatic means would resolve all acute problems of 
today in Ukraine” (April 17; -69.9). 
Section 5: Three Types of Biased News Stories 
The examples below show those two types of negative framing; the first article is 
scored -172.6 points without any quotations, while the second article is scored -111.8 
points with 76% of words in quotations.  
Type 1: No Quote 
UN warns about dangers of nationalistic rhetoric in Ukraine 
GENEVA, April 15 (Itar-Tass) - UN has warned about the dangers posed by 
nationalistic rhetoric in Ukraine, which may affect the situation in the country. 
A report on the observance of human rights in Ukraine drawn up by the UN 
Assistant Secretary General for Human Rights Ivan Simonovic says this problem 
has particular significance now that the country is getting closer to the presidential 
election scheduled for May 25. 
Propagation of ideas of ethnic, racial and religious hatred on the part of some 
political forces and separate individuals, which only serves as instigation to 
discrimination and animosity, as well as the nationalistic rhetoric that made itself 
manifest during protests on Kiev's Independence Square may wield a very heavy 
impact on the situation in the country, the report says. 
Type 2: Composite of Quotes 
Russia's Crimea supports protesters in southeast Ukraine 
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SIMFEROPOL, April 16 (Itar-Tass) - Russia's Crimean residents support 
residents in the cities of Slavyansk, Kramatorsk and other Ukrainian cities against 
whom "the Kiev junta" had dispatched troops and gunmen, acting Crimean leader 
Sergey Aksyonov told news agency CrimeaInform on Wednesday. 
"Instead of dialogue with their people illegal authorities in Kiev have dispatched 
troops and gunmen they control to suppress a peaceful protest of residents in 
southeast Ukraine," Aksyonov said. 
He said with confidence that "people will give a proper assessment to these 
criminal actions of Kiev junta backing on Nazi order and ideology." 
"We give full moral support to residents of Slavyansk, Kramatorsk, Donetsk and 
other cities, where people protect their rights and freedom today," the acting 
Crimean head said, noting that Crimean residents were also prepared "to give 
needed material aid and receive families." 
"We will not leave you in trouble! Crimea succeeded to protect themselves from 
the Nazis, I am convinced that southeast Ukraine will manage to do the same," 
Aksyonov said in conclusion. 
Type 3: Quote with Description 
The following story exemplifies the third type showing the technique used by 
ITAR-TASS to frame Ukraine negatively with quotations from non-Russian sources. In 
this article, quotations from the Italian foreign minister, which account for only 38.3% of 
words, are very positive but followed by very negative descriptions inserted by the 
Russian news agency, which overshadow the positivity making the overall score close to 
zero (-0.71 points). 
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Italian foreign minister lauds Geneva agreements on Ukraine 
ROME, April 18 (Itar-Tass) - Italian Foreign Minister Federica Mogherini has 
lauded agreements reached in Geneva at a meeting of representatives of Russia, 
the United States, the European Union and Ukraine on Thursday. 
"Agreement in Geneva means a turnaround in the Ukrainian crisis, the beginning 
of the phase of dialogue," Mogherini said, adding that it is the start of a new path 
"in which we believed and for the sake of which we worked, but which had not 
been predetermined". 
"Now the agreed measures should be implemented, tensions in the east of Ukraine 
should subside, all sides should take a responsible position, violence should be 
stopped, including with the help of the OSCE mission," she said. 
"It is very important for the set of constitutional reforms to continue quickly, in 
conditions of transparency for the benefit of all Ukrainians and stability in the 
region," the Italian Foreign Ministry said in a statement. 
The Geneva Statement adopted after Thursday's meeting on Ukraine in particular 
envisions that all illegal armed formations should be disarmed in Ukraine, all 
administrative buildings unblocked and all protesters except for those who 
committed serious crimes pardoned. 
Political and economic turmoil has embraced Ukraine after a coup rocked the 
country in February. Amid deadly riots that involved radicals in February 2014, 
new people were brought to power in Kiev, whom Moscow does not recognize as 
Ukraine's legitimate leaders. 
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The crisis deepened when Crimea, where most residents are Russians, refused to 
recognize the legitimacy of the de facto Ukrainian authorities. Crimea reunified 
with Russia on March 18 after a referendum two days earlier in which it 
overwhelmingly voted to secede from Ukraine and join the Russian Federation. 
After the reunification, which Kiev does not accept despite Russia's repeated 
statements that the Crimean plebiscite conformed to the international law, pro-
federalization protests against the new Ukrainian authorities erupted in Ukraine's 
Russian-speaking southeastern territories. 
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The spread of the Kremlin’s narratives  
by a western news agency during the 
Ukraine crisis 
Abstract 
The description of the Ukraine crisis as an ‘information war’ in recently published 
studies seems to suggest a belief that the Russian government’s propaganda in the crisis 
contributed to Russia’s swift annexation of Crimea.  However, studies focusing on 
Russia’s state-controlled media fail to explain how Russian’s narrative spread beyond the 
‘Slavic world’. This study, based on quantitative and qualitative analyses of news 
coverage by ITAR-TASS, Reuters, the AP, and AFP over two years, reveals that 
Russian’s narratives were internationally circulated in news stories published by a 
western news agency. Although this by no means suggests that the western news agency 
was complicit in Russia’s propaganda effort, these news stories were published on the 
most popular online news sites, such as Yahoo News and Huffington Post. These findings 
highlight the vulnerability of today’s global news-gathering and distribution systems, and 
the rapid changes in relationships between states and corporations in the media and 
communications industry. 
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A pro-European demonstration in Independence Square in Kiev escalated into a 
long-lasting confrontation between Russia and the West, attracting extensive coverage by 
news media. The news media’s attention to the Ukraine crisis was not surprising, but it 
was unusual in terms of the international flows of information. During recent wars in Iraq 
and Afghanistan led by the United States, information was gathered and distributed 
mainly by the American and the European news media, but during the Ukraine crisis, a 
substantial amount of news was produced and circulated by the Russian media, including 
Russia’s state-controlled national TV broadcasters (e.g. Channel 1, Russia 1, and NTV), 
the state-owned satellite TV broadcaster, RT, and the state-controlled international news 
agency, ITAR-TASS. 
The competition in covering the Ukraine crisis between the western and Russian 
media has been described as an “information war” by media observers (Galeotti, 2015; 
Hutchings & Szostek, 2015). Earlier results of content analyses of news stories on 
Ukraine (Boyd-Barrett, 2015; Freedman, 2014; McIntosh, 2015) showed that the Russian 
state-controlled media’s coverage of the pro-European Ukraine government was very 
negative, claiming it was connected to ‘fascists’ or ‘nationalists’ in attempt to 
delegitimize the new regime. The Russian TV also continuously broadcasted films and 
documentaries on Nazi’s invasion in USSR to recall the historical experience of Russians, 
and news stories on the alleged crucifixion of an ethnically Russian boy and the murder 
of heavily pregnant Russian woman by Ukrainian nationalists in an east Ukrainian city 
(Hill, 2015; Lankina & Watanabe, Forthcoming).  
The Russian media’s narrative that the revolution in Kiev is a ‘coup’ by fascists 
and ultra-nationalists, who threatened the safety of the Russian-speaking minorities in 
Ukraine  would allow Russia to ‘protect’ its compatriots by invading Ukraine as it did 
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Georgia (Simão, 2016). During the 2008 Georgian War, Russia was unsuccessful in 
international communication, but the Russian government has heavily invested in the 
international media to enhance its ‘soft-power’ in recent years (Avgerinos, 2009; Lankina 
& Niemczyk, 2015), and it utilized the state-owned international news agency’s to 
achieve its military goals during the Ukraine crisis (Watanabe, 2016). The Russian 
government’s narratives circulated by the mass media created groups of people, both 
inside and outside of the country, who perceived the Ukraine crisis as a conflict between 
Ukraine nationalists and ethnic Russian minorities. To counter the  narratives, the US 
State Department, which supported the new Ukraine regime, released a document entitled 
“President Putin’s Fiction: 10 False Claims About Ukraine”, contrasting Russia’s claims 
with the ‘facts’ (US Department of State, 2014). It is not easy to quantify the impact of 
Russia’s propaganda during the Ukraine crisis, but recent publications on Russia’s 
information operation during the crisis by foreign policy and security think tanks suggest 
that it was a success (Paul & Matthews, 2016; Snegovaya, 2015; StratCom, 2014). After 
an extensive review of Russia’s information operations, Jaitner and Mattsson (2015) 
concluded that Russia’s information warfare significantly contributed to its successful 
annexation of Crimea. 
In those studies, however, the focus is on Russian-language TV broadcasts and 
social media that target the Russian speaking population in Russia and the Eastern 
European countries, and they do not address Russia’s propaganda beyond the “Slavic 
world’. Russia’s English-language news broadcaster, RT, which  created a channel 
targeting American audiences in 2011, is often mentioned in literature on Russia’s soft-
power (Avgerinos, 2009; Cottiero, Kucharski, Olimpieva, & Orttung, 2015; Evans, 2005; 
Light, 2015; Nelson, Orttung, & Livshen, 2015; Saari, 2014), but a sobering analysis 
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conducted by Xie and Boyd-Barrett (2015) before the outbreak of the crisis suggests RT’s 
impact on the American population has been very limited due to the small number of  
audiences. Snegovaya (2015, p. 19), in a paper on the Ukraine crisis, confirms their view 
by saying that  “an increasing number of analysts point out that RT’s power to shape the 
narrative in the West is overstated”. If the Russian media’s reach is constrained to 
Russian-speaking communities, there are no worries regarding its influence on the North 
American and Western European public, and no need to spread counter-narratives, as the 
US State Department have done by publishing the unusual documents rebutting the 
Russian government’s claims about Ukraine.  
There is clearly a significant gap between the actual and the perceived ability of 
the Russian media to spread the government’s narratives internationally. This gap leads 
us to the question of how Russia spread its narratives beyond the Russian speaking 
communities during the Ukraine crisis. To answer this question, the author analysed news 
coverage of the Ukraine crisis by today’s most influential international news gathering 
and distribution agencies, namely Reuters, the Associated Press (AP) and Agence France-
Presse (AFP). News stories on Ukraine published by these three news agencies from 
2013-2014 were content analysed, and compared with news stories published by Russia’s 
state-controlled news agency, ITAR-TASS. The result shows that Reuters’ coverage of 
Ukraine during a 3-month period after the annexation of Crimea correlated highly with 
that of ITAR-TASS, and that some of Reuters’ news stories conveying Russian 
governments’ narratives were published on popular online news portals in the United 
States. This is a channel of Russian propaganda that has not been identified in earlier 
studies. 
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This discovery, however, by no means suggests that Reuters was complicit in 
Russia’s propaganda effort, but shows the vulnerability of today’s international news 
gathering and distribution system. While newspapers, TV broadcasters and news portals 
are increasingly dependent on the news agencies for foreign news gathering, they are 
under strong pressure to produce news stories at lower costs because general news 
services are unprofitable. The economic pressure encourages their foreign correspondents 
to rely on official sources in governments, some of whom are intent on exploiting 
international news agencies as a medium of foreign propaganda. Since western news 
agencies are still highly trusted, stories that contain propagandist messages are circulated 
internationally and published on online websites without professional gatekeeping. 
Reuters, AP and AFP 
Reuters, the AP and AFP are today’s most influential news agencies. They were 
founded in the western capitals in the middle of the 19th century, and developed as 
“fundamentally national organizations” (Boyd-Barrett, 1980, p. 36) in terms of their 
ownership structures and sources of revenues. However, these news agencies have 
transformed several times in their long histories. While the AP and AFP are still tied 
respectively to the United States and France by their owners and clients, Reuters is hardly 
a British organization as it is owned by a multi-national media and information company. 
The greatest challenge facing these news agencies is the rapid decline in the news market 
due to the emergence of new technologies, and their general news services are only 
sustained by cross-funding from more profitable financial information services. 
Reuters, the AP and AFP were all founded as commercial enterprises, but they 
developed in different relationships with their governments. AFP’s predecessor, Havas, 
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was established in Paris as an advertising agency in 1835, and developed its news agency 
service with privileged access to France’s official news sources and telegraph network. 
Reuters was established in London as an international news agency in 1851, and grew 
along with the expansion of the British Empire, enjoying access to the government’s 
communication facilities. The origin of the AP is the creation of a non-profit corporative 
in 1848 by newspaper publishers in New York. The AP lacked access to the government’s 
telegraph networks and was initially barred from entering a cartel established by 
European agencies, but it grew quickly as the lucrative domestic newspaper market 
expanded (Boyd-Barrett, 1980). 
AFP kept its close relationship with the French government and became an official 
news agency (OFI) in 1940 under the Vichy government in order to contribute to its 
propaganda. Reuters has never been an official agency and has been protected from 
government interventions due to its lack of involvement in domestic news distribution, 
but it received funds from the British government and was involved in propaganda for 
foreign countries during and between the world wars. The AP maintained higher degrees 
of independence from the government thanks to the strong tradition of media freedom in 
the United States, but its executives have occasionally expressed shared interests with the 
government, and its historical relationship with the Central Information Agency is opaque 
(Boyd-Barrett, 1980; Palmer & Tunstall, 1991). 
After the Second World War, state funding to the European news agencies 
declined steeply, and they were required to be self-sufficient. AFP’s status changed from 
an official agency to a cooperative news agency of French newspapers to ensure 
independence from the state in 1957, but its chief executive was appointed by the 
parliament and the government remained the most important client, whose subscription 
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fees accounted for 50% of its revenue. In the 1970s, Reuters was receiving funds from 
the British government through the provision of foreign news to the BBC World Service 
(Boyd-Barrett, 1997). 
Since the UK’s news market was relatively small, 80% of Reuters’ revenue was 
from overseas clients in the 1970s. AFP also lacked a large domestic news market, but its 
revenues from foreign clients only accounted for 20%, so it relied on clients in the public 
sector for more than 70% of domestic revenues (Boyd-Barrett, 1980; Moisy, 1996; 
Tunstall, 1999). In contrast to its European counterparts, the AP was enjoying the world’s 
largest domestic news market. Most of the clients of the AP were the American and 
Canadian media and the revenue shares of foreign clients were only 20% to 30% in the 
1970s (Boyd-Barrett, 1980). 
In the 1960s, Reuters launched financial information services to compensate for 
the small domestic demands, but its financial services grew exponentially along with the 
liberalization of the financial markets. Between 1977 and 1995, its overall revenue 
multiplied by 40, and its revenue share exceeded 90% of its total revenue by 1989 (Boyd-
Barrett, 1998; Palmer & Tunstall, 1991). Its profit from financial services was invested 
in the acquisition of a wide range of companies in the communication industry in the 
1990s, and it became one of the largest multi-media companies in the world (Moisy, 
1996). In 2008, Reuters was acquired by a Canadian media company, Thomson, and 
became a part of a multi-national media and information company. The AP also provided 
financial information services for non-media clients in alliance with Dow Jones, but this 
had not exceeded 25% of its revenues by 1996. AFP was also involved in financial news 
services for extra revenue, and distributing financial news supplied by Bloomberg (Boyd-
Barrett, 1997; Palmer, Boyd-Barrett, & Rantanen, 1998). It has been diversifying its 
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clients and services to reduce its dependency on public financing, but its status as a 
cooperative news agency prevents it from investing private capitals into new technologies 
(Laville, 2010; Palmer & Tunstall, 1991). Currently, financial information services are 
the main sources of funds for general news services at Reuters and the AP, although the 
contribution is much less in the latter. 
The emergence of the internet accelerated the diversification of the news products 
of the news agencies’ services because the abundance of online news content makes it 
impossible for them to keep high subscription fees for general news services (Sambrook, 
2010). Today, news agencies are providing new types of products, such as professional 
information services, specialist reports, feature materials and multimedia content (Bielsa 
& Bassnett, 2008; Laville & Palmer, 2012; Palmer & Tunstall, 1991; Sambrook, 2010). 
Apart from the diversification of the product line-up, news agencies are also expanding 
their range of customers, who include internet service providers. The bulk of studies have 
shown that news agencies are one of the most important providers of news materials for 
online news sites (Garcia, 2008; Paterson, 2005; Quandt, 2008; Tameling & Broersma, 
2013; Thurman & Myllylahti, 2009; Watanabe, 2013).  
Methodology 
The methodology of this research is a combination of quantitative and qualitative 
content analyses. The quantitative content analysis is employed to discover a period when 
the western news agencies’ coverage of Ukraine was affected by Russia’s narratives over 
the two years, and the qualitative content analysis is performed focusing on a smaller 
number of news stories published in that period. In both the quantitative and the 
qualitative analyses, Russian’s narratives were identified in ITAR-TASS’s news stories 
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on Ukraine, following the earlier study (Jaitner & Mattsson, 2015). Russia also has 
Interfax, which has stronger ties with western information companies, but it is an 
independent commercial news agency (Boyd-Barrett, 2014; Vartanova & Frolova, 2010). 
ITAR-TASS is a successor of the Soviet TASS, which was actively involved in 
international propaganda. The root of ITAR-TASS can be traced back to the Russian 
Telegraph Agency (RTA), which was created by the tsar in 1866. Its news service was 
initially limited to domestic clients, but Russia started the international distribution of 
newswires in 1904 through the St. Petersburg Telegraph Agency, which was created to 
overcome Russia’s dependence on a German news agency. After the communist 
revolution in 1917, the official news agency underwent several name changes, but finally 
became the Telegraph Agency of the Soviet Union, known as TASS, which was 
controlled by the Soviet authorities and often utilized as a propaganda medium of the 
communist party. After the collapse of the Soviet Union, TASS was succeeded by ITAR-
TASS, becoming one of the official news agencies of the Russian Federation along with 
RIA Novosti. After the government’s decision to disband RIA Novosti in December 2013 
due to its disobedience to the media control (Lankina & Niemczyk, 2015), ITAR-TASS 
became the only official news agency of the Russian Federation that is funded and 
administered by the government (Vartanova & Frolova, 2010).1 
Data collection 
As Jowett & O’Donnell (2011) note that research on propaganda requires a 
systematic and longitudinal analysis of news content, the author collected and analysed 
                                                 
1 ITAR-TASS was renamed TASS in September 2014 again to emphasize its connection to the 
predecessor (TASS, n.d.). 
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all the news stories on Ukraine published between January 1, 2013 and December 31, 
2014 by the four news agencies. The sources of data were three news databases: Integrum 
for ITAR-TASS, Factiva for Reuters, and Nexis for the AP and AFP. For ITAR-TASS, 
all the stories in the database in 2013-2014 were downloaded, but for Reuters, the AP and 
AFP, considering the large numbers of stories they publish, only stories related to Russia 
or Ukraine were downloaded with the search terms “russia*” or “ukrain*. The total 
numbers of news articles downloaded were 90,131 from ITAR-TASS and 21,795 from 
Reuters, 12,154 from the AP, and 31,898 from AFP excluding duplications. 
Content analysis 
The content analysis focused on news framing of democracy in Ukraine because 
it is central to the crisis as it relates to the mass protests that toppled the pro-Russian 
Ukrainian government and the following secessionist movement in south and east 
Ukraine. Content analysis is particularly challenging when news sources are prolific, but 
this research achieved an analysis of all the downloaded news stories by employing 
automated geographical classification and dictionary-based sentiment analysis techniques 
(Watanabe, 2017). The advantage of utilizing computerized techniques in this project is 
not only their efficiency, but also their consistency in analysing the content of news stories 
collected over a two-year period, which is very difficult for human coders to achieve. 
Geographical classification 
It is obvious that not all news stories searched and downloaded from the sources 
with the keyword queries were mainly about Ukraine. Therefore, the author selected news 
stories about Ukraine using a geographical classifier which accurately identifies the main 
geographical focus of news stories (Author, 2016). This geographical classifier 
recognizes diverse sets of geographical traits, including the names of people or 
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organizations (such as Arseny Yatsenyuk, OSCE or Black Sea Fleet), which are obtained 
from an automatic expansion of the list of place names based on co-occurrence of words 
(c.f. Qiu, Liu, Bu, & Chen, 2009). The expansion of the geographical lexicon is achieved 
by utilizing a large corpus of world news, which is, in this project, the complete set of 
news stories published by ITAR-TASS in 2013-2014. 2  After the geographical 
classification, the numbers of news stories were reduced to 15,203 (16.8%) in ITAR-
TASS, 3,899 (17.8%) in Reuters, 1,370 (11.2%) in the AP and 4,967 (15.5%) in AFP. 
Framing analysis 
The manner in which the news agencies reported democracy in the Ukraine crisis 
was analysed in terms of news framing (Entman, 2004). The frames in their news 
reporting are negative, neutral or positive, depending on the aspect of the crisis focused 
on, or the news source relied upon, and their temporal variations allow the author to 
compare the overall similarity in news coverage patterns between the news agencies. 
Positive frames of Ukraine’s democracy are agreement based on dialogue (e.g. signing a 
truce; ratifying a treaty); discussion between different parties (e.g. in the parliament or 
formal meetings); actions based on people’s support; actions respecting laws and the 
constitution (e.g. fair elections). Negative frames are use of violence against political 
opponents; coercion of opponents by political power or physical force; Infringement or 
limitation of civil rights (e.g. Arrest or prosecution of citizens); abuse of political power 
or excessive power concentration; existence of obstructions to dialogue; people’s 
expression of discontent against the government (e.g. mass anti-government rallies); lack 
of transparency in political institutions; restriction on journalists and mass media. 
                                                 
2 Crimea was treated as a separate territory in the classification and later merged into Ukraine. 
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Framing of Ukraine with respect to democracy was measured by constructing a 
topic-specific dictionary for computerized content analysis developed based on Latent 
Semantic Analysis (LSA) (Deerwester, Dumais, Landauer, Furnas, & Harshman, 1990). 
Words in the dictionary are those strongly associated with topics, which are identified by 
co-occurrences (collocation) with the target word ‘democra*’. These words are then 
weighted by estimated semantic similarity to general English positive and negative words 
in a semantic space of the news corpus smoothed by LSA.3 As a result, a dictionary on 
democracy that is comprised of 874 topic-related entry words accompanied by continuous 
scores representing positive-negative sentiment was produced. 
The dictionary on democracy assigned positive-negative framing scores to each 
of the news stories. The overall score of a news story was calculated as weighted-averages 
of the sentiment scores of words in the stories, ignoring all the words that did not appear 
in the dictionary. This scoring method has been proposed by Benoit and Laver (2003) and 
makes the scoring robust against occurrences of words irrelevant to the topic. The 
document scores were finally zero-centered and normalized making the standard 
deviation equal to 100. The quality of this dictionary-based coding was assessed by 
manually content analysing 30 randomly sampled news stories. The agreement between 
machine and manual coding measured by Pearson’s correlation coefficient was r=0.77. 
Topic filtering 
                                                 
3 The general English positive-negative seeds were identified by Turney and Littman (2003). Positive words were 
“good, nice, excellent, positive, fortunate, correct, superior”, and negative words were “bad, nasty, poor, negative, 
unfortunate, wrong, inferior”. See Landauer and Dutnais (1997) and Author (2015) for details of the technique. The 
dictionaries are available at http://koheiw.net/wp-content/uploads/2017/01/dictionary_ukraine.zip. 
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The dictionary was not only used for the framing analysis, but also for filtering 
out news articles unrelated to the topic. Since the dictionary is comprised of words 
strongly associated with the topics, the relevance of news articles to the topic can be 
judged based on the density (normalized frequency) of the entry words. For topic filtering, 
the author first generated a subset of the news corpus by selecting news articles in which 
topic-related target words appear more than once. Then, the first quantile density of entry 
words in the subset was calculated to obtain a threshold. Finally, the threshold was applied 
to the entire corpus to exclude articles not strongly related to the topic. Although this 
approach mechanically discards the lowest 25% of the articles in the subsets, it effectively 
excludes long irrelevant articles while retaining very short relevant articles. As a result of 
the geographical classification and topic-filtering, the total numbers of news stories 
mainly about Ukraine’s democracy became 5,149 (5.7%) for ITAR-TASS, 1,342 (6.1%) 
for Reuters, 757 for AP (6.2%), and 2,033 for AFP (6.3%).4 
Analysis 
In the Ukraine crisis, there were at least six pivotal events relevant to democracy, 
which are labelled as E1-6 in the following analysis. The first pivotal event was Victor 
Yanukovych’s speech in the Ukrainian parliament calling for legal reforms for the EU 
association plan on September 03, 2013 (E1), but the Ukrainian government suddenly 
changed its mind and announced it was abandoning trade negotiations with the European 
                                                 
4 The large gaps in the number of news stories is partially due to the difference in formats of news stories, 
and the differences become smaller in total number of words. ITAR-TASS is still the most productive 
(0.91 million), but only 1.5 times more than AFP (0.61 million); Reuters (0.31 million) and AP (0.27 
million) are much closer. 
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Union on November 21 (E2), which triggered anti-regime rallies in Kiev. The peaceful 
pro-EU rallies turned into violent confrontations between protesters and the police, which 
lead to the death of civilians on January 16, 2014 (E3). In the middle of the confrontation 
between the protesters and the police, Yanukovych disappeared from Kiev and was 
removed from presidency by the parliament on February 22 (E4). Soon after the collapse 
of the Yanukovych government, Russia announced a referendum on Crimea’s status and, 
reportedly, 95% of Crimean voters supported accession to Russia on March 16 (E5). 
Following Crimea’s accession to Russia, the Kiev government launched military 
operations against separatists in the eastern Ukraine regions on April 15 (E6). The 
Ukrainians elected Petro Poroshenko as a new president on May 17 (E7) and held a 
parliamentary election on October 26 (E8). 
Figure 1 shows the total number of words in the news stories published by the 
news agencies in 7-day periods. After E1, there are only small changes in increase in 
wordage in ITAR-TASS, but there are significant increases in all the news agencies after 
E2 and E3. The peaks of news coverage were around E4 in all the news agencies, but the 
western news agencies’ coverage significantly decreased in E4-6. News coverage of 
Ukraine by AFP and Reuters was intense around E7, but it was only ITAR-TASS that 
extensively covered events around E8. It is clear from this chart that Russian and French 
news agencies played key roles in news coverage of the Ukraine crisis. The interesting 
pattern in this figure is the almost equal amount of information published by those two 
news agencies in the early stage of the crisis (E2-4), although they were focusing on 
different elections in the later stage (E7-8). 
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Figure 1: Weekly wordage of news on democracy in Ukraine published by news 
agencies 
 
  
Figure 2 represents framing of democracy in Ukraine by the news stories 
published by the news agencies, where coloured curves are the averages of the sentiment 
scores calculated by local-regression (LOESS). The western news agencies’ coverage of 
Ukraine correlated highly with each other in the early stage of the crisis (E1-5), but this 
pattern disappeared in the later stage. Their coverage of Ukraine was considerably 
negative until E4 since their news on Ukraine was dominated by stories about political 
and social disruptions, but it became significantly positive after E4 as the collapse of the 
Yanukovych government ended the violence against protesters. In contrast, ITAR-TASS 
was consistently more positive about Ukraine than other news agencies except for the 
period following the collapse of the pro-Russian regime (E4-5). However, despite the 
contrasting overall news coverage patterns between the western and the Russian news 
agencies, there was a strong correlation between Reuters and ITAR-TASS following the 
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Russian annexation of Crimea (E5), which indicates that the content of the news stories 
published by these two news agencies were very similar during this period. 
 
Figure 2: Framing of democracy in Ukraine by news agencies 
 
  
To further investigate these intriguing patterns, the author first calculated the 
similarity in coverage of Ukraine between Reuters and ITAR-TASS only including the 
news articles published over the 90-day period following the annexation (March 16 to 
June 14, 2014). The correlation of the changes of the mean framing scores was as high as 
r=0.89 between Reuters and ITAR-TASS, while it was only r=0.07 for AP and r=0.33 for 
AFP. Yet, these correlation coefficients are only point estimations, because we cannot 
trust the confidence intervals of the Pearson’s correlation coefficients for the smoothed 
sentiment scores, which are not independent of each other. Therefore, the author took a 
non-parametric approach known as bootstrapping to test if the correlation between 
Reuters and ITAR-TASS was simply by chance. Bootstrapping is widely used to estimate 
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uncertainty in statistics by repeatedly resampling and calculating the statistics with 
replacement: the author repeated random resampling of Reuters news stories with 
replacement and calculated its correlation with ITAR-TASS for each of the sub-samples. 
By repeating this process 10,000 times, 10,000 correlation coefficients were obtained to 
establish if Reuters’s curve was statistically significantly correlated with ITAR-TASS’s 
curve. The proportion of positive correlation coefficients can be interpreted as confidence 
in the correlation between the news agencies not being zero. Figure 3 illustrates this 
bootstrapping process by showing first 100 curves generated by resampling (grey), along 
with the original curves (black and red). From the bootstrapping, 99.9% of the correlation 
coefficients were positive and median value was r=0.81 between ITAR-TASS and 
Reuters, while these values were 57.8% and r=0.06 in AP and 69.2% and r=0.21 in AFP. 
This result suggests that the Reuters’ framing of democracy in Ukraine during the period 
following the annexation of Crimea was statistically significantly correlated with ITAR-
TASS at 99.9% confidence. 
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Figure 3: Correlation in framing of the democracy in Ukraine after Russia’s annexation 
of Crimea.  
 
 
Although the above statistical analysis already shows very high confidence, the 
author also searched for actual news stories that created very strong correlation between 
Reuters and ITAR-TASS in the dataset. It was, in fact, not difficult to find Reuters news 
stories that highly resemble ITAR-TASS’s news stories in the 90-day period. Among 
many of such stories, two of the most striking examples are presented below. In the 
following examples, key words or phrases are underlined by the author for the readers’ 
convenience, but these are original and complete news stories.  
Example 1 
This Reuters’ news article dated March 16, 2014 originated from Moscow and 
reported a discussion on the Ukraine crisis between Russian and American foreign 
ministers, but it was dominated by the Russian government’s views on Ukraine. It 
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emphasized the importance of international support for “constitutional reforms” in 
Ukraine and the need to protect the “interests of all regions” in its eastern regions; it also 
quoted the Russian foreign minister claiming “massive lawlessness” against Russian-
speaking minorities. These were typical of the Russian government’s narratives reiterated 
in ITAR-TASS’s coverage of the crisis.  
 
Reuters 
Lavrov, Kerry agree to work on constitutional reform in Ukraine - Russian 
ministry 
MOSCOW, March 16 (Reuters) - Russian Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov and 
U.S. Secretary of State John Kerry agreed on Sunday to seek a solution to crisis 
in Ukraine by pushing for constitutional reforms there, the Russian foreign 
ministry said. 
It did not go into details on the kind of reforms needed except to say they should 
come "in a generally acceptable form and while taking into the account the 
interests of all regions of Ukraine". 
There was no immediate confirmation from Washington. 
In their second phone conversation in two days, Lavrov also urged Kerry to use 
the influence of the United States to encourage authorities in Kiev to stop 
"massive lawlessness" against Russian-speaking population. 
"Sergei Viktorovich Lavrov and John Kerry agreed to continue work to find a 
resolution on Ukraine through a speedy launch of constitutional reform with the 
support of international community," the ministry said in a statement. 
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ITAR-TASS 
URGENT - Int'l community should appeal to launch constitutional reform 
in Ukraine - Russia foreign minister Lavrov 
LONDON, March 14 (Itar-Tass) - The international community should appeal to 
launch a constitutional reform in Ukraine, Russian Foreign Minister Sergey 
Lavrov said after talks with U.S. Secretary of State John Kerry in the British 
capital on Friday. 
"The international community should appeal to launch the process of 
constitutional reform, the Verkhovna Rada (Ukrainian parliament - Itar-Tass eds) 
should invite all regions without exception to involve in it," the Russian foreign 
minister noted. 
 
URGENT - SERGEI LAVROV CONFIRMS RUSSIA'S POSITION ON 
CRIMEA REFERENDUM 
MOSCOW, March 16 (Itar-Tass) - Russian Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov has 
confirmed Russia's position on the referendum in Crimea. 
In a telephone conversation with US Secretary of State John Kerry on Sunday, 
Lavrov said Russia's position on the referendum in Crimea remained unchanged. 
Lavrov and Kerry "agreed to continue contacts to search for ways to settle the 
crisis in Ukraine in order to launch a constitutional reform in the country in respect 
of all Ukrainian regions", the Russian Foreign Ministry said. 
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URGENT - Lavrov urges US to use influence on Kiev authorities to make 
them stop mass lawlessness against Russian speaking population 
MOSCOW, March 16 (Itar-Tass) - Russian Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov urged 
the United States to use its influence on Kiev's authorities to make them to stop 
mass lawlessness and arbitrariness against the Russian speaking population. 
"In recent times ultranationalist and radical forces stepped up the activities in 
Ukraine's south-east. Victims among civilians are reported. Radicals' actions 
seriously destabilise the situation," Lavrov said in a telephone conversation with 
US Secretary of State John Kerry on Sunday. 
Kerry said the USA took necessary efforts that would yield positive results soon. 
 
Example 2 
On April 20, 2014, Reuters published a story on gun shooting in Slaviansk based 
on the Russian foreign ministry’s statement. This story reproduced the minister’s account 
of the event, which links the revolution in Kiev with a far-right nationalist group, and 
strongly resembled ITAR-TASS’s stories published on the same day, which emphasized 
the Kiev government’s responsibility for “de-escalating” the violence caused by 
“nationalists and extremists”, and the Russian government’s surprise and anger at the 
violence. 
 
Reuters 
Russia says Ukraine clash shows Kiev not disarming militants 
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MOSCOW, April 20 (Reuters) - A fatal gun battle overnight near the eastern 
Ukrainian city of Slaviansk shows that the Ukrainian authorities are failing to rein 
in armed extremists, Russia's foreign ministry said on Sunday. 
In a statement, the ministry said an unspecified number of innocent civilians were 
killed in an attack by armed men from "Right Sector," a far-right nationalist group 
which figured prominently in the overthrow of Moscow-backed president Viktor 
Yanukovich in February. 
"Russia is indignant about this provocation by gunmen, which testifies to the lack 
of will on the part of the Kiev authorities to rein in and disarm nationalists and 
extremists," the statement said. 
It said it was a source of surprise that the incident had happened after Russia, the 
European Union, the United States and Ukraine signed an April 17 accord in 
Geneva calling on people to desist from using violence or intimidation. 
"Russia insists on the strict implementation by Ukraine of the commitments it took 
upon itself to de-escalate the situation in the south-east of Ukraine," the ministry's 
statement said. (Reporting by Christian Lowe; Editing by Richard Balmforth) 
 
ITAR-TASS 
URGENT - Militants' provocation in Slavyansk proves Kiev's authorities not 
willing to disarm nationalists and extremists - Russia's FM 
MOSCOW, April 20 (Itar-Tass) - The militants organized the provocation on the 
night of Sunday in Ukraine's Slavyansk (Donetsk region). It proves the Ukrainian 
authorities are not willing to disarm nationalists and extremists, Russia's foreign 
ministry says in a statement published on Sunday. 
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"At the night of Sunday, April 20, the Easter armistice was broken in Slavyansk. 
The attack of the armed militants from the so-called Right Sector claimed lives of 
innocent civilians The Russian side is indignant at this provocation of the 
militants, which proves Kiev's authorities are not willing to control and disarm the 
nationalists and extremists." 
 
Russia insists on Ukraine's fulfilment of obligations to de-escalate situation 
in south-east - Russian FM 
(Adds details) MOSCOW, April 20 (Itar-Tass) - Russia insists on Ukraine's strict 
observance of the obligations it has undertaken to de-escalate the situation in 
Ukraine's south-eastern regions, Russia's foreign ministry said commenting on the 
events in Slavyansk, where militants from the Right Sector had breached the 
Easter armistice. 
"We are surprise[d] the tragedy happened already after signing on April 17 in the 
Geneva the statement of the four-sided meeting featuring representatives of 
Russia, the US, the EU and Ukraine, which contains the urge to refrain from any 
force actions, threats and provocations," the foreign ministry said. 
"The Russian side is indignant at this provocation of the militants, which proves 
Kiev's authorities are not willing to control and disarm the nationalists and 
extremists," the foreign ministry said adding the local people found in the 
attackers' cars weapons, maps of the region and symbols of the Right Sector. 
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Discussion 
Overall, there were significant differences in news coverage of the Ukraine crisis 
among the western news agencies. AFP was very active in covering the early stage of the 
Ukraine crisis and its total wordage was as high as ITAR-TASS’s. This is not surprising 
if we consider the French news agency’s strong ties to the government. In contrast, 
Reuters and the AP were less active in covering the crisis, presumably because of their 
higher degree of independence from the governments of their home countries. More 
importantly, the Reuters news coverage after the Crimean referendum strongly correlated 
with ITAR-TASS’s coverage, replicating the Russian government’s narratives as shown 
in the two examples. 
Reuters’ publication of such news stories does not necessarily mean that the 
western public was exposed to Russia’s narratives because its news services are primarily 
for news media whose foreign news editors chose which news stories to be published in 
newspapers or on websites. However, it is widely known that online news sites are heavily 
dependent on news agencies for foreign news gathering (Hamilton & Jenner, 2004; 
Paterson, 2011; Riffe & Budianto, 2001; Sambrook, 2010; Watanabe, 2013). To examine 
the possibility that Reuters’ news stories conveying Russian’s narratives were exposed to 
the public through online news sites, the author searched news stories published by Yahoo 
News and Huffington Post in 2014 for keywords ‘Ukraine’ and ‘fascist’ or ‘nazi’. Yahoo 
News and Huffington Post are the most popular news sites in the United States, which 
attracted over 100 million unique visitors in January 2015 (Pew Research Center, 2015). 
In this search, it was easy to discover large numbers of Reuters news stories that replicate 
the Russian government’s views, including those presented as examples (c.f. Huffington 
Post, 2014c, 2014a, 2014b, Yahoo News, 2014a, 2014b, 2014c, 2014d). According to the 
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by-lines in news summaries that the author collected in 2014 from the RSS feeds of Yahoo 
News and Huffington Post, respectively, 21% and 10% of foreign news stories were 
supplied by Reuters. Given the high popularity of the online news sites and their 
dependency on Reuters, it is very likely that substantial numbers of American news 
readers were exposed to Russian’s narratives in their daily news consumption. 
The striking similarity between news stories published by Reuters and ITAR-
TASS can be explained in only two ways: either Reuters reporters were totally dependent 
on press releases from the Russian government or they were subediting news wires 
supplied by ITAR-TASS. Although there was a report that indicates that the Russian 
government attempted to influence western journalists by giving them exclusive access 
to high ranking officials (Evans, 2005), and this is a possibility that we cannot exclude, 
we have no information to determine which was the case. Nonetheless, there are factors 
that could explain the Reuters news coverage. While the AP and AFP are still largely 
American and French news agencies in terms of their ownership, today’s Reuters is a 
multi-national corporation without strong ties to any of the home countries. This lack of 
connection to countries makes the news agency less reluctant to distribute news materials 
supplied by Russia. Also, for the media and technology giant, its news agency services 
are the least economically viable, only accounting for 2% of its total revenues (Thomson 
Reuters, 2016), and therefore, its journalistic resources for the Ukraine crisis could be 
insufficient to the extent that its reporters were forced to rely on the Russian government’s 
official sources. 
Another factor, which is rather technical, is the style of the Reuters news stories. 
The average length of Reuters news stories was 238 words, which is considerably shorter 
than in the AP (366 words) and in AFP (301 words). These short stories, as clearly show 
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in the examples, tend to rely on few sources and lack contextual information. Concise 
reporting is the classic style in newswires, and this is not problematic when recipients of 
newswires are news editors who have access to different news sources and the ability to 
correctly interpret news reports based on their background knowledge. However, when 
these stories based on the Russia government’s statement are published on popular online 
news sites without proper contextualization, they could mislead general audiences about 
the nature of the Ukraine crisis. Newswires are often updated several times with 
additional information, but updated stories do not always reach the audiences of the 
original stories on news portal sites. Once the audience believed that the revolution in 
Ukraine was a coup by nationalists, it was easy for them to reinforce their beliefs through 
selective exposure to online content via search engines or social media. 
In the quantitative content analysis, a strong correlation between Reuters and 
ITAR-TASS was found only after the referendum in Crimea, but this does not necessarily 
mean that Reuters’ reliance on Russian’s official sources only started after this event. As 
shown in Figure 1, Reuters was particularly inactive in covering Ukraine during this 
period, while ITAR-TASS was very active in doing so. This suggests that the large input 
from the Russian officials following the referendum could have increased the prominence 
of their narratives in the small number of Reuters stories, and made Reuters’ coverage of 
Ukraine correlate nearly perfectly with ITAR-TASS. In this case, the Russian 
government’s narratives had been circulated internationally by the news agency from the 
earlier stage of the crisis. 
The findings of this study by no means suggest that Reuters were complicit in 
Russia’s international propaganda effort, but they highlight the vulnerability of today’s 
international news gathering and distribution systems. In news gathering, on the one hand, 
Paper 2 108 
more and more western newspapers and TV broadcasters are retreating from foreign news 
gathering. According to Pew Research Center (2015), the numbers of foreign bureaus of 
CNN, Fox News and MSNBC decreased by 10% (from 53 to 48) between 2010 to 2015. 
A decrease in foreign correspondents usually increases their dependence on news 
agencies, but news agencies are also making losses in traditional news services and these 
are sustained only by cross-funding from financial information services. As earlier news 
production studies have shown (Fico, 1984; Gans, 1979; Tuchman, 1978), the lack of 
sufficient journalistic resources has a direct impact on the quality of news content. As 
Fico (1984, p. 42) eloquently stated, “the more constrained the reporter, the more narrow 
the range of sources relied upon and thus the more narrow the diversity of perspectives 
presented to the public”. In news distribution, news agencies’ stories are published on 
new portal sites with little gatekeeping and no editing to quickly fill the large capacity of 
the online media (Arant & Anderson, 2001; Cottle & Ashton, 1999; Garcia, 2008; 
Phillips, 2009; Quandt, 2008; Tameling & Broersma, 2013), these stories often appearing 
with the logo marks of the still-highly-trusted news agencies. Newswires are not only 
published to the most popular news sites, but  also on small news sites all over the world. 
These stories are then copied and shared on social media, removing the traces to the 
original sources. 
In conclusion, the Ukraine crisis clearly showed us that national boundaries are 
becoming almost meaningless for some of the western news agencies. Historically, 
western news agencies are tied to their counties of origin based on their ownership and 
source of revenues, but Reuters was first to cut such ties. Even today, Reuters is the main 
supplier for British newspapers, but it is also one of the main sources of the most popular 
online news sites in the United States. Reuters was also heavily dependent on the Russian 
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government’s official news sources in the international crisis, in which Russia collided 
with the United States and the European Union over vital strategic interests, and the news 
agency almost undermined the interests of the western countries. This discovery rebuts 
the theory of media imperialism that claims the western multi-national media 
corporations are complicit in their governments’ international propaganda (Herman & 
Chomsky, 1988/1995). For multi-national corporations like Reuters, the interests of their 
home countries are not the priority in pursuit of their own economic interests. Given the 
rapidly changing relationship between the states and corporations in the media and 
communications industry, we must further investigate flows of information in the global 
news gathering and distribution system as they have a substantial impact on world 
politics. 
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Newsmap: A semi-supervised approach to 
geographical news classification 
Abstract 
This paper presents the results of an evaluation of three different types to 
geographical news classification methods: (1) simple keyword matching, a popular 
method in media and communications research; (2) geographical information extraction 
systems equipped with named-entity recognition and place name disambiguation 
mechanisms (Open Calais and Geoparser.io); and (3) a semi-supervised machine learning 
classifier developed by the author (Newsmap). Newsmap substitutes manual coding of 
news stories with dictionary-based labelling in creation of large training sets to extracts 
large number of geographical words without human involvement, and it also identifies 
multi-word names to reduce the ambiguity of the geographical traits fully automatically. 
The evaluation of classification accuracy of the three types of methods against 5000 
human-coded news summaries reveals that Newsmap outperforms the geographical 
information extraction systems in overall accuracy, while the simple keyword matching 
suffers from ambiguity of place names in countries with ambiguous place names. 
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In recent years, there has been a growing interest in so-called ‘digital methods’ 
that aim to answer important questions in media studies by collecting and analysing data 
available on the internet (Rogers, 2013). In this context, social media such as Twitter, 
Facebook, and Instagram are attracting much attention, but the scope of digital methods 
is not limited to user-generated content; some of the researchers collected news stories 
online to study mainstream news media (Blondheim, Segev, & Cabrera, 2015; Watanabe, 
2013; Zuckerman, 2003, 2008). Zuckerman, in his pioneering Global Attention Profile 
project, gauged news media’s attention to foreign countries by automatically searching 
the websites of the New York Times, Washington Post, BBC, and CNN. More recently, 
Watanabe (2013) collected news stories from newspapers and online portals (Google 
News and Yahoo News) in India and the United States to detect cultural biases in the 
news portals run by American IT giants. Blondheim et al (2015) collected economic news 
stories from 35 online news sites between 2012 and 2015 to study changes in the 
prominence of certain countries in the world economy. 
It is relatively easy to construct a very large dataset of news stories through 
machine-readable pages such as RSS (Rich Site Summary) feeds, and the number of 
people who collect news stories online for research purposes is expected to grow. In those 
studies, it is very common for the researchers to apply computer-assisted content analysis 
due to the size of the datasets, which are too large for manual content analysis. In fact, in 
the abovementioned studies, classification of news stories in terms of their geographical 
focus was performed by constructing a dictionary and searching for keywords in the 
documents. This is a widely-used method in computer-assisted content analysis in media 
studies, but there are at least two alternatives: geographical information extraction 
systems and machine learning techniques. Geographical information extraction systems 
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are a set of natural language processing technologies that recognize entities (e.g. places, 
people and organizations) in documents to associate them with locations in knowledge 
databases. Machine learning is a data-driven approach to geographical classification of 
documents, where algorithms discover association between words and locations in 
training data. 
In this paper, I will present the results of my systematic evaluation of the three 
approaches to geographical news classification with 5,000 manually coded news 
summaries to highlight their strengths and weaknesses. A keyword dictionary is 
constructed from existing sources (gazetteers), and information extraction systems are 
those publicly available through Web APIs (Open Calais and Geoparaser.io), but I have 
developed a new machine learning technique, Newsmap, to overcome the short comings 
of the other two methods.1 In this new technique, a geographical classifier is constructed 
from a corpus of news stories with weak supervision given by a small manually compiled 
dictionary. The classifier recognizes not only names of places but people and 
organizations, and scores words according the levels of association with countries. 
Despite the minimal human input, this technique archives high classification accuracy, 
particularly in recall, thanks to the richness of information in the training data. 
The result of the evaluation will show that the large dictionary created from 
gazetteers is confused by place names that appear in more than one country, most often 
in the United States and United Kingdom, and names of people that are also used in names 
of places. The geographical information extraction systems, however, perform very well 
                                                 
1 R package is available at https://github.com/koheiw/newsmap. 
 Paper 3 121 
in term of precision but not in terms of recall, because their knowledge databases have 
only a limited amount of information on people and organizations associated with 
locations. Newsmap performs as well as geographical information extraction systems in 
precision, and outperforms these in recall, thanks to the large amount of information 
extracted from the training data. 
The basic unit of geographical classification in  this paper is nation for consistency 
with earlier studies of foreign news, although I am fully aware that this approach has been 
criticised for being ‘methodological nationalism’ (Wimmer & Glick Schiller, 2002). 
Focus on nations seems particularly odd in studies of international news because these 
studies are often motivated by today’s rapid political, economic and cultural globalization, 
but I argue that nation is still a suitable unit for foreign news classification, because news 
stories often mention names of countries to locate foreign events. When we focus on 
regional or supra-national levels, results of the national-level classification can be 
aggregated into groups of countries. 
Definition of Geographical Focus of News Stories 
Although there are several studies on news coverage of foreign countries, 
definitions of geographical focus have not been clearly stated in the literature. Therefore, 
geographical focus in this research is defined as locations of events or issues that stories 
are mainly concerned with, as it seems the most widely agreed. Nonetheless, there are 
stories that cannot be classified based on this definition. In those cases, the following 
criteria are applied in order. If there are no events or issues in the story, classification is 
performed based on the main actors’ association with countries; when news stories do not 
concern countries, they are classified as regions (Africa, America, Antarctic, Arctic, Asia, 
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Europe, Oceania); when news stories have no information on location or no association 
with locations (e.g. stories on space science), they are treated as unclassifiable.  
Challenges in Geographical Classification of News 
Automated identification of places in documents has been studies in computer 
science, and it is becoming increasingly important for geographical information retrieval 
systems that interpret user queries and return information on specific locations (Buscaldi, 
2011; Martins & Calado, 2010; Zaila & Montesi, 2015). The main challenge in the 
development of geographical information retrieval systems is the ambiguity of place 
names (or toponyms). For example, “nice” can be either Nice in France or an English 
adjective (geo/non-geo ambiguity), and “London” refer to either the UK’s capital or a city 
in Canada’s Ontario (geo/geo ambiguity). To solve these ambiguities, knowledge-based, 
map-based and data-driven methods have been developed for geographical information 
extraction systems (Zaila & Montesi, 2015). In the knowledge-based system, it is 
assumed that the places with larger population or physical areas are more likely to occur 
in documents. In the map-based disambiguation, places in closer proximity to 
unambiguous or disambiguated locations in the same document are chosen over others. 
Data-driven methods extract association between place names from data with or without 
human supervision. These techniques are utilized in geographical information extraction 
systems such as the Edinburgh Geoparser, CLAVIN, Open Calais and Geoparser.io. 2  
                                                 
2 The Edinburgh Geoparser: https://www.ltg.ed.ac.uk/software/geoparser/; CLAVIN: 
https://clavin.bericotechnologies.com; Open Calais: http://www.opencalais.com; Geoparser.io: https://geoparser.io 
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Nevertheless, the challenges in geographical classification of news stories are 
different from those in geographical information retrieval for at least three reasons. These 
differences demand development of a specialized system for geographical news 
classification, but also make creation of it relatively easy. First, systems should determine 
the single most relevant location to a document in classification tasks, while documents 
are given multiple geographical tags in information retrieval applications. Second, 
important geographical traits in news stories are not only names of placed, but also names 
of widely recognized people (e.g. Barak Obama) or organizations (e.g. the Pentagon), 
because locations associated with these actors are often not explicitly mentioned in news 
articles. Third, geographical traits in news stories are less ambiguous than other types of 
documents, because it is very unlikely that news worthy events to occur concurrently in 
places with the same; even if it happens, professional journalists distinguish between 
places very clearly in news articles (Smith & Crane, 2001).   
With the absence of specialized tool, geographical news classification was often 
performed by simple keyword matching in earlier studies texts (Blondheim et al., 2015; 
Watanabe, 2013; Zuckerman, 2008), but it is difficult determine the most strongly 
associated counties based on word counting, particularly in short texts, and they usually 
lack information on people and organizations associated with particular locations, which 
also offer important information on stories geographical focus (Roberts, Bejan, & 
Harabagiu, 2010). One can create a geographical dictionary that also contains names of 
people and organizations, but it is challenging to maintain such a dictionary, especially 
when the research project spans a long period concerning multiple countries, because 
there are many key figures and organizations whose association with locations changes 
regularly. For example, occupiers of influential public offices change constantly; 
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previously unknown groups or individuals suddenly attract the attention of the public; 
organizations merge with others and change names; people and organizations simply 
move from one country to another. Those who maintain large geographical dictionary 
must respond to all these occurrences. 
Fully supervised machine learning techniques such as the naive Bayes classifier 
have been used for various document classification tasks, but creation of a training set is 
particularly difficult when the number of potential classes is larger and documents are not 
uniformly distributed across the classes. For instance, in the classic human-labelled 
benchmark dataset, Reuters-21578, all the 21,578 documents fell into 175 location classes 
(countries), even though there were over 200 countries in the world at the time. 
Supervised geographical classifiers never correctly classify stories about countries that 
are missing in the training set (Buscaldi, 2011). 
Newsmap: semi-supervised geographical news classifier 
Newsmap is a data-driven approach to geographical news classification. It 
constructs a classifier from a news corpus with weak supervision given through a 
manually complied small dictionary. This “semi-supervision” frees us from the burden of 
manually classifying thousands of news stories to train a model. The advantages of this 
technique are the following: (1) the classifier recognizes not only names of places, but 
also names of people and organizations, (2) the classifier can identify the most relevant 
countries based on continuous scores attached to words in the model, (3) the classifier 
can be constructed and updated with minimal human involvement, and (4) very large 
training data can be used to train the classifier for infrequent classes.  
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This section explains the procedure to construct a Newsmap classifier in detail. 
The examples presented to enhance readers’ understanding are taken from the 
experiment. The training set is news summaries collected from the Yahoo News website 
in 2014 as detailed at the beginning of the Experiment section.   
Feature selection 
Newsmap identifies proper names solely based on capitalization of words 
following the earlier work (Smith & Crane, 2001; Wacholder, Ravin, & Choi, 1997). This 
method is not comparable to syntactical named-entity recognition, but the purpose here 
is to select features that the classifier should extract from the corpus. This simple approach 
works sufficiently well with single-word names, but identification of multi-word names 
requires (e.g. New York or Prime Minister David Cameron) a different mechanism. 
Wacholder et al (1997) created a system to automatically identify multi-word names in 
the corpus based on pre-defined rules, which requires considerable manual inputs, but it 
is based on statistical estimation of association between words in Newsmap, exploiting 
today’s greater computational capacity. 
Newsmap identifies multi-word names by estimating strength of contiguous 
collocations of capitalized words based on an algorithm proposed by Blaheta and 
Johnson’s (2001). The system first extract all the sequences capitalized words (8,321 
unique combinations were found in the training corpus) from the training corpus.3 Then, 
it performs pair-wise comparison of sequences in terms of the occurrences of the same 
                                                 
3 Sequences that appear less than 10 times and more than five word long are ignored to limit the number. 
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words in the same positions. Here an absence of trailing capitalized words (show by □ 
signs), which suggests the combinations are semantically complete, are also considered 
as a match. For example, “British Prime Minister David Cameron” and “British Prime 
Minister Tony Blair” are sequences of 𝑛𝑛 = 6 words and have 𝑚𝑚 = 4 matches: 
Sequence 1 British Prime Minister David Cameron □ 
Sequence 2 British Prime Minister Tony Blair □ 
Match TRUE TRUE TRUE FALSE FALSE TRUE 
 
In the next example, where the lengths of sequences are different, the number of matches 
is 𝑚𝑚 = 2: 
Sequence 1 British Prime Minister David Cameron □ 
Sequence 2 British Airways □ □ □ □ 
Match TRUE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE TRUE 
 
After comparing the sequences with all other sequences, we obtain odds ratios 𝜆𝜆  of 
perfect or no matches over partial matches in a log-linear model for each of the sequences: 
 
𝜆𝜆 = (𝑛𝑛 − 1) log𝐶𝐶0 − � log𝐶𝐶𝑚𝑚𝑛𝑛−1
𝑚𝑚=1
+ log𝐶𝐶𝑛𝑛 
 
where 𝐶𝐶𝑚𝑚  denotes the number of sequences that have 𝑚𝑚  matches. To test statistical 
significance of the odds ratios, their standard errors are obtained by taking squares of the 
sum of inverse of the counts: 
𝜎𝜎 = �(𝑛𝑛 − 1)2
𝐶𝐶0
+ � 1
𝐶𝐶𝑚𝑚
𝑛𝑛−1
𝑚𝑚−1
+ 1
𝐶𝐶𝑛𝑛
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The threshold for the statistical significance is set to z-score 𝜆𝜆/𝜎𝜎 > 3.09, which is a 99.9% 
confidence level. Continuing with the above example, “British Prime Minister David 
Cameron” was found insignificant in this test due to occurrences of “British” in many 
other sequences, but “Prime Minister David Cameron” was found significant. 
Seed dictionary 
In Newsmap, seed dictionary is the only manual input to the system, and serves 
as semi-supervision. The seed dictionary that I created contains names of 239 countries 
and their major cities, as well as their demonyms.4 For example, the keywords registered 
to the seed dictionary for Ukraine and Iraq are only {Ukraine, Ukrainian*, Kiev} and 
{Iraq, Iraqi*, Baghdad}. Names of cities in the seed dictionary are restricted to the capital 
and the largest cities; therefore, the total number of keywords for all 239 countries is 800 
words, on average, only 3.3 words per country. 
Word scoring 
Newsmap calculates associations scores of words solely based on co-occurrences 
of words, therefore does not require costly syntactical analysis of a large corpus. Firstly, 
the system searches individual documents for keywords in the seed dictionary (simple 
keyword matching) and gives them class labels (countries); secondly, the system 
aggregates the frequency of words according to the class labels to create contingency 
tables. In the contingency table presented below, 𝑐𝑐𝑗𝑗 is a country of interest and 𝑐𝑐?̅?𝑗 is all 
                                                 
4 The seed dictionary is available at https://github.com/koheiw/Newsmap/tree/master/data  
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other countries; 𝑤𝑤𝑖𝑖 is the word for which scores are calculated and ?´?𝑤𝑖𝑖 is all other words; 
𝐹𝐹 values are all raw frequency counts of words in respective classes. 
 𝑐𝑐𝑗𝑗 𝑐𝑐?̅?𝑗 
𝑤𝑤𝑖𝑖 𝐹𝐹11 𝐹𝐹01 
?´?𝑤𝑖𝑖 𝐹𝐹10 𝐹𝐹00 
𝑤𝑤𝑖𝑖 + ?´?𝑤𝑖𝑖 𝐹𝐹1∙ 𝐹𝐹0∙ 
 
The estimated score ?̂?𝑠 of word 𝑤𝑤𝑖𝑖for a country 𝑐𝑐𝑗𝑗 is calculated as the association 
between 𝑤𝑤𝑖𝑖 and 𝑐𝑐𝑗𝑗 subtracted by the association between 𝑤𝑤𝑖𝑖 and 𝑐𝑐?̅?𝑗: 
?̂?𝑠𝑖𝑖𝑗𝑗 = 𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙 𝐹𝐹11𝐹𝐹1∙ − 𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙 𝐹𝐹01𝐹𝐹0∙  
Table 1 shows scores given to the words most strongly associated with Ukraine 
and Iraq. The keywords for Ukraine in the seed dictionary only match “Ukraine”, 
“Ukrainian” and “Kiev”, but many new words are identified based on cooccurrences: 
Mariupol, Lugansk and Slovyansk are small but important cities in the Ukraine; President 
Viktor Yanukovich, Prime Minister Arseny Yatseniuk and President Petro Poroshenko 
are the leaders of the country before and after the Euromaidan revolution in early this 
year. Similarly, the keywords in the seed dictionary for Iraq only match “Iraq”, 
“Baghdad”, “Iraqi” and “Iraqis”, but the classifier discovered names of smaller cities 
(Anbar, Ramadi, Fallujah, Kirkuk and Tikrit, including their spelling variants), political 
leaders (Saddam Hussein and Prime Minister Nuri) and key ethnic groups (Iraqi Kurds 
and Iraq’s Sunni). 
Table 1: Top 50 features for Ukraine and Iraq in Newsmap 
 
Ukraine Score Iraq Score 
1 Ukraine 11.84 Iraq 11.58 
2 Ukrainian 10.36 Baghdad 10.56 
3 Kiev 10.34 Iraqi 10.39 
4 Ukrainians 7.94 Iraqis 8.15 
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5 Ukrainian President Petro Poroshenko 7.64 Anbar 8.14 
6 Mariupol 7.15 Ramadi 7.55 
7 President Petro Poroshenko 6.94 Fallujah 7.51 
8 Prime Minister Arseny Yatseniuk 6.92 Iraqi Kurdish 7.50 
9 Natalia Zinets 6.84 Kirkuk 7.42 
10 Lugansk 6.72 Tikrit 7.36 
11 Pavel Polityuk 6.71 Falluja 7.32 
12 Donetsk Ukraine 6.63 Maliki’s 7.25 
13 Slovyansk 6.61 Arbil 7.20 
14 Ukrainian President Viktor Yanukovich 6.54 Iraqi Kurdistan 7.12 
15 Slaviansk 6.48 Iraqi Kurds 7.08 
16 Richard Balmforth Kiev 6.46 Prime Minister Nuri 6.97 
17 Petro Poroshenko 6.38 Irbil 6.90 
18 Crimean Tatars 6.36 Isabel Coles 6.74 
19 Kharkiv 6.12 Iraqi Prime Minister Nuri 6.73 
20 Yanukovich 6.05 Baiji 6.71 
21 President Viktor Yanukovich 6.04 Samarra 6.68 
22 Slavyansk 6.03 Amerli 6.56 
23 Andriy Lysenko 5.98 Levant 6.54 
24 Andriy 5.98 Iraq PM 6.53 
25 Ukraine PM 5.98 Sistani 6.51 
26 Hrabove 5.97 Raheem Salman 6.47 
27 Kramatorsk 5.89 Diyala 6.40 
28 Pavel Polityuk Kiev 5.86 Baquba 6.32 
29 Kiev’s 5.85 Sinjar 6.29 
30 Poroshenko’s 5.84 Arbil Iraq 6.15 
31 Ukrainian President Viktor Yanukovych 5.82 Sadr 6.15 
32 Poroshenko 5.81 Mosul Dam 6.15 
33 Natalia Zinets Kiev 5.80 Iraq’s Sunni 6.13 
34 Tatars 5.75 Baghdad’s 6.11 
35 Luhansk 5.75 Jurf 6.10 
36 Donetsk 5.74 KRG 6.08 
37 Vitaly Klitschko 5.73 Mosul 6.03 
38 Ukraine’s Poroshenko 5.68 Saddam Hussein 6.03 
39 Right Sector 5.64 Basra 6.00 
40 Richard Balmforth 5.64 Iraqi PM 6.00 
41 Volodymyr 5.62 Ahmed Rasheed 6.00 
42 President Viktor Yanukovich’s 5.59 Raheem Salman Baghdad 5.97 
43 Anton Zverev 5.57 Grand Ayatollah Ali 5.94 
44 Oettinger 5.54 Kurdistan Regional Government 5.91 
45 Serhiy 5.52 Ned Parker 5.91 
46 Interior Minister Arsen Avakov 5.49 Ahmed Rasheed Baghdad 5.91 
47 East Ukraine 5.49 Michael Georgy Baghdad 5.88 
48 Vyacheslav Ponomaryov 5.43 Maliki 5.85 
49 Donetsk People’s Republic 5.43 Sinjar Mountain 5.82 
50 Ukraine’s Moscow 5.40 Sadr City 5.76 
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Classification 
Newsmap predicts countries most strongly associated with documents in the 
classification stage simply by finding a country that yields the largest total scores ?̂?𝑠 
weighted by the normalized frequency of word 𝑓𝑓𝑖𝑖 in documents: 
 
?̂?𝑐 = 𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑙𝑙𝑚𝑚𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎
𝑗𝑗
��?̂?𝑠𝑖𝑖𝑗𝑗𝑓𝑓𝑖𝑖
𝑗𝑗𝑖𝑖
 
Experiment 
There are several geographical information extraction tools available both in the 
forms of open source software packages and Web APIs, but I have chosen only the latter 
type to compare with Newsmap, because the former type are hardly accessible to media 
and communications scholars as they demands users advanced knowledge of Java and 
operation systems, whereas the online interfaces of Open Calais and Geoparser.io require 
only a short block of code in widely-used programming language (e.g. Python or R). They 
are commercial services but offers free access through non-commercial user accounts. 
Open Calais is provided by Thomson Reuters, one of the largest companies in the media 
and information industry and the owner of Reuters news agency, which gives the expect 
that Open Calais is optimized for extracting geographical information from news articles. 
Dlugolinsky et al (2013) have reported that it recognizes 39 types of entities and its 
performance in identification of geographical locations in microblog posts is the best 
among six well-known knowledge extraction tools. Geoparser.io is an online service 
started in 2016, specialising in geographical information extraction from natural texts. 
The founder of the service is one of the original developers of CLAVIN, who aims to 
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improve the accessibility of geographical information extraction tools by providing the 
online interfaces (Greenbacker, 2017). 
In addition to these geographical information extraction tools, I constructed a 
geographical dictionary, which contains 27,678 place names in 255 countries to replicate 
the methodologies in earlier studies (Blondheim et al., 2015; Zuckerman, 2003, 2008). 
The dictionary combines the list of the names of countries, administrative districts and 
cities with a population larger than 15,000. The gazetteers were created originally for the 
United States National Geospatial-Intelligence Agency’s GEOnet Names Server (NGA) 
and Geological Survey’s Geographic Names Information System (GNIS), but have been 
made available at GeoNames.5 
These gazetteers are also used by the above-mentioned geographical information 
extraction systems. In applying the dictionary, English stopwords were removed from the 
documents and case-sensitive matching was performed to minimalize false positive 
matches.  
Table 2 summaries the different approaches to geographical classification of news 
in Newsmap, Open Calais, Geoparser.io and the gazetter. Newsmap as a semi-supervised 
machine learning technique is ignorant about syntactical structure of documents, and 
named-entity recognition is solely based on capitalization of words; it requires training 
sets to be taken from the same time period as the test set to learn time-dependent 
association between names and places; it downplay ambiguous names that appear in 
                                                 
5 GeoNames: http://www.geonames.org 
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different countries by assigning small weights. 6 Open Calais and Geoparser.io utilize 
syntactical analysis in named-entity recognition, and lookup gazetteers for place names 
identified; place names are disambiguated exploiting the contextual information (map and 
knowledge-based). The dictionary as the simplest method performs neither named-entity 
recognition nor place name disambiguation, merely searching the list of place names for 
the words in documents. 
The differences in the ways these methods detect geographical traits result in how 
they determine the focus of news stories. Newsmap ranks countries based on continuous 
scores assigned to names, but Open Calais only gives entities (places, persons or 
organizations) discreet relevance scores ranging from 0.0 to 1.0 in five steps, which does 
not always help identify the single most important country; Geoparser.io and the 
dictionary only report the positions and number of countries discovered. Therefore, when 
Open Calais gives the same total relevance scores to more than one country, identification 
of the top country becomes random among these; when Geoparser.io or the gazetteer find 
multiple counties with the same frequency, documents are classified into the country first 
mentioned.  
Table 2: Characteristics of the geographical classification methods 
 Type NE recognition PN disambiguation Relevance scoring 
Newsmap Machine learning Capitalization Temporal Continuous 
Open Calais Web API Syntax Contextual Discreet 
Geoparser.io Web API Syntax Contextual None 
Gazetteer Dictionary None None None 
                                                 
6 For example, names of athletes who travel frequently and appear in many different countries in the 
training set gain only small weights for all the countries. Therefore, their impact on the overall 
classification is small. 
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Dataset 
Training set 
In this experiment, the Newsmap classifier was constructed from a corpus of 
online news. I have been subscribing to the Yahoo News US edition, which continuously 
supplies news stories produced by international news agencies (mainly AP, AFP, and 
Reuters) via a RSS feed, and a total of 156,980 items were collected in 2014 
(approximately 13 million words). These texts are not complete news articles but 
summaries containing both headings and lead sentences. Use of newswires collected 
online is advantageous in the construction of a geographical news classifier because (1) 
news agencies tend to cover a wider range of countries than the retail media (Watanabe, 
2013), and (2) subscription to RSS feeds allows users to sample stories without any pre-
filtering. The Newsmap classifier constructed with the seed dictionary and the corpus 
contains 68,755 words for 227 countries. This training process takes only less than five 
minutes to complete on a laptop computer. 
Test set 
The classification accuracy of the four methods were measured by a set of 
manually coded news stories. This dataset is also comprised of news summaries collected 
online in 2014 but from different outlets: The Times (UK), The New York Times, The 
Australian, The Nation (Kenya), and The Times of India. From the collected news 
summaries, a balanced sample of 5,000 was randomly taken and classified by human 
coders in terms of their geographic association. The dataset needs be this large because 
international news coverage typically follows a power-law distribution, in which 
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countries with little influence internationally appear only very infrequently. The 
motivation behind the choice of news sources was also to include countries that are under-
represented in the western news media. 
Manual coding of news stories was performed using an Oxford-based online 
recruiting platform, Prolific Academic.7 The dataset was divided into 20 subsets, each 
containing 250 items, and participants were asked to choose countries most strongly 
associated with the news items, focusing on the location of the events that the stories 
mainly concerned (single-membership). 8  The coders’ performance was constantly 
monitored using gold-standard answers created by the author, and coded subsets that did 
not achieve more than 70% agreement with the gold standard were discarded. Eventually, 
the same items were coded by at least three different coders, and the inter-coder 
agreement measured by Fleiss’ multi-coder Kappa was 𝜅𝜅 = 0.75. After disagreement 
among coders was settled by the majority rule, the coders’ agreement with the gold 
standard became 𝜅𝜅 = 0.88. The main causes of disagreement were (1) the difficulty in 
identifying countries most strongly associated with international stories, and (2) the 
coders’ lack of knowledge about differences between countries with similar names (e.g. 
Congo Republic and The Democratic Republic of the Congo). Such imperfection of 
human coding imposes a ceiling on the accuracy found in the experiments, even if the 
                                                 
7 Prolific Academic: https://prolificacademic.co.uk 
8 The use of regional and ‘I do not know’ categories were also allowed if necessary. The coding instruction is 
available online: http://koheiw.net/wp-content/uploads/2015/02/Newsmap_coding_04_online.pdf. 
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classifications were perfect from the experts’ point of view, but their coding was treated 
as true answers. 
Measurements 
To simulate the most common setting in media studies where researchers select 
news stories based on their geographical focus, the classification is single membership in 
this experiment. Measurements of the classification accuracy are micro-average precision 
and recall, which are the standard measures for document classification tasks in computer 
science literature. ‘Precision’ is the ability of classifiers to retrieve ONLY relevant items, 
while ‘recall’ is the ability to retrieve ALL the relevant items. There is usually a trade-off 
relationship between the two abilities, and high precision often leads to low recall, and 
vice-versa. Low precision indicates many false positive cases, and low recall indicates 
many false negative cases. Micro-average precision and recall are calculated by pooling 
the classification results of all the classes, while macro-average precision and recall are 
the average of precision and recall separately calculated for each class.  
Results 
The results of the experiment show that the overall classification accuracy of 
Newsmap is 0.80 both in precision and recall, while they are 0.83 and 0.63 in Open Calais, 
0.81 and 0.64 in Geoparser.io and 0.64 and 0.48 in the dictionary (Figure 1). The 
harmonic means of precision and recall (F1 scores) are 0.80, 0.72, 0.72 and 0.55, 
respectively. 
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Figure 1: Overall classification accuracy 
 
In Figure 2, we find roughly the same level of precision across the most frequent 
countries in Newsmap, Open Calais and Geoparser.io. Exceptions are the Newsmap’s 
relatively poor performance in the United Kingdom (GB), China (CN) and Malaysia 
(MY), and Open Calais’s lack of precision figure in South Sudan (SS). There is no 
precision figure for Open Calais, because it does not distinguish between Sudan and South 
Sudan. The dictionary’s precision varies and its precision is as high as other methods in 
many of the countries, but very low in some of the countries for the ambiguity of place 
names: its precision is low in the United Kingdom (GB) because the country shares many 
place names with the United States (US); stories about gay rights campaigns were 
misclassified into Russia (RU) because the country has a city called “Gay”; many of the 
stories about the former Egyptian president Mohamed Morsi were classified into India 
(IN) because of the Indian city of “Morsi”; many stories on Nigel Farage, a British 
Politician, were classified into South Africa (ZA) because of his first name; Many stories 
on social cohesion were classified into South Sudan (SS) for a state named “Unity”; a 
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large number of stories about the United States were classified into Japan (JP) because of 
a small coastal city called “Obama”. 
  
Figure 2: Precision in the top 20 countries 
 
Figure 3 shows that Newsmap’s recall is higher than or equal to other methods in 
nearly all the countries. Open Calais and Geoparser have similar levels of recall, but they 
are very different in South Sudan (SS). Since Open Calais classifies none of the story 
about the country correctly, its recall is zero, but it is over 0.8 in Geoparser.io. Newsmap 
also suffers in South Sudan, although it is still better than the dictionary. The dictionary’s 
recall figures are much lower than other methods in the United States (US) and the United 
Kingdom (GB), reflecting the misclassification caused by the above-mentioned 
ambiguity; the very low recall in South Africa (ZA) and South Sudan (SS) is due to 
Cameroon’s “South” region. 
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Figure 3: Recall in the top 20 countries 
 
Discussion 
In the experiment, I have shown that Newsmap’s precision is as high as Open 
Calais and Geoparser.io, both of which are equipped with syntactical named-entity 
recognition and contextual place name disambiguation mechanisms. This result suggests 
that weighting geographical traits based on the levels of ambiguity found in a concurrent 
corpus is an effective way of avoiding errors, and that ranking countries by total scores 
of geographical words is very accurate in determining the most strongly associated 
countries. The very low precision of the dictionary in several countries highlights the 
importance of place names disambiguation mechanisms in methods based on unweighted 
word counts as in Geoparser.io. Nonetheless, the dictionary’s precision was as high as 
other methods in countries that have less ambiguous names (e.g. Ukraine, Syria, Iraq, 
Greece and Nigeria). 
The much higher recall of Newsmap, Open Calais and Geoparser.io than that of 
the dictionary suggests that names of people and organizations are very important 
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geographical traits in classification of news, in which widely known entities appear 
without explicit mentions of their home countries. Surprisingly, Newsmap’s recall was 
even considerably higher than that of Open Calais and Geoparser.io. One could argue that 
this result is produced by the particular design of the experiment, but this is not the case. 
The figures are close to those shown in an earlier study conducted by Dlugolinsky et al 
(2013): the precision and recall were respectively 0.80 and 0.67 in recognizing locations. 
There is no surprise that Geoparser.io has roughly the same precision and recall figures 
as Open Calais’s because they utilize very similar technologies. 
The high precision of Newsmap is largely owing to its ability to recognize multi-
word names, because the ambiguity of names is much higher when they are separated 
into single words. While the ability of the other methods to recognize multi-word names 
is constrained by the size of knowledge databases and gazetteers, Newsmap extracted 
various multi-word names from the training corpus. Although Buscaldi (2011) noted that 
the data-driven methods are uncommon in geographical information extraction systems 
due to the lack of manually labelled data despite their technological advantages, 
Newsmap has shown that the lack of training data is not an unsurmountable problem: 
simple keyword matching can be a substitute for manual coding. With the only 800 
manually chosen keywords, Newsmap extracted 68,755 words from the Yahoo News 
corpus, which is an 86-times increase in the size of the geographical vocabulary. 
Simple keyword matching has been the popular approach to geographical news 
classification in media studies, but the dictionary’s poor performance highlights the 
limitation of word counting-based classification, not only in geographical classification 
of news but in other applications. One might argue that its poor performance is due to the 
inappropriate size of vocabulary (either too small or too large) for the task, but 
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determining the optimal size of vocabulary is very difficult: its recall will increase but its 
precision will decrease if the dictionary is larger containing names of smaller cities; its 
precision will increase but its recall will decrease if the dictionary is smaller only 
including the name of the countries and administrative districts. Additionally, the 
heuristic rule to determine the most relevant country in the dictionary method is clearly 
not the reason of the its poor performance, because Geoparser.io performed very well 
based on the same rule. 
Semi-supervised machine learning was utilized only for the geographical 
classification in this study, but nothing seems to limit the scope of its application. In 
general terms, the advantages of the semi-supervised document classification are the high 
degree of control given by a manually compiled seed dictionary, and the high reliability 
of parameters estimated in large training data. These features would solve challenges 
researchers face when they apply unsupervised (e.g. topic models) and fully-supervised 
(e.g. naive Bayes) document classifiers. The benefit of semi-supervised learning becomes 
greatest in multiclass classification tasks, but it is also useful in binary classification tasks.  
The fully automated multi-word feature identification algorithm used in Newsmap 
can also be adapted to other applications since the original purpose of the model was the 
identification of phrasal verbs (c.f. Blaheta & Johnson, 2001). Identification of multi-
word features would improve the classification accuracy of other bag-of-words models, 
not only because it reduces the ambiguity of single words but also because it alleviates 
violation of the independent assumption by frequently cooccurring words (McCallum & 
Nigam, 1998). The solution is identifying multi-word features by the algorithm and 
redefining their word boundaries (i.e. concatenating components of  multi-word features) 
(Lewis, 1998). There are other association measures that can identify occurring words 
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(e.g. pointwise mutual information or likelihood ratio), but only a very few measures can 
be applied to sequences of words in variable lengths (Blaheta & Johnson, 2001). 
Finally, it is worth mentioning problems readers would face in applying the 
geographical classification methods in actual research. As for Newsmap, it requires large 
corpus of news to train a classifier, but, unlike the experiment, where two separate 
datasets were used for training and testing, the same dataset can be used in practice as far 
as it is large enough to cover all the countries the researchers wish to select or exclude.9 
As for Open Calais, its Web API is much more accessible than the open source packages 
in Java, but it is still not straightforward to extract geographical information from its 
output. This is not only due to the large size of its output in XML, but also to the variety 
of geographical labels attached to entities. 10 Further, Open Calais only allows non-
commercial user to call the API 5000 times a day with one to three second intervals. In 
these respects, Geoparser.io’s Web API is much more user-friendly, because it returns 
only geographical information in JSON format, all the countries being identified by the 
standard country code, and it does not impose strict limits on non-commercial users. As 
for the dictionary method, removal of English function words (stopwords) and case-
sensitive match is necessary to reduced false positive classification. The precision figure 
can be 10 points lower without this precaution in this method. 
                                                 
9 If such a corpus is not available, the author is willing to provide the Yahoo News corpus on request. 
10 It required the author to classify labels manually. For example, North Korea has at least four labels: 
“North Korea”, “N. Korea”, “North Korean” and “North korean”. 
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Big Media Analysis: Application of Vector Space 
Models to Document Scaling 
Abstract 
Computerized analysis of media content is often challenging because diverse 
topics in news stories cause high data sparseness. Although supervised machine learning 
techniques usually require large training sets for accurately analysing diverse content, this 
paper proposes the use of vector space models for this purpose. Vector space models, 
such as LSA, NMF, LDA or Word2vec, are used to extract semantic information from 
large corpora fully automatically to reliably estimate parameters for words that rarely 
appear in small training sets. This new technique is illustrated with two examples from 
large-scale content analysis projects: international news agencies’ coverage of the 
Ukraine crisis 2013-2014, and Russian news media coverage of street protests 2011-2014. 
These examples show advantages of the new technique in document scaling over ‘off-
the-shelf’ dictionaries and Bayesian supervised-machine learning techniques.  
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Computerized content analysis has become increasingly popular in social 
research. The forefront of this computerization seems to be political science, where new 
statistical techniques have been created for the analysis of legislative speech transcripts 
or political party manifestos (e.g. Benoit & Laver, 2003; Lauderdale & Herzog, 2014; 
Slapin & Proksch, 2008). Political scientists owe their lead in computerized content 
analysis much to the public availability of political documents in electronic formats. Yet, 
not only political documents have become available in electronic formats in recent years: 
newspaper articles or TV news transcripts have also become available on the internet or 
in commercial databases (e.g., Nexis or Factiva).  
However, computerization in content analysis is still very limited in media studies 
despite the increased availability of electronic data. Several factors explain the slow 
adoption of computerized content analysis for media research, including issues of 
copyright protection of media sources and the qualitative orientation of the field, but the 
great content diversity of news articles explains this slow uptake more: news content 
analysts face greater challenges in computerization, because news articles discuss a wider 
range of topics and views than political documents. The diverse topics and opinions in 
news stories result in a larger variety of vocabulary, thus most documents share only up 
to 1-5% of words with other documents (Phan, Nguyen, & Horiguchi, 2008). Add-one 
smoothing and word stemming have been commonly used to address this data sparseness 
problem in computerized content analysis (Manning, Raghavan, & Schütze, 2008): words 
are given the pseudo count of one regardless of the patterns of their occurrences in the 
data in add-one smoothing, or words endings are mechanically truncated according to 
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pre-defined rules to reduce the variety of word types in word stemming, but these 
techniques supply no extra information that would improve the accuracy of analysis. 
Content analysts face the greatest challenge when they apply supervised-learning 
techniques (e.g., naive Bayes classifier) to media content, because they have to create 
very large training sets to compensate for data sparseness (Manning et al., 2008; Phan et 
al., 2008). While each document contains only a fraction of the total vocabulary, whose 
distribution is highly concentrated around commonly used words that have little 
substantive meaning (e.g. function words), a training set must be comprised of thousands 
of manually labelled documents. In recent years, online crowd sourcing has made creation 
of large training sets easier, but it is not a solution for all the content analysts, because it 
requires payment to participants; moreover, even if funds are available, it is difficult to 
recruit participants for non-English materials.  
 For these reasons, it seems that the dictionary-based method, which is based on a 
long list of manually chosen words, has been most popular in computerized analysis of 
media content to date. For example, Roberts and McCombs (1994) identified media 
agendas in newspaper articles; Kellstedt (2000) analysed the framing of racial issues in 
Newsweek in terms of egalitarianism or individualism; more recently, Segev and Miesch 
(2011) identified the framing of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict in six languages; and 
Young and Soroka (2012) predicated opinion poll results by analysing news coverage of 
a Canadian federal election. Many content analysis dictionaries are also made publicly 
available: the General Inquirer Dictionary (Stone, Dunphy, Smith, & Ogilvie, 1966), 
LIWC (Francis & Pennebaker, 1993), the Regressive Imagery Dictionary (Martindale, 
1975) or DICTION (North, Lagerstrom, & Mitchell, 1999). Yet, adoption of these off-
the-shelf dictionaries raises concerns regarding the validity of measurements, due to a 
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lack of transparency in the dictionary making procedure (Grimmer & Stewart, 2013; 
Neuendorf, 2002).  
This paper presents a new content analysis technique called Latent Semantic 
Scaling (LSS), developed by the author to perform large scale content analysis of English 
and Russian news articles for recently published studies (Author, 2017a, 2017b, 2017c). 
LSS performs document scaling tasks in a similar way to Wordscore (Benoit & Laver, 
2003), but it exploits the efficiency of vector space models (VSMs) to extract semantic 
information automatically from a large corpus (Turney & Pantel, 2010). Most VSMs, 
such as latent semantic analysis (Landauer & Dutnais, 1997) and latent Dirichlet 
allocation (Blei, 2012), are unsupervised techniques, but LSS enables VSMs to become 
semi-supervised or fully-supervised machine learning techniques for theory-driven 
content analysis in media studies. 
In the first half of this paper, I will demonstrate the possibility of applying VSMs 
to document scaling tasks by accurately measuring positive-negative tones of news stories 
on democracy or sovereignty in Ukraine with a semi-supervised technique (c.f., Author 
2017a). To highlight its advantage over existing computerized content analysis 
techniques, I will also apply the Lexicoder Sentiment Dictionary (Young & Soroka, 2012) 
to the same task. In the second half, I will explain how VSMs can be become fully-
supervised document scaling models by analysing Russian-language news stories in terms 
of the framing of street protests (c.f., Author 2017b). The dimension for this document 
scaling is more complex than sentiment, being whether street protests are framed as 
freedom of expression or social disorder. I will also apply Wordscore to the same task to 
show the strength of the VSMs over Bayesian models in analysing media content. 
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VSM for document scaling 
VSMs are very useful in analysing media content, because they automatically 
extract semantic information from a corpus (Turney & Pantel, 2010), but their raw outputs 
are no more than vector representations of words. Therefore, there are two steps in LSS 
before applying a VSM to document scaling: (1) selecting features relevant to the subject 
of interest, and (2) specifying an axis of the document scaling. The feature selection is 
performed with target words, which express concepts on which the researcher focuses, 
and the specification of the axis is achieved with seed words, which define dimensions 
that the researcher wishes to measure. Here, words frequently used in conjunction with 
target words are selected as features, and the feature words used in similar contexts as 
seed words are given large polarity scores. This is a combination of syntagmatic and 
paradigmatic analyses, which have been treated as two different approaches to automated 
synonyms extraction in the literature (c.f., Schütze & Pedersen, 1993; Turney, 2001; 
2003). This combination is advantageous, because syntagmatic and paradigmatic 
analyses capture very different types of the semantic relations of words.  
In implementation of LSS, syntagmatic analysis is performed as collocation 
analysis with fixed word windows, and paradigmatic analysis as latent semantic analysis 
(LSA) with a cosine similarity measure. The document scaling model is essentially a large 
set of subject-specific feature words with continuous scores representing their polarities. 
Although the structure is very simple, it is dissimilar to the products of lexicon expansion 
techniques, which have been developed by computer scientists to generate a large lexicon 
automatically from a small set of pre-defined words (c.f., Liu & Hu, 2004). With the 
continuous scores given to feature words, LSS can adopt Wordscore’s document scoring 
method, making the results more accurate than that of dictionary-based content analysis. 
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The most straightforward application of LSS is sentiment analysis of news on 
specific subjects. In this application, a set of general positive-negative seed words is the 
only manual input to LSS. I will elaborate on how the document scaling technique works 
through construction of a model that measures positive-negative tones in news stories on 
Ukraine’s democracy or sovereignty. This model was utilized in a longitudinal analysis 
of English news stories published by the Russian news agency ITAR-TASS, during the 
2014 Ukraine crisis (Author 2017a, 2017b).  
For the construction of the model, I created a large corpus of English-language 
news stories published by ITAR-TASS, Interfax, and Reuters between January 2013 and 
December 2014, downloading 240,173 full-text articles from news databases. As pre-
processing, I segmented all the news articles into sentences and removed all the 
capitalized words. Sentence segmentation is necessary to prevent collocation analysis and 
LSA from being affected by preceding and succeeding sentences; removal of capitalized 
words is required to limit the impact of proper nouns and adjectives on LSA in inferring 
general meanings of words. 
Feature selection 
LSS utilizes collocation analysis to select features that are strongly associated 
with democracy or sovereignty. The system identifies words frequently co-occurring near 
target words in the corpus. The target words here were ‘democra*’ and ‘sovereign*’, and 
windows size was set to 10. The level of association with target words was measured by 
the likelihood ratio statistic, or g-score (Hoey, 2012). To compute g-scores, the system 
counts the occurrence of a word 𝑤𝑤𝑖𝑖 and all other words 𝑤𝑤�𝑖𝑖 within 10 words (𝑑𝑑𝑖𝑖 ≤ 10) 
from the target words, and constructs contingency tables: 
 𝑑𝑑𝑖𝑖 ≤ 10 𝑑𝑑𝑖𝑖 > 10 
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𝑤𝑤𝑖𝑖 𝑛𝑛1 𝑛𝑛2 
𝑤𝑤�𝑖𝑖 𝑛𝑛3 𝑛𝑛4 
 
With these tables, the system calculates g-scores 𝑔𝑔𝑖𝑖 for 𝑤𝑤𝑖𝑖 by comparing observed 
counts 𝑛𝑛𝑗𝑗  with expected counts 𝑒𝑒𝑗𝑗, which are estimated by the marginal distribution of the 
observed counts in the same way as a chi-square test: 
𝑔𝑔𝑖𝑖 = 2�𝑛𝑛𝑗𝑗 ∙ log �𝑛𝑛𝑗𝑗𝑒𝑒𝑗𝑗�𝐽𝐽=4
𝑗𝑗
 (1.1) 
For the sentiment analysis models on democracy and sovereignty, the system 
selected up to 1,000 features with 𝑔𝑔𝑖𝑖 > 10.83, the critical value for a 99.9% confidence 
level if their observed counts are greater than their expected counts, 𝑛𝑛1 > 𝑒𝑒1. The number 
of features selected through these criteria was 778 for democracy and 626 for sovereignty. 
All the features for democracy seem to be intuitively related to the topic, but there were 
a few financial words, such as ‘debt’ and ‘bonds’, also present (Table 1). These financial 
words were erroneously selected, but they had a limited impact on the final outcomes of 
the content analysis.  
 
Table 1: Top 20 features for democracy and sovereignty 
Rank Democracy G-score Sovereignty G-score 
1 human-rights           8,503.6  integrity         11,446.2  
2 institutions           3,292.0  territorial           8,216.5  
3 law           3,055.1  independence           2,932.5  
4 supremacy           2,938.1  respect           2,097.4  
5 elections           2,649.4  state           2,043.2  
6 reforms           2,505.5  rating           1,681.2  
7 rule           2,494.0  states           1,245.6  
8 values           1,934.9  right           1,223.7  
9 principles           1,572.3  debt           1,200.6  
10 freedom           1,515.7  country              974.2  
11 election           1,486.8  ratings              947.7  
12 standards           1,468.9  independent              880.6  
13 freedoms           1,161.3  bonds              837.1  
14 party           1,151.6  dispute              698.0  
15 society           1,116.5  islands              661.5  
16 country           1,051.3  principles              656.9  
17 political              911.2  non-interference              536.2  
18 free              859.3  national              497.0  
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19 opposition              793.3  internal              493.1  
20 parliamentary              727.8  violation              464.0  
 
 
Word scoring 
The system estimates sentiments of the feature words based on their distances to 
seed words in a latent semantic space. The seed words are a set of general English words 
that express positive or negative sentiment {good, nice, excellent, positive, fortunate, 
correct, superior} and {bad, nasty, poor, negative, unfortunate, wrong, inferior} (Turney 
& Littman, 2003). Although the semantic proximity between words can also be calculated 
in a raw term-document matrix, a latent semantic space enables much more accurate 
estimation, because singular value decomposition (SVD) of a term-document matrix 
reduces noise and sparseness, only leaving essential semantic information (Turney & 
Pantel, 2010). Although earlier studies suggested that feature weighting by tf-idf or PMI 
improves the accuracy of similarity computations in VSMs, feature weighting is not 
performed in LSS as it does not improve results.  
For the sentiment analysis models on democracy and sovereignty, the term-
sentence matrix 𝑋𝑋, which was derived from a large corpus and consists of 270,000 rows 
and over a million columns, was too noisy and too sparse to estimate semantic proximity 
(left in Figure 1). SVD decomposed the matrix into three matrices, 𝑈𝑈,𝐷𝐷  and 𝑉𝑉 , and 
constructed a matrix ?̂?𝑆 with only 300 columns (right in Figure 1): 
𝑋𝑋 ≈ 𝑋𝑋� = 𝑈𝑈𝐷𝐷𝑉𝑉′ (1.2) 
?̂?𝑆 = 𝑈𝑈𝐷𝐷 (1.3) 
With the matrix ?̂?𝑆, the system estimated the sentiments of words taking the mean 
of cosine similarity to each of the seed words: the sentiment score 𝑣𝑣𝑖𝑖 for a word 𝑤𝑤𝑖𝑖 is a 
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mean cosine similarity to seed words weighted by seed scores 𝑝𝑝𝑗𝑗, which are simply +1 
for the positive seed words and −1 for the negative seed words. Here cos (𝑤𝑤𝑖𝑖, 𝑠𝑠𝑗𝑗) denotes 
cosine similarity between two row vectors corresponding to words 𝑤𝑤𝑖𝑖 and 𝑠𝑠𝑗𝑗 in the matrix 
?̂?𝑆. 
𝑣𝑣𝑖𝑖 = 1𝑛𝑛� cos(𝑤𝑤𝑖𝑖, 𝑠𝑠𝑗𝑗) ∙ 𝑝𝑝𝑗𝑗𝑛𝑛
𝑗𝑗
 (1.4) 
 
Figure 1: Notional illustration of dimension reduction by SVD 
 
 
Figure 2 illustrates this word scoring method in a semantic space, where the 
positive-negative dimension (the dotted line) is defined by two sets of seed words, and 
words 𝑤𝑤𝑖𝑖 and 𝑤𝑤2 , are located at different distances from positive seed words but at the 
same distance from negative seed words. Due to their greater proximity to the positive 
seed words, 𝑤𝑤1 gains a higher score than 𝑤𝑤2, reflecting its importance as a word precisely 
on the positive-negative dimension. 
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Figure 2: Concept of spatial word scoring in LSS 
 
Table 2 and 3 present the top 20 most positive and negative words on democracy 
and sovereignty. In both tables, many of the words are intuitively positive or negative, 
but some are not. For example, ‘intensify’ in democracy, is not always used positively, 
but we cannot judge if its score is accurate unless we investigate its usage in the large 
corpus. Also, ‘upon’ in sovereignty is a function word lacking substantive meaning, but 
it could be removed easily if a larger list of stopwords were to be utilized. More 
importantly, roughly the same scores given to different forms of the same words 
(‘strengthening/strengthen’ and ‘strong/strongly’) indicate that the estimation of the 
sentiment the words is accurate (Manning et al., 2008).  
 
Table 2: Most positive and negative words for democracy 
Rank Positive Score Negative Score 
1 normalising 0.0075 bears -0.0142 
2 inter-parliamentary 0.0074 danger -0.0138 
3 tangible 0.0068 fear -0.0129 
4 praised 0.0066 threatening -0.0126 
5 intensify 0.0060 inability -0.0121 
6 strengthening 0.0058 pose -0.0111 
7 strengthen 0.0055 blow -0.0110 
8 establishment 0.0053 themselves -0.0110 
9 co-operation 0.0047 itself -0.0106 
 
 × 
Positive 
seeds 
× Word w2 
× 
Negative 
seeds 
× Word w1 
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10 peoples 0.0045 helping -0.0105 
11 milestone 0.0041 voice -0.0105 
12 consolidate 0.0040 moving -0.0103 
13 contribute 0.0040 strong -0.0103 
14 importance 0.0039 strongly -0.0103 
15 develop 0.0037 watchdog -0.0103 
16 dialogue 0.0037 criticism -0.0101 
17 achieve 0.0034 beacon -0.0100 
18 chairman 0.0034 fragile -0.0099 
19 promote 0.0034 posed -0.0097 
20 upcoming 0.0033 deeply -0.0096 
 
 
Table 3: Most positive and negative words for sovereignty 
Rank Positive Score Negative Score 
1 relations 0.0099 risk -0.0166 
2 allied 0.0069 low -0.0137 
3 normalise 0.0067 threatening -0.0126 
4 strengthening 0.0058 lose -0.0124 
5 mutual 0.0056 default -0.0122 
6 strengthen 0.0055 negative -0.0120 
7 establishment 0.0053 risks -0.0114 
8 positive 0.0047 likelihood -0.0113 
9 peoples 0.0045 wealth -0.0112 
10 unquestionable 0.0042 pose -0.0111 
11 thanked 0.0040 themselves -0.0110 
12 upon 0.0040 survival -0.0107 
13 contribute 0.0040 itself -0.0106 
14 importance 0.0039 consequence -0.0106 
15 develop 0.0037 threatened -0.0105 
16 dialogue 0.0037 loss -0.0104 
17 adherence 0.0033 afford -0.0104 
18 invariable 0.0031 strong -0.0103 
19 pragmatism 0.0030 strongly -0.0103 
20 commitment 0.0029 posing -0.0103 
 
Once sentiment scores are given to the feature words, the LSS model is ready for 
sentiment analysis of news articles. When words 𝑤𝑤𝑖𝑖…𝐼𝐼 occur in a news article a total of 𝑚𝑚 
times, 𝑣𝑣𝑖𝑖 are the sentiment scores of the words, and 𝑓𝑓𝑖𝑖 are the frequency counts of the 
words 𝑤𝑤𝑖𝑖, the sentiment of the news article, or the document score, 𝑑𝑑′ is computed as: 
?́?𝑑 = 1
𝑚𝑚
�𝑣𝑣𝑖𝑖 ∙ 𝑓𝑓𝑖𝑖
𝐼𝐼
𝑖𝑖
 (1.5) 
 
Validation 
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I applied the document scaling model to two samples of news stories (democracy 
or sovereignty) on Ukraine published by the Russian agencies (ITAR-TASS and Interfax) 
to test their validity. I also applied the Lexicoder Sentiment Dictionary, which was created 
originally to analyse Canadian newspapers’ coverage of elections, to the samples as an 
example of an off-the-shelf dictionary. 1 With dictionary-based content analysis tools, 
including Lexicoder, the sentiment score of a document 𝑑𝑑 is the difference between the 
normalized frequency of positive or negative words, which is defined as: 
 
𝑑𝑑 = 𝑛𝑛pos − 𝑛𝑛neg
𝑙𝑙
 (1.6) 
where 𝑛𝑛pos and 𝑛𝑛neg are numbers of positive or negative words in a dictionary, and 𝑙𝑙 is 
the total number of words in the document.  
Figure 3 and 4 compare document scores assigned by computerized content 
analysis (Lexicoder or LSS) with those assigned by manual content analysis.2 In stories 
on democracy, many scores computed by Lexicoder are accurate, although the overall 
correlation is only moderate (r=0.46) due to overestimations of positivity (#6, #16) or 
negativity (#26). In LSS, there are two large errors (#8, #27), but other documents are 
accurately scored, achieving stronger correlations with human scores (r=0.77). In 
sovereignty, however, Lexicoder underestimates the positivity of many documents, but 
                                                 
1 Lexicoder has a negation words handling mechanism, but I adopted the common bag-of-words 
approach. 
2 Raw scores of LSS are rescaled to between −100 and +100. In manual coding, I classified on a five-
point scale {1: very negative, 2: negative, 3: neutral, 4: positive, 5: very positive}, and calculated 
document scores by taking means of sentence scores. 
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extreme cases (#6, #21, #25) are scored very accurately, hugely affecting the correlation 
coefficient (r=0.65). LSS is less accurate in sovereignty than in democracy, creating 
random errors around the regression line, but it still outperforms Lexicoder in this subject 
(r=0.70).  
 
Figure 3: Sentiment of news on democracy 
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Figure 4: Sentiment of news on sovereignty  
 
 
Supervised-VSM document scaling 
I have constructed document scaling models on sentiment with existing seed 
words, but nothing prevents researchers from selecting seed words themselves and 
applying them for their own purposes. However, the manual selection of seed words is 
sometimes difficult to achieve, particularly when one wishes to measure complex 
dimensions in news content. An example of such complex dimensions is the media’s 
framing of street protests as ‘freedom of expression’ vs. ‘public disorder’ (Author 2017c). 
Therefore, I will present a fully-supervised VSM document technique that is based on an 
algorithm that selects seed words automatically guided by manually coded documents.  
In the supervised-LSS, a larger corpus is supplied as external data to aid 
estimations of the parameters for words that do not, or only rarely, appear in a training 
set. As a similar approach, Nigam et al. (2000) proposed an iterative algorithm based on 
a naive Bayes classifier, in which a supervised model is trained on both machine-
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classified and human-classified documents to improve the reliability of parameter 
estimation. Phan et al. (2008) incorporated parameters estimated in Wikipedia pages by 
LDA models into a maximum entropy model trained on manually classified documents 
for the same purpose. Although the techniques proposed by the computer scientists are 
very complex, fitting VSMs to training data in LSS is achieved by a simple forward 
stepwise algorithm, maximizing correlations between manually derived scores and 
estimated scores given to documents in a training set.  
The external data is a corpus of news articles constructed from the same source as 
the training and test sets. I constructed a corpus of Russian-language news stories 
published by state-controlled newspapers and TV broadcasters in Russia (Channel 1, 
NTV, Russia 1, Izvestiya, Komsomolskaya Pravda, and Russian Gazette) between 2011 
and 2014 (Author 2017c). The corpus contains 39,787 full-text news articles or transcripts 
of news casts on street protests. As before, I segmented news articles into sentences and 
eliminated all proper nouns and adjectives from the corpus. 
I took a random sample of 30 news articles from the corpus, and asked three native 
Russian speakers to classify each sentence of the articles on a 5-point scale ranging from 
framing the protests ‘explicitly as social disorder’ to ‘explicitly as freedom of expression’. 
I aggregated the sentence scores to obtain accurate document scores, and then allocated 
the first half of the documents to a training set and the last half to a test set. 
 
Fitting VSM model 
The goal in fitting a VSM to a training set is to discover 5 to 10 pairs of polarity 
words that define the freedom-disorder dimension. Since there are too many types of 
words in the large corpus, two criteria are applied initially to select candidates. First, 
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candidates are only those strongly associated with the target words, which are identified 
by the collocation analysis. This is in fact the same criterion as for the selection of feature 
words. I selected candidates from the top 10% of 10,380 types of words that occur at least 
five times within a 10-word window from “protest” (“протест*”) in the Russian news 
corpus.  
Second, candidates are only those strongly correlated with the dimension without 
being paired with other candidates. To test the level of correlation with the freedom-
disorder dimension quickly, the system calculates pair-wise cosine similarities between 
all the top features in an SVD-reduced matrix, ?̂?𝑆. When cosine similarities for all pairs 
are stored in a symmetric matrix, 𝐷𝐷, it has 𝐾𝐾 = 1,038 columns and rows corresponding 
to the seed candidates 𝑐𝑐𝑘𝑘…𝐾𝐾. Within the matrix 𝐷𝐷, scores for words are found in the 𝑘𝑘th 
row or column vector when word 𝑐𝑐𝑘𝑘 is the candidate: 
𝑑𝑑𝑘𝑘 = 𝐷𝐷∙𝑘𝑘 = 𝐷𝐷𝑘𝑘∙ (2.1) 
The system takes a weighted sum of 𝑑𝑑𝑘𝑘 by the normalized frequency of words in training 
documents to obtain temporary document scores (Equation 1.5), and records their 
correlation with manual scores as 𝑟𝑟𝑘𝑘. These correlation coefficients allow the system to 
prioritize the candidates in the stepwise selection process. I selected only 50 seed 
candidates with the largest absolute correlation coefficient from both sides of polarity in 
the study. Their seed scores 𝑝𝑝𝑘𝑘 are assigned in the following manner: 
𝑝𝑝𝑘𝑘 = �+1, 𝑟𝑟𝑘𝑘 > 0−1, 𝑟𝑟𝑘𝑘 < 0 (2.2) 
Then, the seed candidates are given adjusted scores to make the scoring of 
documents more consistent when they are combined into a single seed set. An adjusted 
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seed score ?́?𝑝𝑘𝑘 is a raw seed score weighted by the inverse of average squared similarity 
to other candidates in the matrix 𝐷𝐷: 
?́?𝑝𝑘𝑘 = 𝑝𝑝𝑘𝑘 ∙ 1
∑𝐷𝐷∙𝑘𝑘
2 ∙
1
𝐾𝐾
 (2.3) 
This adjustment is not only to equalize document scores obtained from the varying 
similarity vectors 𝑑𝑑𝑘𝑘, but also to increase the dispersion of seed words in the semantic 
space. A candidate’s high average similarity to other candidates indicates that it is in a 
dense cloud of candidates in the semantic space, but ideal seed words are diffused in the 
space, covering wide regions of the semantic space. Seed words widely dispersed across 
the semantic space are less likely to overfit the training data. 
With the top seed candidates from both polarities, the system constructs pairs of 
seed words {𝑐𝑐𝑘𝑘, 𝑐𝑐𝑙𝑙}, identifying a partner 𝑐𝑐𝑙𝑙 for 𝑐𝑐𝑘𝑘 such that (1) the partner has an opposite 
polarity, 𝑝𝑝𝑙𝑙 ≠ 𝑝𝑝𝑘𝑘; (2) the model 𝑑𝑑{𝑘𝑘,𝑙𝑙} yields a higher correlation coefficient than before 
the paring, 𝑟𝑟{𝑘𝑘,𝑙𝑙} >  𝑟𝑟𝑘𝑘 and 𝑟𝑟{𝑘𝑘,𝑙𝑙} >  𝑟𝑟𝑙𝑙; and (3) the correlation becomes the strongest with 
the partner, 𝑟𝑟{𝑘𝑘,𝑙𝑙} ≥ 𝑟𝑟{𝑘𝑘,𝑘𝑘� } . Starting from the seed candidate with the largest absolute 
correlation coefficient |𝑟𝑟𝑘𝑘|, all other seed candidates enter this stepwise paring process. 
This process continues until at least five pairs have been found, and new pairs start 
decreasing the overall correlation (this takes around 30 seconds on a laptop computer). 
Table 4 shows seed words that are automatically selected through the stepwise 
selection process. Although it is difficult to judge the suitability of seed words without 
being familiar with the contexts in which they are used, the freedom-of-assembly seeds 
seem to be related to legal or administrative procedures, while the social-disorder seeds 
seem to describe either the attributes or behaviour of protesters. 
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Table 4: Automatically selected freedom-disorder seed words 
Seed word Seed word (English translation) Seed Score 
подали filed 74.7 
сопровождалось accompanied by 58.7 
атаковала attacked 53.8 
бессрочной termless 44.7 
стычки clashes 39.3 
основополагающие fundamental -48.9 
использования utilization -98.1 
подчиняющиеся obeying -130.2 
госпереворот coup -149.0 
нежелания unwillingness -306.0 
 
Validation   
I applied the LSS model and Wordscore to the 15 manually coded news articles 
in the test set for comparison. In Wordscore, when there are 𝐻𝐻  manually scored 
documents, the score for a word 𝑣𝑣𝑖𝑖 is its average frequency weighted by document scores 
𝑑𝑑ℎ in training set: 
𝑣𝑣𝑖𝑖 = � 𝑓𝑓𝑖𝑖𝑘𝑘ℎ ∙ 𝑑𝑑ℎ𝐻𝐻
ℎ
 (2.4) 
where 𝑘𝑘ℎ is the total number of words in the ℎth document. In training the Wordscore 
model, I eliminated words that did not occur more than five times to obtain the best result. 
Figure 5 shows document scores assigned to the training set by LSS and 
Wordscore. Wordscore reproduces scores assigned by human coders (r=0.93) much better 
than LSS (r=0.85); 95% confidence intervals are also very small in Wordscore, indicating 
high confidence in estimated scores. However, LSS (r=0.76) performs much better than 
Wordscore (r=0.39) in the test set (Figure 6). While LSS’s confidence intervals are nearly 
the same size as in the training set, they became much larger in the test set in Wordscore. 
This suggest that Wordscore is affected by sparseness of data, recognizing only few 
features in the test set. 
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Figure 5: Freedom-disorder framing of protests in Russian news (training set) 
 
 
Figure 6: Freedom-disorder framing of protests in Russian news (test set) 
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Discussion 
In the first half of this paper, I demonstrated that a VSM can be easily applied to 
a document scaling task as a semi-supervised machine learning technique: the only 
additional manual input needed was the input of target words in sentiment analysis. The 
result of the document scaling was as good as or even better than the manually compiled 
sentiment dictionary. The LSS model performed better in news stories on democracy in 
Ukraine, because the system extracted words used by the Russian news agencies from the 
corpus, which are different from those used by the North American news media. This 
means that content analysts can construct subject-specific document scaling models for 
sentiment analysis without additional costs in all research projects, avoiding the use of 
off-the-shelf dictionaries, which raise validity concerns when applied to new subjects 
(Grimmer & Stewart, 2013).  
Nonetheless, the LSS model presented here was less accurate in scoring extremely 
positive or negative news stories than the manually compiled dictionary. This is due to 
the LSS’s scoring method, where the polarity of a word is calculated based on its 
proximity to seed words representing both ends of the scale, and where extreme words 
beyond this range do not gain large enough polarity scores. Although the English 
sentiment seed words are widely applicable, their positivity or negativity is still moderate 
compared to the very strong words appearing in Russian newswires. This encourages us 
to discover extra sentiment words to make sentiment analysis more accessible.  
In the second half of the paper, I showed that VSMs can also be employed in a 
fully supervised machine learning technique. Despite the lexical diversity in the Russian 
news stories, LSS replicated manual coding well with only 15 documents in the training 
set. This efficiency is owing to the VSM’s ability to extract semantic information from 
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large corpora fully automatically: all features are selected based on syntagmatic 
association with target words, and they are scored based on paradigmatic proximity to 
each other in the larger corpus. Fitting the VSM to training data is achieved by 
automatically selecting seed words for the given dimension with the novel stepwise 
algorithm. Unlike the earlier techniques (Nigam et al., 2000; Phan et al., 2008) that utilize 
external data to expand models, no parameter is directly estimated from the training set 
and thus there is no need for complex mathematical operations to combine parameters 
from training and external data with the algorithm.  
The comparison between LSS and Wordscore has shown the challenge that 
diverse content of news articles poses for researchers: a very large number of documents 
must be manually coded for supervised techniques that estimate parameters directly from 
a training set. In my attempt to construct the best-performing Wordscore model (r=0.39), 
I had to eliminate words that do not occur more than five times to improve the reliability 
of parameter estimation. As shown in the right panel of Figure 6, when all the words in 
the training set are included in the model, the model does not replicate human scoring at 
all (r=−0.11); when words occurring only once in the training set are excluded, the 
correlation increases to r=0.24. In this way, an increase in the threshold for minimum 
frequency increased the correlation until the minimum frequency became five. The same 
trend was also found when stemming was performed (left in Figure 7). 
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Figure 7: Minimum frequency of words and types of words 
 
 
Nonetheless, introducing the higher threshold for the minimum frequency rapidly 
decreases the number of word types found in both the training and test set (the broken 
lines in Figure 6): there are 1,132 types of words when there is no threshold, but that 
number halves when the minimum frequency is set to two. When the threshold is raised 
to five, only 175 types are left. After this point, the correlation starts falling sharply as the 
model fails to recognize relevant features in the test set. In a Bayesian model, this is a 
bias-variance trade off and the only solution in such a model is to increase the size of 
training data. LSS can also be affected by this type of trade off problem, but it is easily 
solved by providing a large corpus without the need for expensive manual coding. 
Stemming is a commonly-used technique to compensate for data sparseness, but 
the poorer performance of Wordscore when stemming is applied indicates that it is not a 
solution, and is indeed potentially harmful (left in Figure 7). The better practice is to 
estimate parameters separately for different forms, and assign similar values to those 
which have the same meanings (Manning et al., 2008). This is exactly what LSS does by 
estimating semantic relations between words in large external data with a VSM. Its ability 
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to estimate semantic relations accurately is clearly shown in the very close scores given 
to “strengthening/strengthen” and “strong/strongly”. 
 Overall, the successful application of the VSM to content analysis is due to the 
introduction of target words in addition to seed words. In earlier studies, collocations 
analysis and LSA are parallel approaches to synonym extraction (Turney, 2001; Turney 
& Littman, 2003), but this study made clear that these are suitable for different purposes. 
Collocation analysis is effective in extracting subject-specific terms, whereas LSA is 
accurate in identifying synonyms. Both methods are highly scalable, easily extracting and 
scoring subject-specific features with high confidence in corpora that are comprised of 
tens of thousands of news stories. 
Finally, only LSA is utilized as an underlying model for LSS in this study for its 
accessibility, but nothing prevents us from adopting other VSMs (Turney & Pantel, 
2010). Since the emergence of LSA in 1990, other models, such as NMF (Lee & Seung, 
2001) and LDA (Blei, 2012), have appeared; more recently Mikolov et al. (2013) have 
proposed an efficient vector representation of words known as Word2vec. These VSMs 
are based on different distributional assumptions and constraints, but can potentially be 
used as an underlying model for LSS to estimate the semantic relations of words more 
accurately. Therefore, I encourage readers to apply those models to improve the accuracy 
of computerized content analysis of media content. 
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Conclusion 
In this thesis, I have attempted to address the methodological confusion in earlier 
international communication research, in which the predominantly negative 
representation of foreign countries was treated as news bias, regardless of the levels of 
social disruption in those countries. I proposed a new approach to news bias based on a 
difference-in-differences design commonly used in econometrics, whereby news bias is 
measured using a media benchmark. I measured state-ownership bias in Russia’s official 
news agency (ITAR-TASS) utilizing the same country’s commercial news agency 
(Interfax) as a benchmark during the Ukraine crisis. 
It is unusual to choose an international news agency as a case in a study of news 
bias in which research focuses on newspapers and TV news in the context of domestic 
politics, but it was a strategic decision. The complexity of the international news system 
did not allow me to apply a fixed benchmark in order to analyse news bias, while a 
systematic comparison of ITAR-TASS with Interfax allowed me to estimate any bias 
caused by the Russian government’s influence. Russia’s involvement in the crisis also 
allowed me to predict how ITAR-TASS would cover key events in the presence of the 
Russian government’s interventions. The result of the analysis has shown a correlation 
between ITAR-TASS’s coverage of key events and their desirability for the Russian 
government, which suggests that ITAR-TASS’s news coverage was biased because of  
government ownership. 
The most surprising discovery in this study was the strong correlation between 
news coverage by Reuters and that of ITAR-TASS after Russia’s annexation of Crimea, 
considering ITAR-TASS’s role as the government’s mouthpiece and Reuters’ reputation 
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as a leading international news agency. Reuters published news stories which were 
heavily influenced by the Russian government’s narratives that claim the Ukraine 
revolution was a ‘coup’ by fascists, and that the safety of the Russian-speaking minorities 
were threatened by the nationalists over the three-month period following the annexation. 
Through further analysis, I discovered that these news stories were published in the most 
popular online news sites in the United States, Yahoo News and Huffington Post. These 
findings demonstrate how vulnerable today’s international news gathering and 
distribution systems are to the spread of false information. 
Reuters’s dependence on the Russian government for news production at the 
height of the crisis has an important theoretical implication. Based on the cultural 
imperialism thesis (Herman & McChesney, 1997; Schiller, 1991), I expected Reuters and 
ITAR-TASS to cover the Ukraine crisis differently according to their very different 
cultural, economic and political backgrounds, but they did not at the height of the crisis. 
More specifically, I expected Reuters, as a western media corporation, to conduct 
propaganda against domestic and foreign audiences in the interest of the western states, 
while receiving information subsidies from their governments, but the content analysis 
revealed that Reuters, in effect, conducted propaganda for Russia, receiving information 
subsidies from the Russian government. Importantly, Reuters replicated the Russian 
government’s framing of Ukraine in news stories about its democracy, which is one of 
the core western values. 
Reuters became involved in the Russian government’s international propaganda 
because it ostensibly dispatched temporary correspondents to cover the Ukraine crisis. 
However, Reuters’ newly-arrived correspondents were not able to cover the crisis 
independently when it spread from Kiev to the vast eastern regions, drawing a sharp 
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contrast with the independent reporting of Interfax, which has a news service dedicated 
to Ukraine. This suggests that employing temporary foreign correspondents, or ‘parachute 
foreign correspondents’ (Hamilton & Jenner, 2004), in covering rapidly developing 
international crises is dangerous because their lack of local knowledge can be easily 
exploited by non-western (or western) governments who offer handy news materials in 
order to control the international flows of information for political purposes. 
If Reuters was producing the “least expensive mix of content” (McManus, 1994, 
p. 85) by accepting free news materials from the Russian government during the Ukraine 
crisis, we have to reformulate Chomsky and Herman’s propaganda model because the 
case of Reuters suggests that collusion between western media and non-western states is 
possible in a global media economy in which international media corporations’ interests 
are no longer strongly tied to the interests of their home countries. While the propaganda 
model assumes alignment between national borders and corporate interests, the two seem 
more independent of each other in today’s global media industry, as Appadurai (1990) 
argues. By adding this transnational dimension, the new model can be called the global 
propaganda model, which underscores the decreasing relevance of national boundaries 
to the media industry and the diminishing power of the western media in international 
communication. 
I hope this study will become an example of how computation techniques can 
offer new insights into today’s international communication. The volume of information 
that travels across borders can overwhelm even the most resourceful research teams when 
content analysis is performed manually, but I have demonstrated that an individual 
researcher can analyse all the news stories about a major international crisis published by 
multiple news agencies (ITAR-TASS, Interfax, Reuters, AP and AFP) over two years 
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when content analysis is performed computationally. I hope that computational content 
analysis techniques will be widely used in international communication research because 
this seems to be the only way for us to develop new theories based on evidence. 
Computational content analysis helps us not only to develop new theories, but also 
to address real-world problems such the spread of false information on the internet; 
computational analysis of a large body of news stories assists in the identification of key 
expressions in false news stories. Despite this potential, most journalism scholars at 
British universities have not made sufficient effort to adopt computational techniques, 
only accusing technology companies of not preventing the spread of false news on the 
web and in social media. One of a few exceptions is a new joint project by The Reuters 
Institute and The Internet Institute at Oxford University to tackle the spread of 
misinformation by utilizing computational content analysis techniques, but this project 
focuses on science and technology news, not political news. I hope more media and 
communications scholars in the United Kingdom will take an active role in detecting and 
preventing the spread of false political information. 
I focused on international news media in this study, but the methodology 
presented here can also be applied to the study of domestic news media, among which a 
widely-accepted benchmark does not exist because of strong competition between news 
media companies and the fragmentation of media audiences. In fact, I have employed the 
same methodology to analyse Russia’s national TV and newspaper coverage of anti-
government protests during the same period, and revealed the state-controlled media’s 
tendency to report nationalist rallies more positively (Lankina & Watanabe, 
Forthcoming). I believe that other researchers can take a similar approach to measuring 
news bias in various media systems. 
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I have developed two very efficient computational content analysis techniques for 
this study, Newsmap and LSS. Newsmap classifies news articles based on their 
geographical focus more accurately than complex geographical information extraction 
systems. LSS performs sentiment analysis of very specific concepts in news articles as 
accurately as human coders do. These semi-supervised machine learning models allow 
content analysts to train models with little or no manual input, making them very useful 
for large-scale analysis of media content in which data tend to be too sparse for 
commonly-used techniques due the high lexical diversity.  
Nonetheless, I acknowledge that content analysis with computational tools still 
requires a significant amount of manual work, and does not automate content analysis, as 
Krippendorff (2004) correctly pointed out, calling it “computer-assisted content 
analysis”. In fact, my longitudinal analysis with those tools demanded extensive 
background knowledge of the Ukraine crisis in order to interpret the results of the 
computational analysis; both the presence and absence of media attention are important 
indicators of bias, and I needed to know about all of the occurrences and non-occurrences 
of important events during the crisis. This required me to spend a considerable amount of 
time reading news stories published by both western and non-western media, and research 
papers by foreign policy experts, in order to acquire detailed knowledge of the crisis.  
The need for manual reading also came from the limitation of the econometric 
approach to media bias; we could neither assume high stability in the benchmark media, 
nor find multiple benchmarks. Therefore, reading news articles manually around the 
periods in which statistical analysis suggested an anomaly was the only way to make 
substantive claims with confidence. Similarly, I did not resort to time-series analysis in 
this study because lagged correlations in news coverage between ITAR-TASS and 
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Reuters do not necessarily indicate that Reuters was influenced by Russian sources. Since 
flows of information in the international media system are so complex and opaque, I 
believe mixed-methods are still the best approach in this field. 
 My quantitative approach stands in sharp contrast to traditional qualitative 
approaches in which researchers conduct interviews with journalists or observe the 
newsrooms of news agencies (Boyd-Barrett, 2014; Hester, 1974; Paterson, 2011), but it 
should be seen as a complement to traditional approaches rather than a substitute. Those 
qualitative studies offer very important information on how news content is produced, 
while quantitative studies empirically validate the claims made by those who are involved 
in news production. Although no interviews or ethnographic studies have been conducted 
in ITAR-TASS to the author’s knowledge, Boyd-Barret’s (2014) work on Interfax was a 
very important source of information on how the organization operates. In turn, my 
analysis showed that Interfax is much less influenced by the Russian government than 
ITAR-TASS, supporting Boyd-Barret’s (2014) conclusion that Interfax is an independent 
news organization. Especially as obtaining insider information about news organizations 
is becoming more difficult (Paterson & Sreberny, 2004), quantitative analysis is a very 
useful approach. 
 I conclude my thesis here, but there are a few questions that need to be answered 
in my future research. First, I targeted democracy and sovereignty in my content analysis 
because those were key concepts during the Ukraine crisis, not only for western countries, 
but also Russia (D’Anieri, 2015), but the result of the analysis may be highly sensitive to 
the choice of target concepts, and the result could have been very different if an alternative 
concept such as legitimacy had been chosen instead of democracy. Since it is only the 
Russian government that claimed the legitimacy of Yanukovych’s regime, news stories 
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related to this concept could be almost all from Russian official sources in both Interfax 
and ITAR-TASS, making news coverage by those two very similar. This would lead us 
to the conclusion that ITAR-TASS’s coverage of the Ukraine crisis was not biased.  
Second, I focused on the Ukraine crisis as the most important geo-political event 
in Europe in recent years, but the level of bias in ITAR-TASS’s coverage may be different 
for other geo-political events such as the Syrian war, in which Russia started military 
intervention in 2015. I anticipate that the difference between Interfax and ITAR-TASS’s 
news coverage of the Syrian war will be smaller than that of the Ukraine crisis due to the 
lesser strategic importance of Syria to Russia, but this needs be empirically tested by 
content analysing its news coverage over seven years or more using the same 
computational techniques. 
Finally, I analysed ITAR-TASS’s coverage of the Ukraine crisis in terms of 
international propaganda, but Russia’s information strategy seems much broader. After 
its success in international propaganda during the crisis, the Russian government created 
a social-media-friendly news website called Sputnik News, which currently publishes 
international news in over 30 languages from across the world. I must analyse this 
website’s news content to stop false information spreading globally from Russia’s state-
controlled news media online. 
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